One criticism levelled at the F-35 programme is a lack of access to its core technologies and software code for export customers, even leading to recent rumours of a US “kill switch”. As more details of the Boeing F-47 emerge, and Lockheed touts an enhanced-capability F-35, how much (if anything) of their IP will the US share with putative export customers? And could European rival programmes offering a more collaborative approach stand to benefit?

F-35 exports have been a key part of re-equipping NATO and allied air forces with a new combat aircraft, in many cases to replace the venerable F-16. But the F-16 is from a different time, when most customers were happy to receive a standard model with options for small changes... Continues below

This analysis article originally appeared in June's Decisive Edge Air Warfare Newsletter.

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The concept of NATO-standard systems and concurrent development of domestic aircraft meant that US ownership of the design was not contentious. But the reduction in fleets versus the pressing need to maintain national high-tech industrial bases has evolved this equation.

The F-35, then, poses something of an “ownership” problem. Conceived as a multinational programme, the various tier partners – as opposed to mere customers – have a subsystem supplier or other role. UK companies have the largest share by value, reflecting its status as a Tier 1 partner. Italy and Japan, in Tier 2, have negotiated final assembly and check-out facilities and can in theory build their own aircraft from standard parts.

Other nations have been awarded local component supply or service roles. But none has real, deep access to core systems and software, which remains American and specifically in the purview of Lockheed Martin. BAE Systems, the major non-US equipment provider, has the plug socket details for its contribution, but does not know what goes on behind the panel. Meanwhile, the ODIN support system, managing global spares, remains under US control.

This flies in the face of what should be a shared product. Defence history is rife with sales of standardised systems, but also local modifications. Israel is arguably the leading example of the “local variant” approach. As a very capable technology developer with a degree of neutrality outside its own region, it has achieved significant market position by adding its sensors, control systems and weapons into a range of aircraft.

India, which operates aircraft from across all major exporting nations, is famously a significant consumer of Israeli “tweaks”. Russian-, French- and British-supplied aircraft have all been modified to a greater or lesser extent. Indeed, one reason for Dassault’s successful export of its Rafale was a liberal position on India using Israeli elements in place of standard French equivalents

But limiting customer access to source software – which would be necessary for deep modification – mitigates a major risk to the F-35 programme. Russia and China would dearly love a copy of the aircraft’s system elements, as this would reveal a host of strengths and weaknesses.

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This ties in with Turkey’s removal from that programme over the issue of Ankara buying Russian surface-to-air missile systems; Washington was concerned that its flagship fighter flying daily over Russian radars would enable the latter to build a detailed picture of the aircraft. Such an addition to the “threat library” would be invaluable to Russia’s military if it faced the F-35 in combat.

A third party accessing the equivalent in the software sphere would be holding the keys to the electronic treasure chest. Dassault felt it could risk opening up some black boxes for India. Lockheed had also done the same – within reason – to Israel for the latter’s F-35 fleet, but Tel Aviv is always an exception in US eyes. No one else expects the same favour.

The USAF’’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft – to be the crown jewel in its crewed combat fleet – was last month awarded to Boeing, a fillip urgently needed for a company that has had some torrid recent years. Details remain scarce, but a new, likely tailless design has been implied by elements revealed to date.

Lockheed, which also submitted a bid, choose not to contest the contract but instead offer a significant upgrade to the F-35. In theory, if such an effort is sponsored, it should be available for overseas customers. Clearly, however, they will simply have to accept the modifications and barring a significant change in policy will not be able to fine-tune their aircraft to meet local needs.

A throwaway remark by President Trump might therefore be of interest as a counterpoint. The contract for what has been designated the F-47 was introduced by the Commander in Chief at a wider briefing. Here he made two comments. One was that the older F-22 air superiority fighter would be receiving a massive upgrade to become a “Super Raptor”. The other was that in time the US might consider exporting the F-47 but, as he put it, “with a 10% degraded capability”.

It would be wise not to read too much into this statemen; Trump has never been renowned for factual accuracy, but this does raise an interesting theoretical position. In the 1990s there was significant interest in an export version of the F-22; Japan, Israel and Australia all made noises about a willingness to buy. However, the platform was seen as too important and secret even for use by close allies. Not even a “downgraded” version was offered.

Subsequently, the F-35 was opened up to general partnership and purchase, but with the caveats above concerning access to core technology. It has never been indicated that export F-35s are in any way “downgraded”. Is there a possibility, then, that a nominal F-47E (for export) might walk a line where some critical systems are removed but customers could replace these with an alternative of their own choice?

This might seem like leaning far much on one off-the-cuff statement. However, there are other aspects that support this possibility. First, the Americans are somewhat annoyed with Japan’s (and to a lesser degree, Italy and UK’s) decision to pursue an NGAD equivalent in the Future Combat Air System (FCAS). It was hoped that Tokyo might reinforce its US defence links rather than join with competing providers.

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Possibly adding to the sense of concern is that all three FCAS partners are F-35 operators. That could be coincidental or might suggest they are less than happy with the US approach to high-end defence exports. None has been given any modification opportunity. Japan, hosting a final assembly site, has reportedly come to regret this as an unprofitable white elephant (though Italy seems convinced its equivalent has worked well).

Another recent event also has suggests that there is something moving under the surface. In May the UK’s Royal Aeronautical Society hosted its FCAS Summit. At this, representatives from the UK, Italy and Japan gave briefings on the joint programme. A point echoed by all three speakers was that participants would retain the means and the right to develop independent versions of the aircraft. While it was hoped that the nations and their industries would be mutually supportive, there will be no restriction on access to systems and software. 

This was in contrast with the panel of French military and industry personnel who spoke on the rival European SCAF programme, run in collaboration with Germany, Spain and Belgium. Their comments implied a noticeably more F-35-type model of a primary developer (France) plus its three “customers” rather than promoting equality of participants.

It is not clear what effect any of the above will have on the fighter market. Customers are used to being thick-skinned, and the simplest path of least resistance is most likely. But Australia or even Canada are examples of nations that would dearly like to recover some of their domestic high-end defence industry and F-35 really has not delivered on this. Should FCAS, with its stated goal of mutual access between partners, extend its hand to others, it might prove a beguiling offer.

One statement by a politician on a project in an early stage and about which he is not particularly knowledgeable is not a strong basis for a complicated argument and solid conclusions. But coming as it did with a direct comparison to the desired but un-exported F-22, the generally restricted nature of F-35 participation, France’s relatively open example approach with Rafale (if not SCAF) and the UK-Italy-Japan emphasis on equality of status, it nevertheless strikes something of a chord across the combat aircraft market.

A derated export F-47 might still be a figment of the imagination, but following the F-35 experience a more open approach to customer requirements might be a canny way to bring said customers back to the US fold and mitigate the industrial threat of rival sixth-generation offerings. In the up-ended year of 2025, anything seems possible.

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