As the threat from Russia grows and US commitment to Europe evidently declines, the UK’s Royal Air Force appears to have set in motion an intent to reacquire an airborne nuclear weapons platform in the shape of the F-35A. Is this a smart move, an unpleasant necessity or an outdated Cold War retread? And how does it fit in with wider NATO capabilities?

The European atomic weapons position is complicated. The UK and France have for around 50 years possessed nuclear capability, for both nations at present this is strategically centred on a small fleet of missile-carrying submarines... Continues below

This analysis article originally appeared in July's Decisive Edge Air Warfare Newsletter.

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The UK and US have long cooperated in nuclear systems and, to cut a long story short, the former retired its tactical weapons (carried by the Tornado fighter-bomber) in return for Washington’s Trident missiles and assurances of technical and operational support.

France moved in a slightly different direction. From its original air-land-sea trifecta it has dropped the ground-based element but retained an air-launched tactical missile capability and this will continue into the long-term future aboard Dassault Rafale variants with the new ASNG-4 hypersonic weapons.

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These two nations have therefore been the European part of the NATO nuclear arsenal, although even France would admit – Trump notwithstanding – that the chance of use without US agreement is vanishingly remote.

What was never part of the equation was wider European possession of nuclear arms. However, here there is a caveat: five Continental NATO countries “host” US tactical nuclear weapons that are (as far as is known) under Washington’s control. Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey have basic B61 bombs at air bases (and not subtly, these are listed on Wikipedia).

Unlike France’s independent stand-off ASMPs, the Pentagon has the codes necessary for B61’s use, so these are essentially inert and hence more useful as an expression of US commitment to NATO (Canada and Greece also used to play a similar role).

But nonetheless, all five countries listed maintained the aerial capability to deliver the B61, with Tornadoes in Germany and F-16s in the other four. It is arguably no coincidence that three of these selected the F-35A, as a new fighter also capable of B61 carriage (Turkey was following suit before the S-400 complication occurred).

Germany was considering other options, but for reasons of cost, convenience and collaboration also decided on the F-35A. A nuclear-capable Eurofighter was pitched to Berlin, as was a similarly armed F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, but both were rejected.

The existence of this limited and hence somewhat impotent position is not down to a single factor. A combination of wartime devastation memories, slightly more left-of-centre political positions and confidence in US protection likely all contributed.

However, this has changed markedly thanks to a combination of events that largely invert the previous nuclear-phobic position: from the Ukraine conflict a fear of new wartime devastation should a deterrent be lacking; a new political generation that views nuclear weapons in practical rather than emotional terms; and a growing concern that US protection can no longer be assumed.

The greatest single cause of this evolving perspective has been one Vladimir Putin. The horrific conflict in Ukraine, where casual destruction of major civilian centres and infrastructure is a daily occurrence, has shattered the previous consensus that advanced nations simply would not engage in such behaviour.

That Ukraine voluntarily surrendered its nuclear arsenal while Russian kept a massive force has not been lost on observers. Adding to this, particularly in Eastern Europe, are memories of the Red Army’s 1944-45 rampage through these territories as it advanced on Berlin.

This might have been judged an acceptable risk under a Biden or Obama Administration. But across much of Europe, confidence in Trump is now bordering on non-existent. So, if the answer truly is an independent nuclear capability, how might this be achieved and manifested?

The short answer is: probably not submarines. Anything approaching a UK or French fleet would be astronomically expensive and enter service in the 2050s at best. Some form of nuclear-armed surface combatant might just work, perhaps with a navalised variant of France’s ASMP. For practical reasons, old-fashioned nuclear artillery is out, while land-based strategic missiles would also be budget- and decade-consuming. What to do?

As noted above, multiple European states have purchased the Lockheed Martin F-35. Given its positioning an F-16 successor this was natural, but crucially part of its core design requirement was compatibility with the B61 (although few felt it would ever actually be used in this role). This weapon has negligible stand-off capability and hence is probably not survivable above the modern battlefield. But exist it does.

Military purchases are normally decided in a political > industrial > budgetary > operational sequence. But in the F-35’s case, there is a caveat. The five-nation nuclear sharing capability is a political agreement and expressed through operational capability. In that decision sequence, F-35 ticks the last and hence first boxes.

Germany apart, the others had industrial skin in the game and this confuses the picture, but such considerations arguably drove budget and cost down the list. While some might be sceptical of the aircraft’s suitability for smaller customers outside this agreement, for the B61 hosting “family” the decision process might arguably be closer to political > operational > industrial > budgetary, with the order of the last two elements being debatable.

This, obviously, is a simplification (and possibly wrong). Germany evaluated the alternatives listed earlier and could even have partnered with Paris on a nuclear Rafale, although the wider “negotiations” would have been exhausting. Turkey does not fit easily into any part of this model. Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands were all F-35 industrial partners long before the Russian threat escalated. But the F-16/nuclear-capable replacement was at least part of the decision process. Traditionally, being on America’s good side makes for an easy win.

This becomes more interesting when considering other nations with potential nuclear ambitions and F-35 purchase decisions. We can probably discount Switzerland, but several others either were or have expressed interest in the B61-sharing concept.

Greece was a B61 club member but departed. It operates the nuclear-capable F-16 and has now ordered F-35. Canada fits into the same bracket, although obviously is not part of Europe. Two other customers are of interest. Poland, fast becoming a military juggernaut and understandably concerned about Russia, has publicly mulled some kind of nuclear role or capability. It has been suggested that Polish public opinion is swinging slowly towards support. This would be something of a political > operational case but being outside the nuclear sharing club, that is a highly retrospective argument.

Slightly out of left field is Finland. There have been sensible suggestions that F-35 was far from an ideal choice in many respects. The decision was made in 2021, ie before the Russian invasion, and while concern over what Moscow is doing is part of Finnish DNA, the idea of nuclear capability was likely not a priority.

Joining NATO was clearly a critical step. On this specific matter there exist no concrete statements but plenty of hypotheses. Nuclear energy MoUs with the UK add some fuel to the speculation. Exercises with NATO nuclear-sharing partners bring a degree of familiarity with the concept. But at present it seems unlikely.

Helsinki may feel that this option simply is not worth the risk. Certainly, the Russians would view this potentially nuclear neighbour with great alarm. They would have a point, but on the other hand they have only themselves to blame.

The final piece in the puzzle is the UK. As mentioned, an airborne capability was dropped with the RAF Tornado retirement, and this has not been replaced with a Eurofighter equivalent. As part of its combat fleet the UK also operates the F-35B, suitable for aircraft carrier operations but – crucially and unlike the conventional F-35A – not nuclear weapons carriage.

Then in mid-2025 the MoD announced it would buy 12 of those F-35As, sparking much interest as to the rationale. In truth it was not exactly unexpected. The F-35B, intended for V/STOL carriers, was a replacement for the venerable BAE Harrier, which was not nuclear capable. It was also costlier, less capable, had a shorter range and smaller payload than the F-35A. An RAF-centric F-35A purchase had been long anticipated, but the contract for only 12 did raise eyebrows. This has been complicated by the woeful F-35 fleet performance highlighted by a recent UK National Audit Office report.

The official reason was that those 12 aircraft would be a cost-effective training pool for air and ground crews, which is far from ridiculous. But speculation arose concerning potential other uses for an F-35A. The UK is a nuclear-sharing partner and had previously possessed an airborne delivery role. Military service traditions die hard, while ambitions can run rampant.

Under deteriorating European security conditions, could the RAF have convinced Whitehall that a small, airborne, tactical nuclear fleet was worth the cost and risk? The current UK Labour government is trying to cut budgets but simultaneously play a strong role in European defence. The old UK-US alliance remains somewhat credible. Just possibly, the F-35A buy is a nod towards the UK in particular (and Europe in general) accepting more of the strategic NATO burden.

This is arguably picking facts to support theories. No one is saying that the Swiss Air Force will be slinging nuclear bombs at Moscow just because its new aircraft are technically capable of it. That the nuclear-capable F-35 wasbought by an air force in no way means that it was bought for this mission.

Nevertheless, as European powers weigh a resurgence of US-independent nuclear capability, the F-35A opens a door to such a possibility. Nuclear weapons have long been seen as a statement of commitment and deterrence, not an actual arrow in the quiver. That the US holds the keys to the aircraft and – currently – the specific bombs means Europe can do very little alone.

But, for Russian consumption, the presence of these aircraft plus nuclear weapons presents another defence problem. With US blessing, European NATO could assemble in time a rapid strike team of F-35 plus B61s theoretically ready to roll. Likely to be used? Not really. Likely to impact Russian strategic planning? Very.

US decisions and partnership on this will be the deciding factor. No one in European NATO really wants to reach the stage where, in the face of a local existential threat, nuclear weapons platforms are on high alert. But the potential alone is a powerful card in the game and one towards which previously cautious players are drifting. France aside, the technology is essentially American. But given the erratic administration in Washington, a green light in the face of, say, a Russian ground offensive out of Kaliningrad is not as impossible as it once seemed.

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