Decisive Edge Newsletter | Air | May 2023
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Newsletter contents:
- The future of French air power - cooperation or independence?
- Is developing hypersonic weapons ‘on the cheap’ a shortcut to success?
- Are the F-35’s ‘engine troubles’ really over?
The future of French air power – cooperation or independence?
Despite being a key part of NATO’s capability, the French Air Force tends to receive little attention in many English-language media.
This is the result of three interlinking themes that underpin the country’s political-defence establishment and are in some way reflective of France as a whole. Thus, despite the French defence budget being a healthy €45bn in 2023 and – under current planning – scheduled to rise by €3bn per year to 2030, this has often been overlooked in the debates concerning aid to Ukraine and European force planning.
The first reason is simple: much French political and defence information is published only in French. Though translation does appear, this is not considered a priority and hence a lot of timely detail is more difficult to discover for English speakers, in contrast with other EU and NATO states.
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The second is that much French military equipment is of domestic design and development. Combat aircraft are almost all domestic rather than European, helicopter fleets have traditionally been of national design, although this is changing
Indeed, the paths of attempted international efforts have been rocky, either falling apart (Rafale vs Eurofighter), quietly fading (nEUron), increasingly divergent (Tiger, new Maritime Patrol Aircraft) or running into significant delays (A400M, EuroMALE).
Even the new SCAF next-gen fighter appears on shaky ground. This is not a French problem alone, but Dassault is widely if sotto voce seen as something of a difficult partner and the project has done nothing to dispel this.
By contrast, much of the rest of Europe and NATO has procured relatively common designs at some level, or simply bought American. This converges with a last, arguably French, characteristic, independent foreign policy and defence planning not requiring US permission, leading to less international publicity.
Some of the current parliamentary debate on the budget has been made available (in French) and key points can be discerned.
In the combat aircraft area, 36-48 Mirage 2000Ds will have completed an MLU by 2030, but are expected to be retired by 2035, leaving just the Rafale fleets. Thirty new Rafale B and C variants should be delivered by 2030 to the F4.2 standard with updated system hardware, with newer aircraft in the existing fleet being standardised at F4.1 and worn-out examples retired or sold.
The navy will probably receive another 12 new Rafale Ms models by the early 2030s but this will depend upon exports and supply chain. Total platform numbers by 2035 should be 225 but clearly this is subject to wider circumstances. The differences between the F4.2 and F4.1 will also create a de-facto two-tier force in the short-term.
One item of interest is hours flown by fighter pilots, with the air force seeking to raise annual proficiency from 147 to 180 while the navy targets 200 up from 188. Alongside improved training, this plan also reflects the retirement of the Mirages and a widening of Rafale capabilities to cover increasingly EW, SEAD and control of UAV fleets.
SCAF planning remains unclear in terms of the budget vs flying examples: at least one by 2030 with possibly a half-unit of initial production models by the mid-2030s would be reasonable.
A large part of the budget was dedicated to rebuilding magazine stores, with SCALP ASMs being ordered and existing examples updated. Meteor is now fully integrated with Rafale and is also included in the shopping list.
Above: France intends to upgrade its E-3F fleet and extend its service life until 2035. (Photo: Armée de l’air)
Elsewhere, the four E-3 AWACS are scheduled to remain in service, with small upgrades, to 2035 (and replacement by the increasingly standard Boeing E-7 would be politically a bitter pill, with possible collaboration with Saab as an alternative). Three navy E-2Ds will stay with the fleet, also to be upgraded but not replaced until the 2030s. A single new platform to supplant both is unlikely, but common radar and systems for a smaller, twin-engined aircraft is a reasonable supposition.
The dedicated EW fleet will remain small, with only three new Dassault Falcon 8X Archangels replacing the C-160 fleet by 2030. The A330 MRTT fleet will grow to 15 in service by the mid-2030s, while the 22 A400Ms will be joined by another 11 (or possibly 14). Four C-130Js will also remain, with older H models slowly retired in favour of the new ATSM transport.
The navy appears to have swallowed its wounded pride over Germany’s P-8 purchase and is apparently considering continued collaboration on data links and other systems that can be integrated into multiple platforms. Eight Atlantique 5s will remain in service, joined by around ten of the Standard 6 upgrade configuration.
The new and now likely French-only MPA programme is targeted at around having three examples in operation by the turn of the decade.
The UAV picture is obscure with a target of one EuroMALE system (four aircraft) by 2030 and up to six systems by 2035. Four Reaper systems (16 aircraft) will remain in service for the foreseeable future.
New UCAVs will be decided alongside the SCAF plan, but with the USAF deciding it needs three of these for every front-line crewed fighter (including training and reserves), a figure of up to 600 is possible once design is agreed.
The navy is seeking 15 SDAM VTOL UAVs by 2030, up from a current total of three. These will be fielded aboard new frigates and logistics ships which in turn will service the venerable Charles de Gaulle. The carrier is scheduled for another upgrade around 2025 with its replacement to start construction around 2028.
Above: The Atlantique MPA is still due to be replaced by an as-yet-unspecified new design, despite former partner Germany going down the P-8 route. (Photo: French MoD)
If fulfilled, this budget plan will provide France with a powerful air-naval force, with virtually all combat and support aircraft seeing significant upgrade or replacement. The greater NATO defence cohesion currently developing may drive a widening of international collaboration on some of these programmes, or possibly a flood of US products into Europe.
There is some concern in France that despite historically large expenditure, flagship projects seem mired in planning delays and technical difficulties. Yet most of the mature and developing systems have shown themselves to be effective and now boast a future roadmap.
If France can realise the restocking of systems and munitions, concurrent with a significant increased in crew training, the 2023-24 budget is a good place to start sharpening the country’s aerospace capability and as a result may lead to better understanding and wider coverage.
Is developing hypersonic weapons ‘on the cheap’ a shortcut to success?
Weapons that travel more rapidly can inflict greater damage and are usually more difficult to intercept. However, this objective tends to fall foul of a certain rule of thumb, that the cost and complexity of a design often increases with the square of the proposed maximum speed.
Hypersonic flight, usually taken to mean at greater than Mach 5, has tended to fulfil this prophecy.
In the last year, two approaches have become evident. China and the US have been trialling air-launched hypersonic weapons.
Following a series of unsatisfactory tests, the US recently cancelled the Lockheed Martin AGM-183A ARRW to focus on the Raytheon/Northrop HACM. Both are accelerated by a booster rocket then switch to a SCRAMJet to achieve Mach 5+, after which they use this energy to manoeuvre towards their target in a glide. The same principle is used by China’s YJ-12 missile.
This allows for a purpose-designed body, oriented towards manoeuvring in-atmosphere and with a degree of low-RCS shaping. However, as the ARRW showed, this approach brings its own complications.
Above: Rather than developing a hypersonic weapon from scratch, Russia has opted to modify an existing ballistic missile design for air launch from a MiG-31. (Photo: Russian MoD)
The other path has been brutally demonstrated by Russia. To achieve the benefits of hypersonic attack but avoid designing a new weapon, its air force has taken its smallest ground-launched ballistic missile – the 9K720 Iskander/SS-26 Stone – and converted it to an air-launched variant.
The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, commonly fired by an adapted MiG-31K fighter, was heralded as an ‘operational hypersonic missile’, but since all ballistic missiles are hypersonic, that was a rather cheap approach to ticking that box
The drawback to this method, despite breathless reporting, is that the speed of the weapon is only half the story. Ground-launched ballistic missiles are generally expected to hit only stationary targets, lacking the sensors or manoeuvring required for unknown or mobile equivalents.
This has reduced the potential use for Kinzhal, which has also been taken down a notch through multiple successful interceptions by Ukrainian Patriot anti-air batteries, puncturing the missile’s supposed reputation for air-defence invulnerability.
This is not to say that a basic hypersonic capability is worthless. Many slower stand-off weapons also have difficulty avoiding defences or attacking mobile, ‘pop-up’ targets. The issue here is more of practicality: few Kinzhals are available, and their loss inflicts (further) reputational damage on Russian air capability against Western-supplied air defences.
Nevertheless, a working system, albeit with limitations, is arguably better than a ten-year development process with little to show at the end.
The Russian experience might also cause reconsideration of another adapted hypersonic weapon, the infamous Chinese DF-21, dubbed the ‘carrier killer’ for its purported mission against USN capital ships in the event of a Pacific conflict.
This, too, is a conventionally armed, short-range ballistic missile. It also has an evolved, air-launched variant in the CH-AS-X-13, although this remains in development.
While the Kinzhal was de-facto supposed to be incapable of hitting moving targets, the DF-21 has vessels at sea as a primary goal. However, by repurposing a design intended for traditional land-based target types, this may prove a key weakness of the ‘basic hypersonic’ approach.
Against an isolated island base, the speed of the weapon’s terminal phase might prove overwhelming for defences. Against a Carrier Strike Group, the precise location of which might not be known and in any case would require third-party targeting, the effectiveness is far from certain.
This also does not consider the kinetic and non-kinetic defences of the fleet, not to mention new countermeasures that may be fielded but not revealed.
Above: The US has abandoned development of the ARRW hypersonic missile. (Photo: USAF)
In the case of the Kinzhal, Russia has shown that a pseudo-hypersonic weapon has some benefit, but it should be seen as a half-way house. It is unlikely that NATO states would opt for a similar approach (a lack of similar ground-launched weapons would anyway preclude this), but mid-level militaries may prove interested.
For MENA states it is an obvious path towards low-cost capability and users in the Indo-Pacific – wary of a neighbour and/or Chinese power – may also be tempted.
India’s BrahMos-II (a SCRAMJet development of the far slower BrahMos-I) has interest from Vietnam and others, and is a similar approach to developing a less ambitious but arguably still practical hypersonic weapon.
Given that the US is struggling with more advanced designs, the adapted ballistic missile or enhanced cruise missile may in the short term be sufficiently capable for many operators’ needs.
Are the F-35’s ‘engine troubles’ really over?
Despite an unbroken string of 2022 export successes, 2023 has not seen a strong start for the F-35 programme. Repeated comments from US military and government officials have highlighted dissatisfaction with disappointing development rates and cost overruns.
At the core of this is the Block 4 hardware and software that is intended to make full use of onboard systems and bolster the aircraft’s electronic warfare capability, something originally intended for roll-out around 2020.
Above: The F-35 programme looks to be sticking with Pratt & Whitney’s F135 engine, with a decision taken in favour of the ECU upgrade. (Photo: USAF)
Currently under testing, the introduction of Technology Refresh 3 software (a crucial step towards wider Block 4 capability) is now anticipated in 2024 on new Lot 17 examples, with the timeframe for upgrading older models unclear.
But alongside these issues is arguably a deeper concern, that of the F-35’s engine. While greater thrust and fuel efficiency would certainly be welcome, an equal requirement for the engine is to provide electrical power and cooling for the Block 4 capability.
In these areas, and long before Block 4, the F135 engine had been assessed as ‘under-spec since the beginning’, and that this deficiency – even under current systems requirements – was ‘eating into the life of this engine’, according to comments made before the House Armed Services Committee reported by The War Zone in late March.
The problem is likely connected to the current 53% fleet availability rate, as reported in March by Bloomberg News. The answer has been to search for an improved power plant, either an update to the current P&W offering or a wholly new alternative under the GE X-100 variable cycle engine proposition.
The issue seemed to have been solved in March with the P&W Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) selected as the preferred route. While in terms of performance this offers less absolute improvement than the GE pitch, it is lower-risk and applicable to all three main F-35 variants.
An IoC towards 2030 – one year after the current estimate for Block 4 completion – remains far behind planning, but does remove the problem of concurrent new system and new engine development. Whether older US or export aircraft will receive the ECU remains unanswered.
The alternative – briefly favoured – is GE’s XA-100 Adaptive Engine. This was always considered more applicable to the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) platform than an extant aircraft design and it was acknowledged it would present integration difficulties with the ‘B’ STOVL variant.
However, despite the P&W decision being confirmed, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall commented in mid-March that ‘if we had the opportunity to reconsider [the P&W award], I think that would be something I’d like to have another shot at. Right now [the GE option is] unaffordable.’
Given the wider cost overruns and development snags, there is a strong argument for the P&W solution. Significant aircraft kinetic performance improvement is arguably impossible at this stage, but power and cooling for the new systems is vital.
While F-35s produced towards 2030 may benefit, a question remains over those in service or due for delivery during the 2020s. This raises the spectre of a multi-tier fleet, not least in the form of a downgraded export model as the US take the majority of ECU examples.
A different software block across aircraft is a historical norm, but a different generation of engine that allows said software to run is a difficult gap to bridge.
Above: Export customers for the F-35 may not be happy if they are required to foot some of the bill for US-driven upgrades to the aircraft. (Photo: USAF)
Despite the ECU selection, there appears to be some doubt or even countervailing currents in the Pentagon. Gen Charles Q Brown, the new USAF Chief of Staff, appears less enamoured of the aircraft than some of his predecessors and after an NGAD down-select in 2024-25 the connected engine issue may reappear.
After so many years of delays, the selection of a lower-risk solution is sensible. But it does raise the question of the aircraft’s longer-term utility and whether a new power solution might be required for a Block 5/6/7 model (replete with directed energy weapons or similar).
The more difficult question is likely to be that facing export customers, in that they might be asked to foot some portion of the development and integration bill for a new engine type in order to realise for the 2030s an aircraft that they purchased a decade earlier and under entirely different circumstances.
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