While the F-47 could most likely be adapted into a carrier-capable fighter, there would be inevitable compromises. (Image: USAF)
Will the US Navy be forced to take a navalised F-47 under F/A-XX?
The USAF recently flew its second pre-production B-21 Raider strategic bomber. The programme office and Northrop Grumman had given confident but measured releases concerning the platform’s progress. On several occasions the phraseology centred around a “hope” for the aircraft’s flight by the end of 2025.
Clearly, this has been exceeded by a significant margin and is in welcome contrast to the litany of delays most programmes manage. This fact will also be of great interest to the naval air arm, for whom Northrop seemed likely to be its next combat aircraft champion... Continues below
This analysis article originally appeared in September's Decisive Edge Air Warfare Newsletter.
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UCAVs aside, the US has at present three major new combat aircraft programmes: B-21; the F-47 fighter for the air force; and F/A-XX for the navy. In terms of dividing up the procurement pie, it was assumed that Lockheed Martin would be awarded F-47 and Boeing, responsible for the F/A-18, would develop its carrier-borne replacement.
It was therefore slightly surprising when Lockheed dropped out of the navy competition and was beaten by Boeing on F-47. Lockheed has offered a “super F-35” as an alternative. Given that the current Block 4, which was in some ways supposed to be “super-ish”, is now years late and might quietly be downscaled in capability, that is not an easy sell.
For the navy – also an F-35 customer – this is not great news, nor to a degree is the ending of F/A-18 production, although some comfort is to be drawn from the new uncrewed tankers and UCAVs that are nominally in the pipeline.
But what it did seem to mean, though, was that a new carrier strike aircraft must be on the horizon and would emerge from one of two primes associated with legendary naval aviation history: Northrop Grumman (Grumman) or Boeing (McDonnell Douglas).
However, things are not so simple and the policies of the current US administration seem at best opaque. The F-47 appears to have funding, as clearly does the B-21. However, money for F/A-XX in the 2026 budget has become the proverbial football.
The Pentagon, articulated through Secretary of Defense (War?) Hegseth, had wished significant cuts to F/A-XX, favouring other programmes including F-47, but Congress in a counterproposal asked for around $1 billion for 2026. A not dissimilar opposing set of positions formed over Hegsgeth’s call to drop USAF E-7 AEW acquisition in favour of a new space-based network. In a small spot of irony, the air force might receive a sympathy gift of navy E-2 AEW aircraft in lieu of its preferred E-7s. Few consider this a good idea.
These political debates are inevitable, but from the navy’s perspective a few worrying trends are starting to appear: the USAF seems to have its new bomber and fighter funded; it has a variety of UCAVs and similar on the way; it has a new trainer (Boeing-Saab T-7); it has new ordnance lined up (some shared/joint) so overall many of its requests have been granted. That is a lot of money invested, allocated and being spent.
Meanwhile, early USN Super Hornets are getting old and are worked very hard; F-35Cs will not receive their promised upgrade any time soon; the new CMV-22 transport remains restricted in operation and has been supported by the ancient C-2 it was supposed to replace. It also does not have a new trainer to replace the antiquated T-45 Goshawk, and to the horror of many it has been suggested that the new type will not need to land on aircraft carriers as a land-based deck mock-up will suffice.
For the Western world’s primary maritime defence and strike force, this all seems discouraging, especially when set against China’s acceleration of its nautical endeavours. Many of these problems are not new, but 2026’s budget uncertainty is arguably the (sour) cherry on the cake.
What can the navy do? Energising a pushback on F/A-XX funding is clearly the tactical goal, but there is an unsettling precedent hovering in the background.
The CMV-22 mentioned above is a modified version of the V-22 Osprey, developed initially for the US Marine Corps and has received very mixed reviews in its carrier logistics role. Over the C-2 or large helicopters such as the CH-53 it does offer benefits in terms of carriage vs speed vs range vs flexibility. But it is a complicated and expensive solution to what was traditionally a simple supply mission, with the tiltrotor now absorbing funding and energy that might have better been spent elsewhere.
The suspicion that the programme was driven less by suitability but rather the ghost of “merging and consolidation”, best known from the McNamara years, is not without basis. F-35 was conceptually based such a view and is an object lesson in how not to fuse differing requirements into one airframe; all three service operators have been burned.
It is yet to be seen whether the CMV-22 will escape the “failing everyman” trope, but if one accepts the view that the F-35 programme was (or might be) a success and the tiltrotor was the right decision, then the obvious next stop on this train of thought is to complete a “joint” trinity with a new sixth-generation multi-service combat aircraft (marines not invited).
Before exploring how this might develop, it is worth laying down some assumptions. The B-21 is off the cards, being wholly unsuited for maritime operations and far too large. The new trainer is most likely a navalised T-7 – made easier if the requirement for carrier landings is waved off – or another extant design like the Textron M-346 in collaboration with Leonardo.
Next, the navy will receive a UCAV/buddy-tanker in the form of the MQ-25 or equivalent. Following this, some kind of collaborative wingman with supersonic performance and autonomy will follow, probably with USAF overlap at systems level if not higher. But the merging of two crewed fighter programmes is another matter.
Modern combat aircraft are a series of compromises and trade-offs. The higher the performance or niche mission requirements, the more complicated and precise becomes this balancing act. Fighter aircraft can look interchangeable – Rafale, Eurofighter and Gripen spring to mind – but while Zeitgeist-y design approaches do play a part (here, the canard/delta approach) key requirements differ and this element may be less obvious.
In the case of land vs naval fighter assessment, the problem is essentially one of airframe strength and durability as well as redundancy and sustainability. Naval flying is hard and places enormous stress on aircraft, crew and onboard systems. With the distances involved and lack of alternative landing options, such jets must be damage-resistant and able to operate or at least recover to base after major system failures. Finally, the small spares space on a carrier means the aircraft must be low maintenance.
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All the above are also of benefit to a land-based aircraft, but not nearly to the same extent. As a basic example, “carrier-proofing” an aircraft increases airframe weight, which reduces thrust-to-weight ratio and increases wing loading. Clever airframe design might mitigate this, but only to a degree. The carrier aircraft needs to handle well at low airspeeds where its land-based equivalent does not. That dictates wing design, whether vertical tails are required and how they are shaped.
These are simply general pointers; the detailed list goes a lot further. One of the naval CMV-22’s issues has been icing, which is also a land-based aircraft problem, but not to the same extent or posing as much danger as when on naval operations.
Despite these factors, it remains a medium-level probability that the programmes will be merged. The likely historical analogy will be the F-4 Phantom, the tri-service stalwart of the Cold War. Unfortunately, it is arguably the only successful example of a large and complicated aircraft attaining such status.
The A-4 and A-7 served with distinction, but were relatively small and cheap platforms. Efforts to navalise top-end fighters, including the F-16, all failed. Meanwhile, the USAF did not want F-8 Crusaders, A-5 Vigilantes, E-2 AEW aircraft and other models. Sometimes this was for the practical reasons stated above, other times out of rivalry or sheer bloody-mindedness. The catastrophic money and logic sink that was the F-111B (a carrier fighter version of a USAF bomber) still casts a long shadow. F-35 is not helping much either.
However, more cheerful conclusions can also be drawn. First, it actually can be done with a bit of effort and luck. The obvious example is the F/A-18 which was redesigned as a carrier-capable aircraft and although not entirely optimised for the role, has performed well. The CMV-22 is not the abomination some claim and, with a favourable wind, could become a very useful part of the fleet. Finally, if anyone were to doubt that an aircraft can do most things at least once, the landing of a C-130 on the carrier USS Forrestal demonstrated that naval use of a land aircraft can exceed expectations. As well as common sense.
Is the amalgamation of F/A-XX and F-47 possible and how should the navy view such a prospect? The short answer is: “With some concern”. Despite a few successful examples, the general outcome of such efforts is trade-offs and loss of key performance. The air force might get away with it, but the naval variant is likely to bear the brunt of the compromises.
However, this is all viewed through the lens of airframe commonality. What has tended to offer far better return on investment is collaborative development below platform level. There is a reason many new military systems carry the term “joint” in their title: they are genuinely intended to spread development load and reduce risk.
One of the F-35’s success stories is its standard engine, sensors and software (from a commonality perspective) which keeps the fleet at a higher degree of interoperability. Just as the F-14 and F-15 eventually shared GE’s F110 engine, so the F-47+F/A-XX approach could more easily be built around a new generation of powerplant, radar, communications, weapons and software than it could around airframe design.
At this point in time the supplier base for high-end physical systems has dwindled, making such an approach almost a de-facto one. Rapid software development involving semi-commercial providers can also be used by both aircraft without core compromises on design and hence capability. Since the sourcing will be largely US, this does not create the political- industrial squabbling that would undoubtedly occur were the European GCAP and SCAF programmes to attempt something similar.
Obvious as this approach might sound, it has never really been a cornerstone of multi-aircraft, multi-user thinking. But it is a neutral way in which development budgets can be shared with an output that is of benefit to both programmes and wider platform advancement. The knee-jerk reaction has usually been to assert control of airframe design, driven by a mixture of precedent, emotion and rivalry.
But, as noted above, this has at best a mixed history. A scalable radar based on common transmit/receive modules, integration, interface and software is arguably a far better example of joint-ness. Far simpler to say than do, but lower risk and probably more useful not to mention acceptable.
It is unclear how the political debate will develop and to what degree 2026’s budget will see a reallocation of funding to F/A-XX. The USN is rightly nervous that its requirements will be de-prioritised. But a focus on the guts of the aircraft, not the form, with software being one of the most vital organs, would be useful and mature. Certainly, it would be a good position from which to request autonomy in platform design.
The naval air arm seems to have friends in Congress, and escorting these through a balanced and mature focus on combining system-level spending is a strong – if not guaranteed – approach to separating its aircraft from that of its air force brethren.
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