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Ready for launch – will submarine-deployed uncrewed systems be a game-changer?

In the last few months, the French Navy announced it had successfully deployed a UAV from a submarine, while the USN carried out the first autonomous launch and recovery of a UUV from an underway SSN. What do these achievements mean for the future of underwater warfare?

On 4 May, under the auspices of the French Defence Innovation Agency (AID) and just off the coast of Toulon, Naval Group and Diodon Drone Technology (a French SME) successfully undertook the launch of a UAV from an (unnamed) French Navy SSN.

Schiebel – leading the unmanned evolution

The UAV, Diodon’s HP30, was encased in a Naval Group waterproof ‘cocoon’, as the company calls it, and was released from the dedicated airlock zone within the submarine, submerged at periscope depth.

On reaching the surface, the ‘cocoon’ opened up, allowing the UAV to inflate and take off. Once in the air, the drone established a direct radio communication link with the host boat, allowing submariners to pilot the aircraft and receive its images.

A couple of months later, on 21 July, L3Harris announced that, along with industry partners, it had successfully accomplished the fully autonomous launch and recovery of a UUV from an underway submarine. The test demonstrated the homing and docking solution developed by the project team, leveraging L3Harris’s Iver4 UUV technology.

These two pieces of news follow in the footsteps of similar developments and tests over recent years. For instance, back in 2013, the USN successfully launched the Naval Research Laboratory’s eXperimental Fuel Cell (XFC) UAS from the SSN USS Providence.

The aircraft was fired from the submarine’s torpedo tube using a ‘Sea Robin’ launch vehicle system, and subsequently operated for several hours feeding live videos back to the boat.

Similarly, submarine design and development leaders, such as Naval Group and Saab, have been working on integrating UUVs with their latest designs – respectively the Barracuda and A26 SSKs.

The immediate aim here is twofold: keep the crew out of harm’s way; and gather information in areas otherwise inaccessible to submarines, ie the sky and very shallow and confined waters.

Above: The HP30 UAV used in the French Navy trial is capable of floating on the surface of the water for recovery, although it is unclear what method was used. (Photo: French Navy)

Mostly these systems will be used for ISR missions. The HP30, for instance, weighs less than 2kg, has a range of 8km and a maximum endurance of 30nmi. While this performance may seem limited compared to other UAVs, it is important to remember that submarines have to be at periscope depth to be able to control the drone, thus exposing themselves.

A 30nmi mission would be more than enough (possibly even too long) to subsequently recover the system and dive back.

Nevertheless, industry leaders are progressively exploring how to include lethal payloads on these systems. On 4 May, the French DGA procurement agency awarded Naval Group a nine-month contract to carry out a study on an uncrewed combat underwater vehicle (UCUV). This work will focus on potential use cases and system architecture.

There is no doubt that these developments have the potential to significantly alter the way in which underwater warfare – and anti-submarine warfare – will be carried out in future. Both UUVs and UAVs have the potential to provide submarines with unprecedented levels of situation awareness.

UUVs also have the potential to become real threats to other underwater platforms. In fact, both sensors and effectors for the underwater world are today optimised for much bigger crewed platforms. The appearance of smaller, stealthier and more manoeuvrable uncrewed assets, which are harder to detect and can create a much bigger surprise effect, can seriously test crews’ decision-making capabilities within short timeframes.

Yet a number of hurdles remain before these systems can be integrated operationally.

For instance, there has been little follow-up news concerning the USN’s experiments with submarine-launched UAVs since that first test in 2013. Why is that?

Above: Little has been heard of US efforts to field submarine-launched UAS since a 2013 Naval Warfare Laboratory test. (Photo: Naval Warfare Laboratory)

Similarly, Naval Group and Diodon’s successful test raises several questions. There is no information as to where the airlock containing the UAV is placed in the submarine, nor are there indications as to whether the UAV transmitted still images or also videos.

Just as importantly, there is the question of signature. To communicate with and remotely pilot the UAV, a submarine has to remain at periscope depth. However this puts it in a significantly vulnerable position, both in terms of radar cross-section from the mast and being at the mercy of magnetic anomaly detectors.

Additionally, when the UAV is transmitting it is creating electronic signatures that are easily detectable with a ship’s or aircraft’s EW systems. Admittedly, in an interview released to trade media Paul Bougon, drone integration manager at Naval Group, did mention that the roadmap for further development of the system includes refining the signature created by the transmission.

It is also worth noting that there was no information about the recovery of the UAV. While this was not explicitly mentioned in the roadmap, we can assume this is also something Naval Group and Diodon are currently working on.

Finally, at least as far as the Western defence industry is concerned, while technological progress will no doubt bring lethal UUVs on the market in the coming years, multiple ethical questions remain as to their use.

In fact, considering that currently underwater communications remain challenging, the use of AI-enabled fully autonomous systems to deliver lethal payloads will be an important hurdle to get over.

France’s new defence budget plan reveals some worrying naval gaps

On 13 July, the French Senate officially approved the government’s Military Programming Law for 2024-2030. The document, which foresees a 40% budget increase compared to the previous five-year period, puts more emphasis on uncrewed systems and the importance of the seabed. But in some respects, it still falls short of what is really needed.

The defence budget foreseen by President Macron’s government in the new Military Programming Law (LPM) has been hailed as a historic landmark. It will mark a 40% increase compared to the LPM for 2019-2025, for a total of €413.3 billion ($450.6 billion) to be spent over the next six years.

Above: France still intends to hit a total of 15 frigates but needs to export two of these to remain in budget. (Photo: Naval Group)

The latest LPM also puts more emphasis on uncrewed systems, with a whole new section dedicated to these technologies. A total of €5 billion will be dedicated to their continued development for each of the armed forces.

For the French Navy, this will mean carrying on with underwater and onboard uncrewed systems. Presumably the latter refers mostly to UAS, with the exception of the MCMM programme that involves a combination of surface and underwater.

This is in line with a new section dedicated to the seabed, reflecting the needs highlighted in the Seabed Warfare Strategy published in February 2022. Here, the LPM mentions systems capable of exploring the seabed at up to 6,000m deep.

Exail has been working on developing such a system (Ulyx) with the Ifremer (French Research Institute for Exploitation of the Sea). As of December 2022, Ulyx had successfully reached a depth of 4,500m and was in qualification phase.

For the navy, the following programmes – either already ongoing or due to be kick-started – will contribute to the modernisation of the force by 2030: three fleet tankers (BRF), with the first delivered by Naval Group on 19 July; three FDI frigates, with the first now undergoing sea trials and scheduled for commissioning in 2024; seven blue-water patrol vessels (PH), the first scheduled for delivery by end 2026; six Suffren-class SSN submarines, with the first having entered active duty in June 2022; four third-generation SSBNs (SNLE 3G), with the first scheduled for delivery in 2035; and one new aircraft carrier (PANG), which is currently in the definition phase.

While these programmes may seem ambitious, a report published by the Senate in June 2023, entitled ‘An LPM that leaves many capability issues unresolved’, highlights a couple of problems for the navy.

Chief among those is that several projects have either been cancelled or delayed post-2027, ie after the end of Macron’s second and last term as president.

Above: A replacement design for the carrier Charles De Gaulle is in the definition phase, but there is no budget to acquire new combat aircraft for it under the latest plan. (Photo: French Navy)

For instance, the LPM does not guarantee a replacement for the 41 Rafale carrier-based jet fighters. This could lead to issues of operational availability when part of the fleet undergoes a retrofit to remain up to date.

As for frigates, the goal to reach a total of 15 is maintained, although two have been deferred in the hope of being able to export them. The Senate report notes: ‘If the export does not happen, the frigates will have to be bought back on the LPM’s budget.’ This would present an additional unforeseen cost.

Finally, two additional changes from the previous LPM are noteworthy. First, the budget for innovation has increased from €1 billion to €10 billion. Specifically, the new LPM puts significant emphasis on projects such as directed energy weapons, with one such system successfully tested aboard the anti-air warfare frigate Forbin in June.

Another focus is UAV swarms, for instance the navy Chief of Staff awarded ArkéOcean the Perseus prize in early July, creating opportunities for the company to collaborate more closely with the French Navy to continue developing its project in this area.

Second, where the previous document put a strong emphasis on European cooperation on defence, the new document only mentions EU funds in relation to ongoing programmes.

As Macron, a fervent pro-European, steps down in 2027 and fears of a presidential election victory by Marine Le Pen (a renowned anti-European), increase, it is worth considering if this LPM risks setting the scene for a diminished French involvement in European defence.

What a ‘Buy American’ policy might mean for US shipbuilders

Senator Tammy Baldwin, from Wisconsin, successfully managed to gather unanimous consent in the Senate in late July to pass an amendment requiring that 100% of components for all USN ships be manufactured in the US by 2033. Should this pass final vote, what will be the impact on the US defence sector?

Perhaps the first thing that comes to mind when reading news about the Senate considering amendments to the Buy American Act is: here we go again!

Above: Complex naval platforms such as the Virginia-class SSN require large amounts of exotic raw materials which are not currently widely processed in the US. (Photo: USN)

Passed back in 1933, the legislation has been revisited – or seen attempts to that effect – at regular intervals. This trend has been particularly evident in the last two years, since current POTUS Joe Biden announced in November 2021 that he would boost domestic-content preferences. The rate would go from 50% (as it currently stands) to 55% and then 75% by 2029.

Shortly after the announcement, Donald Norcross, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, sought to amend the legislation in line with Biden’s 2029 goal. His proposal did not pass. In 2022 he made a similar unsuccessful attempt.

Today, it seems as though Baldwin may get more support for a similar proposal: 65% of components ‘manufactured substantially all from articles, materials or supplies mined, produced or manufactured’ in the US starting in 2026, 75% by 2028 and 100% by 2033. Yet one crucial question remains: is this really a viable solution?

Typical opposing arguments focus on allies’ reactions if such amendments make it to the finish line. Would foreign suppliers seek trade retaliation, looking to restrict US suppliers’ access to their own defence markets? History seems to indicate that this is rather unlikely, at least not at the level which critics fear.

There are arguments that it would be impossible to enforce this kind of policy on all 26 countries that are already exempt from current Buy American requirements. This is essentially the result of existing trade agreements that would be difficult to amend.

In fact, thus far, despite the 55% requirement, several countries are already exempt from it – for example Australia, Egypt and Germany, and others could apply for exemptions to the new amendment, unsurprisingly, among others, Canada, New Zealand and the UK.

A more grounded argument against the amendment is that several US defence systems and platforms include rare earth elements that are currently largely processed outside of the US, mostly in China. This is the case, for instance, for the Virginia-class submarine, which requires 9,200 pounds of rare earth materials.

While seeking independence from China is most likely a sound idea, if the US wants to start mining and processing its own rare earth elements it is likely to run into two main issues.

Above: A 100% ‘Buy American’ rule might safeguard US jobs and industrial sovereignty, but would also cause programme delays, and many US trading partners could seek exemptions from it anyway. (Photo: USN)

Firstly, the costs of building infrastructure on US soil will be rather high and will likely be reflected in the cost of the final platform and equipment.

Second, the time it will take to develop skills and the industry in the US will likely significantly delay multiple critical defence programmes – additional delays that the US forces can hardly afford.

There is value in wanting to strengthen and grow the national defence sector, both in terms of sovereignty and job creation. But there is also value in questioning why these repeated quests to increase American content in defence capabilities do not have as their starting point a more specific analysis of the components and rare earth elements markets.

Why the blanket application – which seldom turns out that way because there are always exemptions – when such attempts at strengthening sovereignty in the defence industry could be more targeted?

Walrus-class replacement programme (Netherlands)

The Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) hopes to replace its existing class of four 1980s-vintage Walrus-class submarines with a new batch of boats and increase its sub-surface capability. 

Approval was granted for a new class of diesel-electric attack submarines (SSKs) under the Walrus Replacement Programme (WRES) in 2018, with deliveries now expected between 2034 and 2037 due to several delays. Naval Group, TKMS and Saab as individual consortium team lead were downselected in 2019. A winner is expected to be selected by mid-2024.

Programme Background

The initial plan under the Walrus Replacement Programme (WRES) was to have new vessels in service by 2025. However, this date was first pushed back to 2027 and again to 2028.

When 2027 was still the targeted first delivery year, a defence note released by the Dutch MoD in 2018 gave a commitment to a new submarine programme with a budget of €2.5 billion ($2.77 billion). A B-letter notice confirming the government's intent to procure four new submarines was due to be delivered to Parliament in 2018, but this did not occur until 13 December 2019.

A D-letter notice with a procurement decision was due to follow in 2021. This was first pushed back until 2022, but in October 2021, the MoD stated this date was no longer feasible, instead pushing the expected date back to 2023, with deliveries planned from 2028 to 2031.

However, in a statement released in April 2022, the Netherlands MoD stated that the first two new submarines can now be expected to enter service in the 2034-2037 timeframe.

In November 2022, the Dutch MoD sent an RfQ to Saab, Naval Group and TKMS, with a deadline set for 2023.

Last July, the Dutch Defence Secretary Christophe Van der Maat told the country’s House of Representatives that the MoD received responses to its invitation to tender from Naval Group, TKMS and Saab.

Contenders

According to Van der Maat, quotations received in July will be examined and assessed through early 2024, with the winning design expected to be announced in a D-letter to the parliament by the first half of next year.

Saab

In 2015, Damen and Saab announced a partnership to compete for the Walrus Replacement Programme, and in 2018 stated they would offer a variant of the Swedish A26 design. The design offered is the Oceanic Extender Range submarine which has been tailored for the Dutch Navy while integrating some of the experience from the RAN's Collins-class submarines.

On 28 July 2023, Saab confirmed in a press release that it has submitted its proposal for the Walrus replacement programme. Saab's offer includes the C718 expeditionary submarine, a version of the Expeditionary-family submarine called C71. Technology onboard the A26 submarine is also integrated into the C71 family.

Interestingly, in the abovementioned press release, Saab stated that its proposal has been supported by Sweden and the UK, suggesting that some British manufacturers have teamed up with Saab.

Naval Group

Meanwhile, the French shipyard Naval Group has partnered with the commercial Dutch shipyard Royal IHC and will offer a diesel-electric variant of its Barracuda nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) design, called the Shortfin Barracuda. Royal IHC is to provide a larger amount of Dutch content in the partnership.

At Euronaval 2022, Naval Group told Shephard that it is ready to offer a Lithium-ion battery solution as part of its offer for the Walrus replacement programme.

TKMS

The TKMS-led team is offering an expeditionary version of the Type 212 CD, called Type 212 CD E (Expeditionary). Compared to the baseline version, the expeditionary variant has a larger range and endurance that allow the submarine to operate in the Dutch overseas territories.

The diamond-shaped submarine is also suitable for lithium-ion batteries and will be capable of firing cruise missiles from its torpedo launchers.

Programme Value

Although the total value has not been officially disclosed, the Ministry of Defence announced a budget increase for the programme. According to the 2022 Defence White Paper, the Walrus replacement programme falls in the category of those projects with a budget of ‘more than €2.5 billion’.

According to local Dutch media, the total value of the programme has now reached €4.5 billion ($5.02 billion).

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