Above: HAL is still awaiting a breakthrough export order for its Tejas light combat aircraft. (Photo: HAL)
Out of left field – can emergent suppliers crack Middle East markets?
What should have been an unusual and interesting Dubai Airshow was plunged into tragedy when an Indian Air Force Tejas Mk 1A fighter aircraft crashed, killing the pilot. Beyond this sad turn of events, the question of what HAL and its jet were doing in the UAE is of interest as it is indicative of some subtle shifts in the defence market.
Many current air force fleets still suffer from a Cold War legacy, when procurement largely mirrored political alignment. Governments may come and go but barring an outright revolution the general security outlook usually remains constant, (although this “rule” is being strongly tested in the US).
Meanwhile, in states like those of the GCC – usually unable to develop indigenous products – the tendency is to buy from the politically strongest, most expedient and most flexible seller... Continues below
This analysis article originally appeared in December's Decisive Edge Air Warfare Newsletter.
Newsletter Sponsors:
This is reinforced by industrial and operational factors. Even where domestic industry is limited, local participation usually exists even if it is basic servicing. The need for a logistics chain, crew training, wider integration and other aspects all add inertia to the environment. On top of this, the supply and introduction of a complex system is a lengthy process, difficult to halt or reverse. Far easier to continue with one of the few major suppliers and save time, money and energy. Until now.
In the military aircraft market, the years 2022-25 have seen the eclipse of a traditional supplier (Russia), the evolution in character of another (the US) and the rise of several potential alternatives. In Dubai, these trends manifested to some degree.
The wider MENA area has traditionally been home to a hodgepodge of defence systems. Russian aircraft found favour in some places, American in others, with Europe somewhere in between. But given industrial and geopolitical shifts – plus the continued absence of key local industry – it has now become an open field for a new generation of combat aircraft exporters.
The HAL Tejas' participation is indicative of how these matters are evolving. Traditionally, GCC countries opted for premium offerings from Western suppliers in the shape of F-15s, Eurofighters, Tornados and Rafales. The first type – and the UAE’s F-16s – are bespoke models, costing a lot more. But for a combination of factors these buyers seem prepared to look further afield.
Resilient. Redundant. Ruggedized. For a new level of reliability in connectivity. Meet Amazon Leo.
India has long had high hopes of joining the combat aircraft big league, though so far that has been at best a mixed trajectory. What it needs to prove its bona fides is a major export sale, building credibility as well as revenue. That India feels increasingly confident to send their aircraft to major air shows and that this might result in an export indicates that the traditional import-export paradigm is shifting.
While Dubai itself is unlikely to have been the target customer, the wider audience at a prestigious regional event certainly were. The public tragedy unfortunately had the opposite effect to that intended, but wider Indian military-industrial policy should recover.
Facing perhaps a steeper uphill battle was the Sukhoi Su-57, now under the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) umbrella. Russia has rarely had success in the Gulf states, as opposed to Iraq or Syria, but the current confused climate and doubts over US and European direction suggested that the opportunity might as well be taken.
Egypt changed a longtime policy of buying Western aircraft in 2015 with an order for 48 MiG-29Ms, boosting hopes that MENA might again become a market for Russian systems. However, the war in Ukraine has largely closed that door. Nevertheless, to demonstrate that the oft-maligned Su-57 does exist and can be bought, an example flew. UAC have frequently claimed that there is an export customer, although identify and details have not been disclosed.
The Tejas and Su-57 form something of a duet owing to the historical defence relationship between India and Russia. A further link is that the Sukhoi product was supposed to be – at least in its design process – a collaborative effort between the two nations, with Delhi adopting it or something similar for its Advanced Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (AMCA).
This has notably not occurred, with the focus being on the Tejas, touted as largely indigenous though with foreign elements such as an Israeli radar; by any definition it is a conservative design. Nevertheless, with lighter fighter aircraft around the world being quietly retired (the MiG-21 is an obvious example, as are older Mirages), there is market space and India is seeking to fill it.
There therefore exists the potential for a new entrant to become a major rival, not least owing to limited alternatives from more traditional sources. The Saab Gripen E/F is roughly comparable although larger, costlier and more complicated while the Saab-Boeing T-7 is smaller and lacks the performance.
The KAI T/A-50 is likewise a light fighter. Meanwhile the same stable’s KF-21 is a known quantity and while it is clearly Korean, it is also partly American (Lockheed Martin played a large part) and contains significant US elements, so is subject to that country’s export laws. Crucially, as part of the contract between LM and KAI, it cannot compete against F-16 or similar US sales efforts.
Tejas does have two competitors in the “new kids on the bloc” territory that, with potential for domestic industrial collaboration, are attractive to customers. The first is Turkey’s TAI Kaan, a largely indigenous effort bearing great similarity to the KF-21. Unlike the latter, Kaan has very limited foreign components beyond the GE F414 engines, which seem likely to be replaced by a modified EJ200 or other powerplant.
It is much larger than Tejas, but nevertheless aimed at similar markets in MENA and Southeast Asia, while erstwhile F-35 prospects such as Spain are said to be mulling the concept. TAI is likely – as part of a political effort – to offer great partnership deals on the aircraft and certainly that has been a strong sales focus. Certainly, the F-35 and KF-21 cannot compete on this level.
Like India, greater flexibility on the point gives it a strong advantage over its US rivals. Gripen E/F, currently on something of a roll, could to a degree compete here, but Ankara has more leverage over its industry than does Stockholm, which will not be lost on potential customers.
The final new entrant, predictably, is China. Fitting perfectly within the wider narrative of it eclipsing Russi as the “non-Western” source of goods and services, it’s military offerings are yet another challenge to traditional options. The JF-17, co-developed with Pakistan, is its “entry-level” model. That the aircraft was a joint project (though firmly majority Chinese) is a strong selling point, and Pakistan is managing the export effort (which will not be lost on other Muslim nations).
China also has the international size and power to be considered a political partner and crucially a source of wider investment and trade. This has long been a foundation of US exports, but the latter’s far more stringent export restrictions have always been a limiting factor.
The other major Chinese export offering is the J-10, now well known for several possible victories over Indian fighters. Success sells, so whatever the truth is, this combat experience will not have done it any harm. Add that to potential customers with a possibly dim view of India (although beyond China and Pakistan, these at present do not really exist) and a neat package emerges. China would also likely allow local participation of some form to cement its partner status, another benefit of an autocratically managed industry.
That Turkey and China (plus Pakistan) would enter the combat aircraft market was a sure bet. Russia remains an option although whether it can attract customers three years into a sanctions-accompanied war is unclear. The new entrants both benefit from freshness, an “alternative” political stance, likely looser export and collaboration policies and a sense that they are “on their way up” versus the West.
The actual aircraft have frequently been mocked by commentators as “second-rate” and given that they are essentially the first export generation from these countries this is perhaps not entirely off the mark. But increasing sophistication is almost inevitable.
It is even possible that other newcomers might arrive over the next decade: Indonesia could perhaps use its aborted KF-21 programme participation with some Chinese input to underpin a move in this direction. Brazil now has to some extent the capability with its Gripen production line (although contractually independent exports might for now be blocked). But there are not many.
The degree to which the Kaan and J-10 pose a direct and immediate threat to Western exports remains to be seen, but for the purposes of strategic planning they are undoubtedly now counted as competitors.
Don't want to miss out on future Decisive Edge content? Make sure you are signed up to our email newsletters.
