The return of Donald Trump to the White House will undoubtedly have far-reaching effects on NATO members and other nations with longstanding defence relationships with the US. Will there be increasing pressure to ‘buy American’ equipment to rebalance trade and avoid tariffs, or might it force nations to come up with their own solutions to fill air domain procurement priorities?

A long-gestating issue within NATO has been how to replace the venerable E-3 Sentry AWACS fleets, now entering their fifth decade of operations. This successful Boeing product has been a useful addition to the Western alliance and for most operators the obvious successor is the smaller but equivalent E-7, also straight out of Seattle... Continues below

This analysis article originally appeared in December's Decisive Edge Air Newsletter.

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But one E-3 user that has chosen a different path is the French Air Force. While a contract has yet to be inked, all indications are that Saab’s bizjet-based GlobalEye is the preferred AEW option. Is this a one-off decision or does the selection point to deeper trends? Is the upcoming Trump administration likely to drive allies to seek non-US aircraft types?

Arguably France is an outlier and not a good gauge of would-be American defence customers. The nation has a highly independent national industry with a history of supplying its own systems. Irrespective of who is in the White House, there is always a high probability of France choosing the less obvious defence procurement candidate.

Nonetheless, the results of the US election and the very clear articulation of policy outlines – if not details concerning their implementation – will likely drive other states to re-examine their defence approach. The question is how to square the circle between increasing spending to satisfy a key US demand (and the need to protect against Russia), and to mitigate tariffs through a show of goodwill by the purchase of US equipment and services, but not simply bow to Trumpian pressure.

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The last element could prove detrimental to local industry, leaving a nation even less able to work independently or form an alternative defence grouping with neighbours. And so the cycle continues.

US pressure on third parties to buy its defence exports over alternatives has long been accepted as a simple fact of life. Its aircraft and subsystems are usually of high quality and competitive price, compatible with almost all NATO and allied assets. But possibly the most attractive aspect is the large size of the global fleet and the confidence a customer has in sustainment and development.

If something enters US service, the export customer can jump on board and have its aircraft fixed to the coat-tails of the Pentagon’s combat mass. Indeed, an equivalent product to the E-3 would have been difficult for most states to develop themselves, although several tried with varying degrees of success. The Sentry remains the default option and despite products such as GlobalEye, the successor E-7 looks set to capture much of the market.

As noted above, this is not of itself unexpected. But the wildcard, across many different subjects, is whether Donald Trump’s policies will have as major an effect on the defence market as they will on wider international commerce. Many nations fear becoming the object of his wrath, both because of the threat of tariffs or even sanctions, as well as the attendant changed defence alliance position.

As galling as it is for many medium-sized states in Europe and elsewhere, their safety really does depend on remaining under the umbrella of Pax Americana. Already in Trump’s previous term a clear link was made between NATO members spending sufficiently on defence and the US military being willing to intervene in any dispute.

He is certainly not the first president to voice frustration at perceived ‘freeloading’; even the relatively Europhilic Obama was not beyond expressing similar displeasure. The difference is that, from January 2025, Europe and others are likely to take these risks far more seriously.

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How might the new transatlantic defence relationship and equipment buying patterns evolve? One key element will likely be the withdrawal of US-deployed forces and the need to replace them with local equivalents. This affects both personnel levels and the need for systems owned and funded by local militaries.

An obvious example is Eastern Europe’s investment in air and space defence systems, removing the need for a continued US presence on NATO’s Russia-facing borders. Extending this beyond radars and interceptors, a new tier of sensor assets would likely be viewed favourably by the Trump administration. Fortunately, these already exist as US products and the OEMs would undoubtedly be happy to provide local training, funded by their customers.

A second area is a locally managed force of enablers. Beyond the E-7, assets such as aerial refuellers and a small reconnaissance fleet, particularly of the electronic type, would reduce the need for the US to fil gaps in European capabilities. Despite what would likely be a preference for local sourcing, the threat of a reduction in cooperation will no doubt be used to pressure countries into selection of at least some US solutions.

Fortunately for most of the states in question, their combat force is already extremely healthy and Atlanticist. Most operate US fighters with US sensors and weapons, and the F-35 has quickly become the default replacement for older fleets. Where this is less applicable, such as in the Baltics, the dependable F-16 is ready either in new guise or second hand with a tidy upgrade.

A similar position exists in rotary-wing fleets, where the S-70 remains popular in the mid-size category alongside significant CH-47 numbers. One dramatic and well received way to show America that defence is a priority would be joining the AH-64E camp, although this might prove too complicated and costly for many in the region.

Turning away from NATO, similar pressure is likely to be brought to bear on Pacific allies. The administration is relatively Sinophobic – more so than it is concerned over Moscow – so the Japans, South Koreas and Taiwans of the world will be encouraged strongly to reduce dependence on deployed US forces.

Indeed, this may prove more complicated than in Europe as there is something of a US presumption that these countries will enter more closely into defence programmes. AUKUS, relatively quiet during the Biden years, is an obvious alliance to stress and possibly expand.

It is no secret that America was disappointed with Japan’s entry into the GCAP fighter programme and in the face of significant trans-Pacific trade a protectionist-minded Washington could easily highlight some core defence relations as not being up for discussion.

Australia is arguably of better standing, but past behaviour is unlikely to guarantee special treatment, so the expectation will be strong that US technology is its only real choice, making Canberra’s GCAP participation less likely.

This, of course, is nothing compared to the pressure on Taiwan. Strong exports to the US of electronics components, exactly the kind of products Trump would like to see domestically sourced, makes the territory ripe for tariff treatment. Dependent almost wholly on the US to deter Beijing’s ambitions of ‘reunification’, Taipei is largely out of options other than to grin and spend it.

Other nations, such as the Philippines and even India, are watching carefully for signs as to how these situations develop. Saab’s sale of a Gripen E/F batch to Manila has likely lost some momentum. And now may prove an excellent time for India to accelerate its retirement of older Russian weapons in favour of shiny equipment featuring US IP.

In a slightly stronger position are the GCC states. Although they also seek US protection, they are largely seen as reliable customers, while America’s growing energy independence means that it carries a stronger whip-hand than in decades past. Pressure on MENA domestic defence capability and competence will continue, but in the Trump book they are probably viewed as closer to pulling their weight.

The objective here is likely diplomatic but pressure to give up a dangerous tendency for procuring European aircraft is probable. By contrast, Israel has relatively little to fear on the equipment side if it does what it is told when it comes to America’s political position in the region.

There is undoubtedly a sense of resignation in many US-allied countries. Those already part of the F-35 edifice are probably feeling relieved, but what is troubling is the incoming president’s tendency to shoot from the hip. A sudden decision to slap a tariff on a major export from an ally is not far from most politicians’ minds and there is only so far a defence procurement can be rushed through in a bid to offset such an action.

Despite – not unjustified – complaints the US arguably does rather well out of its hegemonic defence status, but logic was not a trademark of the 2016-2020 period and rational policy cannot be counted upon. The potential for a cosier position with Russia would leave (former?) allies scrambling to react and there are limits on how quickly new defence budgets or policies be evolved.

NATO and other US allies are caught between the risks of potential trade disruption and throwing money at the US military-industrial sector. It has been suggested that this situation might accelerate greater collaboration without US participation, with the likes of GCAP bringing together nations on opposite sides of the normal US defence umbrella.

But this is a long-term and expensive prospect. It also flies in the face of trying to smooth relations with a potentially wild actor. Small comfort can be found in the fact that the US still needs friends and would be well advised not to alienate them too much through trade or defence activity. There is also the view – equally prevalent in America itself – that this may end up as the last years of Trumpian impact and possibly the beginning of slow MAGA decline.

But gameplans and options are undoubtedly being developed in numerous capitals, as the current disordered state of the world is unlikely to balance out any time soon. Expecting the unexpected will be an extremely healthy approach to foreign, trade and defence policy.

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