Developing the uncrewed CCA and integrating it with in-service aircraft and technologies may be a better use of USAF resources in the short term than pressing ahead with a full system of systems. (Image: Northrop Grumman)
Why pressing ‘pause’ on the USAF’s NGAD programme actually makes sense
July was a difficult month for the USAF’s now ‘paused’ flagship Next Generation Air Defense (NGAD) programme. A rethink of priorities seems inevitable and (perhaps surprisingly to some) would be eminently sensible.
Coming amid the long saga of the F-35’s Technology Refresh 3/Block 4 upgrade and continued uncertainties over future crewed vs uncrewed force ratios, NGAD’s ‘system of systems’ approach – a blanket term for what often in reality is ‘TBD’ – has entered what appears to be a new phase... Continues below
This analysis article originally appeared in August's Decisive Edge Air Newsletter.
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While not being specific, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall suggested last month that current planning is moving towards a smaller, simpler aircraft, with possibly a more conservative approach to aspects such as the adaptive cycle engine that was supposedly a key part of NGAD.
Details are limited, but the phrase ‘taking a pause’ does suggest some fundamental revaluation of the entire concept.
The programme’s key uncrewed element, the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) seems relatively untouched by this, and the reasonable inference is that its agnostic nature means it is likely to remain on course.
Indeed, Northrop Grumman recently revealed what is termed the Model 437. Surprisingly, this featured a cockpit that would allow testing to be undertaken with direct human input as well as fulfilling certain ATC requirements. The design is almost certainly intended – cockpit likely aside – for a CCA offering.
Resolving the F-35’s TR3/Block 4 issues is also imperative. It could be argued that further NGAD development work makes no sense until these solutions are ironed out. (Photo: USAF)
The current US – and global – crewed combat aircraft market offers good scope for debate as to how programmes may or may not proceed. F-35 is moving, albeit slowly, while legacy platforms are undergoing something of a renaissance. The US is virtually alone in its enthusiasm for true strategic bombers, so these account for a significant proportion of budget not mirrored in other forces.
But, across wider operational scenarios, the CCA concept matches many ambitions, including long-range strike. Hence the B-21 investment is not mutually incompatible with this or similar efforts, unlike NGAD against which the bomber is competing for attention. Meanwhile, sensors, communications, materials and engine technology developed for a given CCA can all be used on differing platforms (IP and similar contractual issues notwithstanding).
It would be sensible to suppose that CCA is on firmer ground than the crewed platform, given that the former has a greater notional customer base across the force. Nevertheless, software development issues and/or a change in the AI confidence curve may still alter this trajectory.
What then might be the reason for the new uncertainty over the crewed aircraft and how might this be reflected in contemporary ‘6th Gen’ vehicles? The first and most obvious cause is money. Kendall’s comment concerning simplicity is an obvious suggestion that a project that begins with an accepted per-platform posited cost of three F-35s is no longer acceptable.
Veteran aviation journalist Bill Sweetman’s May 2024 book on JSF, the provocatively titled Trillion Dollar Trainwreck, has some clues as to why this might be. But there is also the sensible concern about launching down a track from which it is extremely expensive to shift.
NGAD should not have the complexities of differing ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ variants, but the design will be expensive and the prospect of yet another delicate, low-availability, high-cost-per-hour platform is understandably daunting.
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However, the investment hesitation remains as much a symptom as a cause. Questions of mission priority, capability, size, weight or range remain difficult to answer. For defence planners and those scoping advanced projects, current operations in Ukraine and across the Middle East are providing reams of information in almost real time.
This data, of course, carries its own embarrassment of riches problems, fuelling the natural concern that any given decision on specifications might prove incorrect when set against tomorrow’s report from the front line.
There is also something not obvious in the reports, but which remains a source of unease: the F-35 has its benefits, but Israel has tended to prefer using its other aircraft, while the Ukrainian theatre’s logistics situation would make it difficult to operate the type.
GCAP and SCAF partners will be keeping a close eye on US 6th-gen developments as their own programmes enter the hardware phase. (Photo: GlobalCombatAir)
It is also strongly tied to runways, something specifically referenced by Kendall as an NGAD concern, but one primarily with eye on China, a foe not so topical in the current reporting cycle. The generally held view that NGAD would be of ‘F-22 or larger’ size reinforces this support and basing issue. Russia has lost a lot of aircraft on the ground, and Israel and Taiwan are extremely mindful of this.
As NGAD is supposed to be forward deployed (versus the B-21’s largely US-based operations), these requirements will be difficult to square; currently only Saab’s Gripen can claim useful rough-field operational capability, and NGAD will not be a Gripen.
The July musings on NGAD’s position are echoed by the USN’s changed budgetary attitude to its own 6th Gen F/A-XX, where authorised funding might prove a fraction of the annual circa $500m expected.
With the concurrent ending of F/A-18E/F production and the F-35 development saga, not to mention T-45 issues and other wider concerns, delaying investment until a strong consensus is reached makes some sense. The navy and air force have differing priorities and mission requirements, but they likely share concerns over operational primacies as well as a calculation on the maturity of the key technologies (sensors, software, weapons, engines).
The ongoing F-35 powerplant debate and the downstream impact on availability of new turbofan designs is a particular issue: re-engining a delicate package such as a modern fighter aircraft is bordering on the impossible, so that box needs to be ticked very early on.
Should either programme proceed, it is possible that a developed version of the crewed design will remain in service for 50 years. Making the wrong choice now, amid competing and conflicting China, Russia or MENA scenario requirements, is understandably daunting. Kendall emphasised this with a comment about this point being pivotal as a ‘last chance to think carefully’ about what is needed.
So much for the known unknowns. But are there any new firm facts on these programmes and what might be made of their European GCAP and SCAF rivals?
It has been speculated that early test examples of NGAD have been built and possibly flown. Inferring from Kendall’s comments, the following basic aspects seem likely unchanged: although the aircraft will be twin-engined, the size/range/payload issue remains under debate within a general view that ‘high and fast’ will be a key aspect.
A failure to decide on the new F-35 engine and associated future technology is restricting possible performance, while the current position of F-35 Block 4 and B-21 leaves the software interoperability aspect a thorny subject.
From such shadowing outlines it can be stated with some certainty that NGAD will not be single-engined, it will be bigger than an F-35, it will be smaller than a B-21, it will have to super-cruise and battlespace control of CCA will be key. But it should also not be a costly hangar queen, software updates should be seamless and deployed operations should not be horrendously risky.
Given that much of the above is contradictory, a ‘pause’ sounds like the sensible option. With other more immediate procurement concerns for the DoD’s aviation arms, a ‘99 problems but 6th Gen ain’t one’ approach garners sympathy. Meanwhile, the uncrewed aircraft that will be a key part of the system appear for now to be making progress. Integrating these with current and developing aircraft and weapons, given the likely calls on US forces and their budgets, makes a lot of sense.
Over in Europe (and Tokyo), the GCAP and SCAF teams will doubtlessly be viewing this with close concern. Neither programme is a replication of American efforts, while both cannot help but be influenced.
The US has money to burn that the rival teams cannot hope to enjoy, as well as enjoying a priceless, intrinsic homogeneity. While the UK, Italy and Japan are all F-35 operators, all appreciate their heavy twin-engined fighters, and have a mixed continental/maritime operations interest they are nevertheless different in outlook.
SCAF members should be cohesive, but France as both the lead and the outlier risks significant operational disagreements not to mention political squabbling. The latter’s requirement – thus far – that SCAF be carrier-capable cannot have improved the atmosphere.
NGAD being ‘on a break’ was perhaps almost inevitable. It is not a priority and it should not be: there are far bigger problems to fix in US combat air. Getting Block 4 in shape is not only necessary, but will demonstrate that the procurement and development system can actually work (eventually). Once that plus the engine issue are decided, stronger ground exists for a decision on a next-generation aircraft.
These solutions will help settle the question of what should it be by providing an answer as to what can it be. The world wonders, and watches with great interest.
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