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The Philippines has ended its flirtation with China – so what next for the country’s navy?

For decades, largely as a result of historical ties, the US was the only Western country with a strong interest in the Philippines and its navy. Over the past year, other nations have turned their attention to the archipelago. The question is why now? And what is the impact of this shift on the Philippine Navy?

As the second largest archipelagic state in the world – behind Indonesia – and situated at the edge of the Pacific but with territorial waters at the crossroads of international maritime trade routes, the Philippines has always held a strategic position in Southeast Asia.

Yet for decades the US was the only Western country showing interest and building ties with the Philippines and its navy, with several bases in the country until the non-renewal of the lease in 1991.

Schiebel – leading the unmanned evolution

Additionally, despite its 36,289km of coastline and its 2,263,816 sq km of EEZ, both of which require considerable maritime capabilities to patrol and secure, Manila’s investment in its navy has remained surprisingly low for decades.

In fact, the Philippine Navy (PN) today features a relatively high number of ships that were transferred essentially by the USN in the 1990s and early 2000s. A few have also been donated by, or purchased from, neighbouring countries such as the Republic of Korea (RoK) and Australia.

Over the past decade, however, as regional tensions have been intensifying – such as illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, competing territorial claims, incursions by other states – international attention has turned back to the Philippines.

This has been even more apparent in the past year, as the election of Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr (BBM) in June 2022 prompted a subtle but clear shift in the country’s regional outlook.

While during his campaign BBM reasserted his desire to continue building relations with China – a key tenet of former president Rodrigo Duterte’s regional strategy – his actions over the past year have gone in a different direction.

They have shown that he is clearly seeking to retain strategic independence from Beijing in order to build and/or strengthen regional and international alliances instead.

Relations with the US, which had been a little strained under Duterte, are now being rebuilt again. Beyond continued joint maritime exercises and drills between the two countries’ navies – the latest one in June, together with Japan – in April the Philippine government granted the US access to four bases – three on the main island of Luzon, close to Taiwan, and one in the southern territory of Palawan, near to the South China Sea.

Above: The French Navy’s FREMM frigate Lorraine recently paid a visit to Manila, and there are clear signs of aspirations towards greater strategic and industrial collaboration by Paris. (Photo: French Embassy in Manila)

Over in Europe, France is looking to build stronger relationships with the strategic archipelago. In June this year, the French Navy FREMM air defence frigate Lorraine made a week-long port visit to Manila, part of a deployment to support a free and open Indo-Pacific, and a strong signal of Paris’s intentions to play an important role in the region’s security.

It also comes five months after Germany – which is also seeking to increase its support to the region – and France jointly announced that they were ready for maritime cooperation with the Philippines. Displaying similar intentions, the Italian Navy made a four-day port call in Manila in July.

At a regional level, Manila is also becoming a stronger partner to a number of nations. In fact, despite an ongoing dispute over the Kalayaan island group, the Philippines and Malaysia, together with Indonesia, are considering expanding Sulu Sea trilateral patrols. These aim to tackle transnational organised crime and terrorist threats.

Finally, following the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue, there have been rumours of a ‘Quad 2’ group featuring the US, Australia, Japan and the Philippines, with the latter having also increased its cooperation with the PN – mainly through joint exercises.

Such renewed regional and international attention towards the archipelagic state has, understandably, had a significant impact on the country’s attention to its own navy.

In fact, after an all-time low defence budget representing a mere 0.8% of GDP in 2018, allocations have seen an important uptick. In 2021, the budget had reached 1% of GDP, according to World Bank data, and in 2023 proposed defence spending (US$4.28 billion) represented an 8% increase from 2022 ($4 billion), with 14.4% to be allocated to the navy. This was on par with the air force, whereas the army will receive 46% of the budget.

Part of this increase will go toward a number of new, key programmes such as the Philippines very first submarine, a programme that is also creating the opportunity to strengthen regional and international industrial ties. Both France (Naval Group, which opened an office in the Philippines in 2020) and the RoK (DSME) have been shortlisted for the programme.

At operational level, since 2019 France’s DCI group has been providing the Philippine navy with assistance on the deployment of submarines and organising an SSK force.

On 3 May, the US also announced its intention to transfer four patrol boats to the PN (two Island and two Protector class), continuing the long tradition of transfers between the two nations.

Above: After years of shoestring budgets, the PN is now shopping for new capabilities, including doubling the size of its LPD fleet. (Photo: Philippine Navy)

Finally, the relationship between the Philippines and Indonesia is also being strengthened at industrial level, with the Philippine Navy signing for the acquisition of two more Landing Platform Docks (LPD) – it already operates two.

Ultimately, after decades of being a quasi-outlier, the Philippines – and by extension the PN – is finally regaining its rightful place in the security framework of the Indo-Pacific. BBM’s pivot back toward Washington – and more specifically away from China – has presented regional and Western partners with an opportunity to strengthen operational and industrial ties, which in turn is providing the basis for a significant fleet renewal.

Corvette collaboration – how Europe is pooling skills and funds in a time of need

When it comes to security, NATO tends to make the headlines more often than the EU. Yet since the war in Ukraine broke out, there has been a quiet but determined strengthening of purely European defence. And it starts with budgets.

Over the past decade several heads of state and experts questioned the existence of NATO. Current events would seem to offer irrefutable proof that the alliance is not a Cold War dinosaur, however.

Above: Much of Romania’s naval fleet is elderly, with some missile corvettes dating back to the late 1980s, so the need for replacement is urgent. (Photo: Romanian Naval Forces)

European defence’s popularity has been on a similar rollercoaster ride. And though its rise has been a much quieter affair, it is noteworthy because it sheds light on a critical way of doing naval business on the old continent – financial burden-sharing.

What is new here is that several European countries are now stretching their navies across multiple theatres of operation, and although budgets have seen a significant uptick, that is not enough.

Similarly, several countries may be lacking the experience and know-how to shape the navies they need. And with a war on their doorstep, the pressure of time is on.

The Romanian Navy is a great example. Its fleet is now ageing significantly, with some ships commissioned in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Just as importantly, the country has not built an indigenous ship in over 20 years, leaving little room for doubt concerning its industrial capabilities.

Yet in its 2020-2024 National Defence Strategy, it was already clear that Romania was acutely aware of the need to update its armed forces.

The government has now launched an important fleet upgrade, with two important programmes ongoing: new corvettes and new submarines. And while the SSK contract remains to be awarded, Romania recently decided to participate in the European Patrol Corvette (EPC) programme.

The EPC objective is to design and develop a prototype for a new class of ship, which allows hosting several systems and payloads, in order to accomplish, with a modular and flexible approach, a large number of tasks and missions.

Above: Romanian participation in the EPC programme will spread the financial burden and give local industry involvement in R&D work. (Image: Naval Group)

‘Considering the EPC objective, this project represents a viable long-term option for our fleet modernisation process and will complement the ongoing acquisition efforts,’ an MoD spokesperson told the author in a written statement. ‘Furthermore, this option is based on comprehensive development actions that are financially supported by the European Defence Fund (EDF) and will bring results after 2027.’

Finally, the programme offers the country a guarantee that Romanian industry will be involved in the R&D activity co-funded by the EDF.

Evidently, the possibility to participate in the European programme will help Romania not only to share the financial burden of the R&D that will go into this new, common project. It will also provide an opportunity to boost its industrial base, again thanks to European funds.

In fact, signs of the industrial benefits of a more common, cooperative European bloc are visible in several European companies.

During a visit by the author to MBDA’s Fusaro site on 12 July, research and technologies and HW engineering Italian operations director Giacomo Sabino presented the company’s ongoing programmes. One thing was evident: MBDA is involved in several European cooperation efforts, of which at least three are naval (FSAF/PAAMS munitions, the Aster anti-air missile and the FLAADS/CAMM missile family).

‘Many of these systems can be rather complex to develop, especially when one looks at the speed at which threats and countermeasures evolve,’ Sabino told the author, ‘so the ability to pull together the knowledge and expertise of several different countries, together with the European funds, is a significant asset for companies like MBDA.’

European cooperation programmes have been ongoing for some time, but as the war in Ukraine continues and the continent’s security is increasingly challenged, these provide the right framework to pull resources together – financial, human and technical. This is a critical asset at a time where threats evolve faster than ever before.

France’s approach to an emerging threat: countering uncrewed systems at sea

The war in Ukraine has left no room for doubt: uncrewed systems – aerial or surface – are now an integral part of 21st century naval warfare. The race to develop and deliver such systems (as well as counter them) has therefore picked up speed the world over. How is the French Navy tackling this new danger to its ships?

On 27 June, the French Navy held its first ‘LADA Day’ in Brest, a training event dedicated to counter-drone exercises organised by the Force d’action navale (FAN). The FAN is responsible for training navy personnel and ensuring materiel availability, and in this case the objective of the day was clear: testing surface combatant crews’ and Rafale M fighter pilots’ ability to counter UAV and USV attacks.

Above: The French Navy’s counter-uncrewed training day saw ships and aircraft tackle airborne and surface threats. (Photo: French Navy)

The training day made the headlines because it featured the use of several technologies to counter both air- and water-borne threats. The high speed USVs deployed were neutralised by Rafale M aircraft, whereas the UAVs were dealt with differently according to size and manoeuvrability.

From the FREMM frigate Bretagne, onboard crew neutralised drones flying toward the ship at speeds varying between 50 and 85m/s with the use of the 76mm main gun, 20mm Narwhal remote weapon stations and manually operated 12.7mm machine guns.

Micro-drones were also made to take-off from the FREMM’s helicopter deck. These were successfully disrupted using the BADA rifle (an autonomous anti-drone jammer) and subsequently neutralised with special anti-drone munitions fired from the Navy Riflemen’s dedicated shotgun.

This is not the first time the service has trialled ship-borne C-UAV technologies. From June 12 to 14, in the Mediterranean, the DGA defence procurement agency, the navy and CILAS successfully tested the High Energy Laser for Multiple Applications-Power (HELMA-P) weapon prototype on board the anti-air warfare frigate Forbin.

Initially developed for land forces, HELMA-P offers escalating countermeasures against UAVs, from dazzling optical sensors to neutralising a mini- or micro-UAV by altering its structure and causing it to fall in a matter of seconds.

During the tests on board the Forbin, HELMA-P was deployed from a 20ft ISO container positioned on the helicopter deck. Although there have been no discussions yet as to how the system would be fully integrated onto a ship, the tests have opened the door to new possibilities and the fact that laser weapons need no munitions would likely facilitate such installation.

Above: Recent trials of the HELMA-P laser weapon saw the system mounted in an ISO container on the helideck of the frigate Forbin. (Photo: French Navy)

Finally, the DGA, the navy and Naval Group also tested, in spring 2022, the use of AI-enabled sensors to detect, identify and track multiple UAVs simultaneously (50 during the first test).

When the author spoke to Yonec Fihey, then business development senior manager for surface ships and systems at Naval Group, about the tests back in 2022, he could not disclose the sensors that were used for the test.

He did, however, mention that the company was working with the navy and the DGA on the roadmap for AI’s integration to facilitate UAV detection, identification and tracking.

Other French companies, such as Thales with its Sea Fire digital radar, are also seeking to include powerful algorithms in their sensors to meet the UAV threat.

All these developments accurately reflect the importance given to uncrewed systems and the respective countermeasures in the French military programming law (LPM), both in the 2019-2025 iteration and the 2024-2030 version overwhelmingly approved by the government on 29 June 2023.

Future Submarine Acquisition (Philippines)

The Philippines is looking into acquiring at least two diesel-electric submarines to form a submarine arm for the country. It currently does not operate any submarines but, as of 2023, they remain a topmost priority for the Philippine Navy. Submarines that have been considered include Naval Group’s Scorpene and Hanwha Ocean’s Improved Type 209/1400 submarine.

The procurement programme was initiated in 2015, with the acquisition scheduled for 2023-2027. However, this has been moved to the 2018-2022 period. The programme has a reported value of $1.8 billion.

Programme Background

Requirements

The Philippines began its Future Submarine Acquisition back in 2015. The Philippines has no experience of operating submarines, but there is a growing need to protect its sovereign rights and citizens following fishing incidents with China. While surface combatants can establish a presence, submarines offer a stealth presence which the Philippines currently lacks. The country, without submarines, is also lagging behind its neighbours in terms of subsea capabilities. The country has a requirement to buy two to four diesel-electric submarines in the near future.

Timeline

As recently as March 2020, the Philippine Navy (PN) have said one of their top priorities is the acquisition of two submarines. The procurement was initiated back in 2015 through the issue of a preliminary request for information (RFI), while the navy also established a submarine programme office capable of reviewing contemporary designs, drawing up a concept of operations and also being part of the planning process.

The acquisition of two submarines was scheduled for 2023 to 2027. Still, in 2018, under the Philippines’ ‘third horizon’ military modernisation programme, this was moved forward and accelerated to the 2018 to 2022 ‘second horizon’ period. However, the programme might have been delayed since submarine-related acquisition would consume considerable financial resources, already impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Philippines Defense Secretary, Delfin Lorenzana, stated that should the submarine acquisition be pushed through, it will be acquired via a government-to-government procurement and under a loan, so they do not need a large upfront capital outlay.

A key stumbling block for an order by Manila is funding; however, Philippine President Bongbong Marcos is reportedly ‘warm’ to the idea of the country acquiring a fleet of SSKs.

Contenders & Bidders

United Shipbuilding Corporation

In 2018, it was reported that the PN and Russian Navy were discussing the terms of an agreement to expand collaboration to include diesel-electric submarines. The navies discussed a draft memorandum of understanding (MOU) where Russia would look to meet the PNs subsurface capability requirement.

In September 2018, Russia offered the Philippines an economic package to support its potential acquisition of two Kilo-class submarines. The offer made to the Philippine government included a soft loan that would be repayable over several years. This followed the terms of a memorandum of understanding around the provision of training and support of submarines. The estimated cost of an exported Improved Kilo-class submarine is $600 million each, giving a programme value of around $1.2 billion. The Kilo-class submarines take around two years for construction and a further two years between launch and commissioning. This would mean should a contract be placed in 2022, the PN could receive the first submarine in 2027.

It would appear that nothing was agreed over the offer of Kilo-class submarines. The US is particularly against the idea of the Philippines, considered an ally, procuring Russian equipment and has urged the Philippines to consider other purchasing options.

Naval Group

In March 2021, local media reported that Naval Group’s Scorpene is among the list of preferred submarines by the PN while the acquisition remains a topmost priority. The platform was evaluated by Philippine naval and defence officials in December 2019 and is high on the list of preferred platforms. Naval Group stated at the virtual Euronaval event in October 2020 that it is in ‘intense dialogues’ with the government of the Philippines to see Scorpene-class submarines.

It must be noted that the PN has no funding in the 2021 budget for submarines and that perhaps the pronouncements about defence contracts in this instance might be premature. The offer from France and Naval Group includes full training over years of several rotations of the crew, along with training with French companies and its navy which includes assisting in the construction of the submarine base, formulating doctrine and providing soft loans.

In 2020, the French shipbuilder opened an office in Manila, saying it stood ready to support the Philippine Navy by providing a submarine fleet and setting up training, supply chain, facilities, and other support capabilities.

At IMDEX Asia 2023, Naval Group India, Asia and Pacific business development VP Nicolas de la Villemarqué told Shephard that the Philippines was looking to Malaysia as an example of submarine capability. Naval Group is currently working to help educate the Philippine Navy on the capabilities and operation of a submarine fleet.

Should Manila select Naval Group, the French shipbuilder has pledged to help the Philippine Navy in building a new naval facility for submarine operations at Subic Bay.

Hanwha Ocean (ex-DSME)

Another competitor appears to be from South Korea, which is offering a 1400t improved Chang Bogo-class submarine from Hanwha Ocean.

Despite it being recently reported that Naval Group is in a strong position to be selected for the Philippines submarine requirement, a report by Janes has revealed that South Korea and the Phillippines have continued cooperation talks aimed at meeting the future submarine requirement. Hanwha Ocean announced on 27 May 2021 that the Assistant Secretary for Logistics and Acquisition at the Philippines’ DND visited the RoKN’s Submarine Force Command to discuss areas of cooperation that would enhance the PN’s future submarine capabilities.

Issues discussed between South Korea and the Phillippines did not just include training and know-how on operating submarines but the resumption of the RoKN-hosted International Submarine Education and Training Program (ISETP) and the level of support by the South Korean government and a soft loan. A meeting on the latter was held between South Korea’s Defence Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) and the Export-Import Bank of Korea (KEXIM).

The pack being offered by South Korea is that of a total solution. It includes Hanwha Ocean’s 1400PN diesel-electric submarines, which are a modified and upgraded version of the Nagapasa-class submarines currently in service with the Indonesian Navy but also include crew training and a soft loan.

During MADEX2023, Janes reported that Hanwha Ocean is proposing some of the combat systems fitted onboard the KSS-III, such as the LIG-Nex1 hull-mounted sonar.

TKMS

Germany is also reported as having offered a design (Type 209 or Type 214).

Navantia

In 2023, Navantia showcased its submarine design at Philippine Fleet Defence Expo.

Contracts Award

Shephard estimates a contract would be awarded by 2024.

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