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Fast jets for Ukraine – what makes sense, and what is available?

Ukraine continues to receive new weapons and munitions both to replace those lost or expended and recapitalise its armed forces in an increasingly NATO-standard direction.

Some donations are arguably more useful than others, but Kyiv’s forces have shown a superb ability to adapt to the diverse variety of unfamiliar systems and achieve proficiency at a rapid rate.

With the debate over supply of main battle tanks settled, a second capability of wide interest has been new fighter aircraft. This is a complex debate, and not one well suited to quick solutions.

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Fighter aircraft supply by the West would be a very strong political statement (and would be interpreted as escalation by Russia and possibly third party nations). Moreover, a modern combat aircraft capability is heavily dependent on support and supply, and such forces take time to develop via training and understanding of how best to use them.

The air war in Ukraine has defied general expectations. The Russian Air Force has been far less active or competent than was expected, the high-level A2AD environment less lethal than predicted and ground-launched weapons and fire support have been the overwhelming indirect means of attack.

However, Ukrainian combat aircraft remain active in ground attack roles, and with the rapid integration of US High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs) on their legacy MiG and Sukhoi aircraft, have undertaken air defence suppression work.

The easy route of supplying Ukraine with similar Soviet designs has been pursued so far, although with some hesitancy.

Supply chain issues and their limited overmatch against Russian equivalents all point to replacement by Western aircraft but so far this has not materialised. This is despite, technically, the wide array of fighters available for Ukraine.

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Looking at European NATO members, an obvious choice emerges. The Lockheed Martin F-16 has long been the alliance’s default fighter and would be a very strong fit for Ukraine.

Several hundred Block 30, 40 and 50 models (with what would be considered roughly an early-2000s operational capability) have been recently retired as F-35s and other types have entered service. The F-16 is truly multi-role, arguably far superior to most Russian equivalents and spares, training facilities and weapons for Ukraine are available in Europe.

With older Norwegian and Danish F-16s lying fallow and an active training regime for new users, the process of converting Ukrainian air and ground crews to the type would be relatively rapid.

Practical experience of operations by small air force users is also available, with several European air forces able to supply first-hand knowledge of how to get a fleet up and running with limited resources.

However, the F-16 was designed for large air bases, strong support and highly trained crews, all of which represent the opposite of the Ukrainian frontline environment. The chin-mounted air intake alone might be an issue with austere operations.

The other strong contender is Saab’s Gripen C/D. From a purely operational perspective, this is arguably an even better choice for Ukraine.

It is also a NATO-standard, capable multi-role fighter but was designed specifically for austere operations from woodland clearings and with only a skeletal ground staff. It was also designed to reduce pilot training and conversion hours, reflecting Sweden’s need for a small but useful and dynamic air force.

Above: The Gripen C is designed for operation from austere bases with minimal support and there is the possibility of new production aircraft for Ukraine. (Photo: Swedish Armed Forces)

Alongside Sweden, it serves with Hungary and the Czech Republic, providing ‘next-door’ support, although Budapest at least may be reluctant to provide this. Space also exists on the Saab production line for new orders.

At a political level, supply of a Swedish jet is potentially less incendiary than a US design, though Stockholm’s quest to join NATO may mean that this is no longer an advantage. With no current firm offers of any other fighters it certainly remains on the table as a strong contender.

Other suggestions have also been made, but do not seem well-suited to Ukraine’s requirements or circumstances.

The A-10 was initially cited as a strong candidate, particularly during the first weeks of the war when large Russian forces were relatively immobile in the Kyiv area. While the aircraft was designed for use in just such a scenario, its relatively low performance and lack of multi-role capability counts against it.

As a relatively old, and single-operator (USAF-only), offering it also risks becoming a costly and supply-chain restricted alternative – there are no small-fleet users past or present that could advise and assist Ukraine.

Likewise, Finland and Switzerland’s selection of F-35 as their new fighter potentially frees up some of their older F/A-18Cs as an option. However, with Bern generally opposed to arming Ukraine and Finland nervous of Russian intentions, these sources remain rather unlikely.

The UK’s pledge to train Ukrainian pilots also raised a discussion concerning the older Typhoon Tranche 1s recently retired from RAF service.

This idea does have some points in its favour, with the aircraft possessing high performance in the air-to-air role and hence able to engage Russian bombers or fighters from within Ukrainian airspace over their own territory. 

Above: While ex-RAF Tranche 1 Typhoons would be able to engage Russian combat aircraft, they would offer little ground attack capability. (Photo: UK MoD/Crown Copyright)

However, the Tranche 1s, limited to the old Software Release Package 4.3 and lacking the new computer of the Tranche 2s, would offer little ground-attack capability, particularly in terms of stand-off weapons. It is also an expensive and complex aircraft, and not intended for austere deployments supported by unfamiliar crews.

Finally, Dassault’s Rafale has merits as an offering. It offers better multi-role capability than Typhoon Tranche 1 plus better load-carrying than the single-engined F-16 or Gripen. However, it too is more costly and complex, as well as lacking local operators in the region.

New fighters for Ukraine remain likely, but not guaranteed. They would represent a strong political gesture, they are complex and expensive and arguably less important in the short term than extra air defences, artillery, UAS, armoured vehicles, supply vehicles… the list goes on.

Fighter aircraft would add another layer to Ukrainian planning and tie up personnel and energy. So, they are useful but come with a cost.

An objective assessment would place F-16 and Gripen as the most obvious and useful options. Would-be providers remain hesitant for now, but a few more months may change this.

However, in the current phase of the conflict it is arguable that air defence should precede air attack capability and something as useful but complex as a fighter jet force requires long preparation and should not be hurried.

Turkish and South Korean ‘4.5th gen’ fighters target middle market

The Turkish TF-X and South Korean KF-21 combat aircraft programmes have been virtual siblings in their development.

Respective OEMs TAI and KAI have evolved from component manufacturers for foreign platforms to full design and development entities. Both have very strong national backing and – owing to wider local development – access to a domestic supply chain for key systems.

And both are a core part of wider national policy and enthusiastically supported on the export market by government.

Above: The 4.5th generation TF-X (illustrated) and KF-21 have similar configurations and could both appeal to nations seeking a non-aligned source of combat aircraft. (Photo: TAI)

The aircraft also bear strong physical resemblance. Pitched as ‘4.5th generation fighters’, TF-X and KF-21 have a classic ‘chined’ nose, matching angle of vertical stabiliser and intake and are ultimately intended to carry an internal payload.

In export markets, the two aircraft will no doubt compete directly. Both are new designs and not as ossified as their 1990s equivalents are now largely perceived, and both will be pitched with potential for industrial participation and possibly local variants.

One key selling point is that South Korea and Turkey have relatively a independent status, with neither country seen as unequivocally on one or other side of what has become a new global divide.

Although Turkey is in NATO and South Korea has strong US relations, neither are as politically aligned as most would-be competitors. Turkey, as an exception to the majority of defence exporting nations, is also a Muslim country, which is of significant importance for a number of Middle Eastern and Asian markets.

In this sector they compete more closely with India and particularly Sweden, both of which are marketing new fighter designs (AMCA and Gripen E/F) and offering strong partnership propositions. The same is less true of China’s FC-31 and Russia’s Su-75, which puts these latter pair at a disadvantage.

In terms of Turkish and Korean market potential, the most obvious targets are mid-tier customers that previously operated Russian or mixed fleets. Turkey has made no secret that it wishes to supplant Russia as the regional power in the southern ex-Soviet republics, while South Korea is a clear alternative to China in South East Asia.

The KFX was originally a joint project with Indonesia, but that effort is troubled by financial problems in Jakarta and there exists other strong opportunities.

In the Central Asian market, Kazakhstan has not followed up on recent Russian fighter purchases, Turkmenistan procured the limited-capability Leonardo M-346FAS and Uzbekistan has little that is airworthy.

In other geographies, Colombia remains open, Argentina is unfulfilled, Egypt might be interested in new alternatives, the UAE has plans but little is concrete, something which could also be said of Saudi Arabia.

Above: The KF-21 may have appeal in Asian countries with more moderate budgets that need a modern capability and do not wish to buy Chinese. (Photo: KAI)

In Asia Thailand is seeking new aircraft, Malaysia and the Philippines have selected the KAI T-50 and while – stretching the scope a little – Myanmar and Mongolia are not beyond possibility (more for TFX). All of the above have some need and might seek a supplier they consider more neutral.

These few next years are potentially a seller’s market. Many older designs are reaching the end of their life, while Global politics have arguably removed Russia from the supplier base and sharpened the West vs China divide. The F-35 is off the cards for many, while the F-16 remains possible but is getting old. Rafale and Gripen E/F are the main European beneficiaries from this, but Turkey and South Korea are well positioned to capitalise on a gap in what might be termed the middle market.

USAF changes course on tankers as Pacific threats loom large

Boeing has experienced several extremely difficult years. While normally depending on strong commercial aircraft sales for around 35% of revenue, this business area remains turbulent in the aftermath of COVID-19, and the company posted a 2022 Q4 loss of over $600 million.

Military aircraft programmes have also been uneven, contrasting the USAF TF-7 contract success with the end of USN F/A-18 purchases and the vacillating F-15EX fighter programme (now back up again, in Boeing’s favour, to 104 examples).

Above: Recent changes in US strategic thinking mean the KC-46 could be the last airliner-based tanker procured by the air force. (Photo: USAF)

Arguably the company’s largest unforced error lies at the confluence of its defence and commercial lines in the shape of the KC-46 tanker programme.

Based on the Boeing 767 airliner, the KC-46 was envisaged as a low-risk KC-135 replacement that could provide multi-role refuelling and transport capabilities using a mature airframe in widespread civil service.

However, a long list of issues – many still unresolved as of early 2023 – have dogged the programme and although around 60 have been delivered and for 2024 a ninth lot of 15 has been ordered, it could not so far be considered a resounding success.

At a strategic level, the programme’s misfortunes may also have affected USAF planning for its aerial tanker capability. Refuelling aircraft generally use commercial designs because they fulfil similar roles – efficient load-carrying at medium altitude with an emphasis on range and persistence.

However, these design features also mean that they are vulnerable to enemy action and must operate far from hostile air defences. This means the combat aircraft being refuelled have a long way to travel between the tanker and their mission objective, burning valuable fuel.

The idea of a bespoke, low-observable tanker, able to refuel its charges far closer to an enemy coast or border, has circulated for years. One of Boeing’s recent successes has been the uncrewed MQ-25 for the USN, which operates primarily for air refuelling but has a low-RCS shape.

At present, this is an isolated example of a ‘stealth tanker’, but the USAF has indicated it was looking at such a capability under its KC-Z programme. Various renderings by aerospace companies suggest that this idea has been taken seriously by industry.

The travails of the KC-46 have led to a proposed new USAF tanker under the KC-Y programme, referred to as a ‘bridge’ solution and also based on a commercial airliner. This would fulfil requirements before the more ambitious KC-X enters service in the 2040s.

However, rising concerns over China and the need to operate combat aircraft over distances resulted in the proposed KC-Y being drastically cut, concurrent with a March 2023 request for information (RfI) for a Next Generation Air-Refueling System (NGAS), which ‘shall be required to address employment in contested scenarios’.

To further emphasise this change of tack, the NGAS should consider ‘a clean-sheet-of-paper approach not constrained to commercial-derivative aircraft’.

This new strategy has arrived with unusual speed. Although KC-Z had been in circulation for a while, the RfI and various statements with an ambitious IoC of 2040 have pushed the programme high up the priority list.

With the USAF clearly preparing its next generation of systems for a Pacific context, KC-Z fits neatly alongside the B-21 and NGAD/sixth-generation fighter. It would also mitigate the relatively short range of the F-22 and F-35 while operating without external tanks.

Above: F-22s and F-35s operating over long ranges in the Pacific may need a low-observable tanker to refuel them closer to a well-defended hostile coastline. (Photo: USAF)

The unanswered question is funding priorities. At present, the USAF is seeking to advance capability across several areas. The F-35 continues to absorb a large portion of its budget, the mysterious NGAD is a central pillar for the force, T-7 production is ramping up, and various UAS programmes have a key position, while the B-21 is also clearly a core element of force planning.

With the KC-46 far from mature, the nominal KC-Z programme is arguably far in the future. By the same token, the intermediary KC-Y is almost certainly dead in the water. Despite budget increases – and calls for more – concurrent investment across all these (and many more) efforts will be difficult.

There is a strong case for a new tanker. Despite the poor performance of Russian air defences over Ukraine, a Western Pacific/Taiwan conflict with Beijing would require US forces to plan for a deep and dense defensive Chinese wall.

Given the distances involved, refuelling combat aircraft forward is seen as a necessity. Even had the KC-46 been problem-free, it could not securely undertake its main role over the Philippine Sea. KC-Y, therefore, is likely to be dropped in exchange for emphasis on a purpose-built, low-RCS platform that can loiter at the edge of hostile air defences to the maximum benefit of its charges.

Given current fashion towards networking all platforms and sensors, such an aircraft would be useful also as a C4ISR node. But barring the unlikely adoption of the USN’s MQ-25 refueler, the air force’s new emphasis on a survivable tanker design seems to have gathered new momentum.

F-16 retains top slot as world’s most ordered fighter jet

Analysis by Norbert Neumann

The F-16 Fighting Falcon programme began in 1975 as a low-cost, highly manoeuvrable day fighter to complement the higher-cost, heavier McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle air superiority fighter.

Above: Despite the design first flying in the 1970s the F-16 remains an effective multirole fighter with a reasonable price tag. (Photo: Lockheed Martin)

Over the years, it has grown into a multirole platform, which has widened its international appeal and sales prospects. Production in large numbers has helped decrease unit cost, making it more affordable for smaller countries with limited budgets.

The latest and most advanced variant is the F-16 Block 70/72 Viper, targeted primarily at international customers.

Source: Shephard Defence Insight

The total number of F-16s ordered worldwide is around 4,500, whereas so far only around 3,400 F-35s have been sold.

As the number of countries choosing the F-35 grows, the jet’s flyaway unit cost is projected to fall to $80 million. Despite high maintenance costs, this can make the fifth-generation fighter even more attractive to international customers. However, it will take some time for the number of F-35 purchases to catch up with global F-16 orders.

In comparison, the Russian Su-24 fighter bomber’s production also began in the 1970s, but only under 2,000 jets were delivered.

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