Above: Italy will embark F-35s on the Trieste, but the ship will not be as capable as a US-style fleet carrier. (Photo: Italian Navy)
When is an aircraft carrier not an aircraft carrier?
Aircraft carriers drift in and out of fashion. Crucial behemoths of the Cold War (at least on one side) to costly, vulnerable relics, to useful soft power tools, and then outdated because the future is all drones.
The UK Royal Navy for example got rid of its conventional carriers, then decommissioned the ski-jump Hermes and Invincible.Replacements – the two-strong Queen Elizabeth class – were always a solid bet, but these went through a variety of planning processes and U-turns, mostly concerning their embarked F-35s. Essentially, for a while the UK backed out of the whole force type.. Continues below
This analysis article originally appeared in November's Decisive Edge Air Warfare Newsletter.
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Meanwhile France maintained its single nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle and although it would have been operationally sensible, never matched this with a second vessel. The US continues its policy of multiple large CVNs, with the Gerald R Ford class commissioned in 2017. Italy has nominally two examples (Cavour and Trieste), Spain one (Juan Carlos II) and Turkey so far only one (Anadolu).
The major difference, and the one to which a casual observer might point, is that the large US carriers have catapults and arrester wires for what is termed catapult-launched but arrested recovery (CATOBAR). This is necessary for the operation of large aircraft. The other vessels listed above do not.
Should they all be considered aircraft carriers? All “carry aircraft”, ergo they are “aircraft carriers” and can prove this by their full “flat top” decks. But this is an observation of output (that they can deploy fixed-wing aircraft) rather than a statement of intent (that they provide the traditional strategic maritime aviation capability).
The latter concept is more nuanced. Common terms used would be “power projection” or “sea base”, which denotes a significant, land-independent capability to take the fight to an enemy or protect significant assets. Here complications arise.
To widen the debate, there have been multiple mixed-role vessels that also carried aircraft for a variety of tactical missions. Many such designs have disappeared, but some have remained fashionable. These have multiple designations but are generally grouped into landing helicopter assault (LHA) or landing helicopter dock (LHD) types.
These differ in the latter having a well deck (the “dock”) at the stern that can be flooded for the operation of amphibious assault craft. The USN’s Wasp and larger America class are the generally cited example of the LHA, while France operates Mistral-class and Italy new Trieste-class LHDs.
While these vessels have a lineage back to the old “light” or “escort” carrier, the confusion is to some degree the fault of the Harrier and Sea Harrier. As cited above, the carrier is supposed to have a full deck for the operation of combat aircraft. Yet the Falklands War was fought using far smaller ships, lacking the large flight deck and deploying the compact but capable Harrier family.
The RN would justifiably claim that these were “aircraft carriers”, while a US Tomcat pilot might demur. The F-35B – vertical and/or short take-off and landing (V/STOL) model has increased this confusion.
The new Italian Trieste is acknowledged as an LHD. But when the author was fortunate enough this month to have a tour, the captain was most interested in his F-35B operational capability timeframe. It can and does carry helicopters and landing craft, but it was the combat aircraft power projection that formed the centre of the conversation.
This might sound like a circular argument, were it not for the ongoing evolution of technologies and concepts of operation. A common view is that uncrewed aircraft are the future, and indeed significant progress has recently been made on fighter-type examples. Some of these clearly can be used for naval operations.
Another concurrent development is uncrewed strike aircraft with a secondary role as aerial tankers. The latter take away the burden of using crewed combat aircraft to refuel other fighters (buddy tanking) to increase the range and endurance of a unit on a combat mission. For many reasons this is an extraordinarily inefficient use of – for example – USN F/A-18s.
But one underlying point of this crewed/uncrewed integration is that a large traditional aircraft carrier might no longer be required. Fighter-sized UCAVs need less space and in general less support, reducing the size of the ship needed. While a large and powerful vessel maintains its utility, it is extremely costly to build and complex to maintain. The USN’s Ford class is an order of magnitude more expensive than the Wasp or Italy’s Trieste.
They can also encounter technical problems: President Trump’s threat to personally cancel by decree the USN’s new EMALS carrier catapult launch system is an outlier, but it has been troublesome, significantly raised budgets and reduced operational efficiency. It is something of a shorthand for the running of a carrier programme.
Does this really matter? The US has the budget and technical wherewithal to overcome most problems of this nature. It can send these powerful vessels and air wings to trouble spots and rival many land-based air forces. These have been continually used and useful and by any comparative measure the European F-35B-focussed vessels are nowhere near as potent, although when deployed the Charles De Gaulle is a very strong asset.
However, a new element has crept into the conversation in the form of the People’s Republic of China. While the Soviet Union only managed a single operational example of what could possibly be termed an “aircraft carrier” (the unlucky and much-derided Kuznetsov), Beijing is on a wholly different course: if imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, the PRC is in full seduction mode.
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This rise of Chinese naval power brings us back to the initial point of the article: are aircraft carriers back in fashion and is there in reality a useful definition? Clearly China believes strongly in the first and is exploring the envelope of the latter. Its first carrier, the Liaoning (ex-Soviet Kuznetsov class) was the baby step.
It used a short take-off but arrested recovery (STOBAR) system, combining the “ski-jump” forward deck seen in smaller Western carriers with wires across the aft deck to decelerate the landing aircraft. It has no LHD-style well deck and does not embark the helicopter contingent of an LHA. But it lacks the catapult and large air wing – plus ability to sustain – of a Ford-class CVN.
This has been joined by the domestically developed Fujian (that, not being subject to Oval Office whims, does feature EMALS catapults) and a far larger air wing including the J-35, which most people agree is something of an F-35C copy.
A still-larger vessel, at present known only as Type 004, is due for completion some time before 2030. It is suspected that like the large US carriers, it will be nuclear-powered (which provides more energy for EMALS and other systems). Sister ships are highly probable.
Concurrent with this is the upcoming Type 076 (believed to be the Sichuan, first of the Yulan class). This is an LHA, comparable to the America class referenced above, but is even larger. Developed from the earlier Type 075, the newer vessel’s final configuration is the subject of debate. But it is very large and the suggestion that it will also have EMALS is by no means impossible. Yet it seems too small to embark the current range of crewed Chinese fighters.
So, is it an aircraft carrier, or is it possibly the first of the “drone mothership” types that have for several years been postulated? This is a worrying development. The point of modern UCAVs is to provide significant mass and depth without the need for valuable and vulnerable crews. Should this and other Chinese carriers field 100 or 200 aircraft of the G-11 Sharp Sword UCAV type it could challenge (although not necessarily defeat) the US’s prized CVNs.
While the prospect of Chinese carrier groups plying the world’s oceans is of great concern to US planners, these new vessels also raise a problem much closer to Beijing’s home waters. The term “anti-access/area denial” (A2AD) is usually a description of the Chinese strategy for defence of the South China Sea, particularly around Taiwan.
The DF-21 ballistic missile, often credited with anti-aircraft-carrier accuracy (ie against US vessels), is a cornerstone. Should the PRC manage to deploy these new vessels, and should it develop a mass UCAV capability that could deploy under a DF-21-plus-land-based aircraft umbrella, the prospect of a successful invasion of Taiwan increases significantly. Concurrently, the disputed atolls and shoals in the region would likely fall under the shadow of strong Chinese naval power projection.
This force might not be able to defeat the entire US Navy, nor threaten the continental United States, but for the American military there is likely a nasty “1941” feeling to all of this.
The takeaway from this last analysis is that, while the debate over CVN/CV/LHA/LHD as “aircraft carriers” is fairly open among allies, the envelope is being pushed by potential foes. Japan, South Korea and India have examples of the former vessel classes, grouping them in a relatively conventional manner. But – so far – only China is putting significant resources into what should be seen as a carrier of aerial systems rather than what is traditionally meant by “aircraft carrier”.
This has its shortcomings, at least in the medium term, and might be better suited to home waters rather than expeditionary operations, but several hundred modern UCAVs launched from a mobile sea base is a cause for concern. As land- and sea-based air fleets slowly increase their uncrewed components, ships such as the Type 076 have a certain chilling logic.
They outnumber and possibly out-range naval F-35B components, and would be a severe threat to smaller CVNs such as Queen Elizabeth or Charles De Gaulle. Should Western navies follow suit? As with land-based UCAVs, these aircraft lack the “romance” of traditional naval operations but may be more brutally effective. Maverick and Iceman would no doubt be horrified, but on the other hand Goose would still be alive.
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