Decisive Edge Newsletter | Air | June 2023
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Airliners versus business jets – sizing up the options for airborne early warning aircraft
The recent announcement that Poland is negotiating with Saab for the sale of two 340 Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft is the latest in a long line of high-end procurements by Warsaw.
These turboprops – not the more advanced Saab GlobalEye as reported by some sources – will join the F-16 Block 50s, F-35s and F/A-50s as part of a new and shiny air force.
The fighter acquisition largely mirrors that of NATO neighbours, but the AEW&C purchase is unique. Given the current situation in Ukraine, it worth considering whether this will remain a one-off decision or become more common, either as a country-specific capability and/or a shared, networked element.
The NATO E-3 fleet has long been the backbone of shared airborne C2 in Europe. It is arguably a vital but expensive capability, underwritten by the USAF’s own fleet of AEW&C aircraft as well as other multi-mission and specialist platforms.
Some NATO states (the UK and France) have sought their own AEW fleets, but these have traditionally been an exception. However, the last decade has seen AEW&C procurement by Italy, Japan, South Korea, Australia the UAE and Chile.
The purchase of special mission aircraft tends to be driven by particular circumstances. What is also relatively unusual is the rapid introduction of new niche capability.
AEW&C is complicated and expensive, and it takes a long time to train crews and integrate with wider forces. However, it is a significant asset and force multiplier if effectively managed and used.
There are cases both for and against this capability. The aircraft carry powerful and highly discriminatory radars, able to classify ground as well as air targets. They are the embodiment of the oft-espoused ‘information node’, bringing together and distributing information from tens if not hundreds of sources.
With a dedicated back-seat crew, not distracted by flying or weapons management, they can be a second or third pair of hands for a combat aircraft. A favourite future role is managing drone swarms or ‘loyal wingmen’ to complement and multiply the effectiveness of the fast jet fleet.
But there is (inevitably) a counter-argument. Modern fighters are supposed to be self-networking, with all information processed onboard and in the cockpit with the crew. These aviators might better judge and manage supporting UAS, as a JTAC controls air support at squad level.
Furthermore, AEW&C aircraft are extremely expensive, vulnerable and perishable assets. A fleet of just two might well mean zero available on most days. Even when airborne, they are of low relative performance and cannot easily be moved around in a high-tempo fight.
Above: While future AEW platforms will not be the size of the E-3, there is still scope for solutions based on airliners or business jets. (Photo: Leonardo)
The Polish decision, mirrored in wider recent procurement, indicates air forces believe these aircraft are worthwhile despite the drawbacks. The USAF decision to replace the E-3 with the E-7, based on the Boeing 737 airframe, has somewhat settled the argument among NATO and allied forces.
With the UK, Australia, South Korea and Turkey all operating the type it might become the new de-facto choice. But while the use of airliner-based platforms has its merits, within the special mission market there is a wave of thinking that business jets might be a better solution.
These are faster, operate at higher altitude and – this is a contentious point –arguably no more expensive or possibly cheaper over several decades. The smaller crew is offset by greater automation.
This approach challenges what might be Boeing’s market domination. Although Airbus has at times offered a variety of competing designs these have never progressed.
Meanwhile, the small jet AEW&C contingent has slowly grown. Brazil, Greece and Mexico operate an Embraer-based design (the latter has only a single example), but alongside Saab’s offerings IAI has sold several examples of its Eitam aircraft.
Based on the G550, this latter is a direct competitor to GlobalEye, although Saab has a collection of existing customers to whom it is offering the new product. After the latter’s UAE contract win, Saudi Arabia is an obvious target given its current use of the Saab 2000.
An interesting test of the airliner vs business jet argument will be future decisions in Europe. Boeing has achieved a string of successes with the 737-based P-8 maritime patrol aircraft. This was contentious in the case of Germany owing to the proposed new MPA programme to be shared with France.
Indeed, Paris will be something of a bellwether for this. Historically allergic to US purchases, France may look to Saab for a bespoke GlobalEye variant to replace its own E-3s. Dassault has no doubt pitched something similar as a wholly domestic design using its business jets and a Thales radar.
With possibly two European alternatives in the current security situation, other medium-sized states may decide that they also should invest in this capability.
The alternative, some way in the future, is a fleet of UAS. Built around an MQ-25 or MQ-28 equivalent, a networked force would offer redundancy and depth. Flying closer to the combat zone, these could prove more usable in assisting combat aircraft.
Above: The MQ-25 has been used to refuel AEW aircraft but similar designs may yet serve as one themselves. (Photo: Boeing)
However, as with most of the proposed high-end ‘loyal wingman’ they are expensive and far from ‘attritable’. They also raise the question of providing effective C2 in an electronically hostile environment.
With its E-3 replacement in widespread service, Boeing is arguably best-placed to benefit from like-for-like decisions by entities such as NATO.
But for smaller operators such as Poland the appeal of a compact offering such as Saab’s 340 or GlobalEye may prove higher. Sweden and Finland are moving towards shared use of the capability (if not yet the aircraft themselves), and with Poland now on board, a Saab geographic zone may start to form among the northern and eastern NATO members.
IAI, with a sale to Italy, is likely also to become a competitor. Aside from Boeing it is Saab that potentially stands to enjoy a string of sales across both existing and new customers, as Poland is unlikely to be the last swift adopter of new AEW&C aircraft.
Is the Indian Air Force’s strength in numbers approach doomed to failure?
While an aggressive China is often couched in terms of a potential threat to Taiwan, India has long been the local peer competitor.
Above: Finding a rapid replacement for large numbers of elderly MiG-21s is likely to present a major challenge for India. (Photo: Indian Air Force)
For several decades the Indian armed forces have largely overmatched Pakistan, but the ability to deal with a Chinese war around the Himalayas in the East or north of Pakistan in the West is more problematic.
As with most large states, the air force would be a key component of any conflict, but India has itself admitted that all is not well.
The current CO, Air Chief Marshal Vivek Ram Chaudhari, has stated a requirement for 42 combat squadrons. At present, depending on how ‘strength’ is calculated, there are around 30.
There is no timeframe for this growth but given the years needed to procure and field new aircraft it is likely a 2030-plus goal.
While ‘in the 2030s’ is a common shorthand in military planning, actual Indian strength is likely to decline towards and during that period. The force faces a multi-faceted problem, covering size, sourcing and support.
The size issue is simple in that there are not enough aircraft. India is by no means alone in this, but force size is also a cyclical matter determined by introduction and retirement schedules.
Here, the goal for growth is undermined by imminent retirement of many types. The Su-30s are and will remain a backbone, but their 250-strong contingent is matched in numbers by a mix of Jaguars, MiG-29s and – arguably the real problem – MiG-21s.
No force wishing to be taken seriously can keep such relics and these will be retired towards 2030. However, this means India will lose about 250 fighters, with no concrete plans for replacement.
Even with further Rafales (likely) and smooth delivery of either Tejas or a third-party Light Combat Aircraft (less likely), total squadrons will at best remain relatively static.
A second issue is aircraft supply. A simple solution to ageing aircraft is to retire them and procure the next model from the OEM. This is feasible – if expensive – for the Mirage 2000s. But for the Jaguars there is no obvious replacement and certainly none from the defunct SEPECAT joint-venture.
Tejas could arguably fill the gap, but the programme is not progressing smoothly. F/A-50 is another candidate, but this would further complicate Indian’s polyglot fleet. The new platform cannot simply appear once Jaguar has gone, so a period of costly contemporaneous operation would be necessary.
The real issue, however, is Russian aircraft in the current geopolitical maelstrom. Replacement of MiG-21s with new-model MiG-29s would burn many bridges with allies. The US CAATSA policy would spring into full effect and France would face a dilemma over the morality of its future sales.
Indeed, India would find itself sliding closer to the Chinese position on Russia. All things being equal, MiGs will have to be replaced by something from somewhere else, which will be complicated and expensive.
On to the final point. India is aware it needs to excise its old fleet, but it cannot do this overnight. Even were new aircraft to appear ‘by magic’, the infrastructure required for operation needs to be introduced: support systems, parts, training, new weapons, even manuals take time to gain sufficient mass.
From first delivery to operational capability is at best three to five years (Ukraine aside). Concurrently, spare parts for older aircraft, particularly the Russians, are likely rapidly dwindling.
Above: Keeping Mirage 2000s active as the supply chain dwindles is risky and expensive. (Photo: Indian Air Force)
France is retiring its Mirages and the supply chain is essentially gone. Even with help from Israel, support of the aging fleet will be very difficult. The cost-saving and realistic answer is retirement, but then we return to the issue of net fleet size.
The 42-squadron goal is likely unrealistic. Retention of an increasingly non-Russian Sukhoi fleet, six to eight Rafale units, a similar number of Tejas and – pride swallowed – something like Gripen E would give a 30-plus force with very strong capability.
Availability and utility is arguably more important than absolute numbers though. Combining the suggested force above with AEW&C, improved networking and a growing UAS contingent would likely offer a more useful and flexible air arm than scrabbling desperately for an anachronistically large number of fighters.
Why the USAF is focused on not repeating F-35 mistakes with the NGAD programme
The USAF’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter is one of several sixth-generation programmes currently in progress across the NATO and allied world.
Above: Little is known of the likely configuration of NGAD, and renderings such as this one from Lockheed Martin may end up bearing scant resemblance to the final design. (Image: Lockheed Martin)
It likely has some overlap with the USN’s F/A-XX and there was a suggestion of limited collaboration with the UK’s Tempest, though that seems less likely now the latter has evolved into the multinational Global Combat Aircraft Programme. Lastly, the Franco-Spanish-German Future Combat Air System is likely to be roughly similar to its contemporaries.
For NGAD the USAF has been remarkably tight-lipped about the actual design. It was stated that a prototype had already flown, although this is likely to have been more of a technology demonstrator. Shadowy shapes have been seen at US testing areas, suggesting a tailless delta. But with an industry dialogue begun in May 2023 further details are likely slowly to emerge.
The usual adjectives of ‘next-gen’, ‘lethality’, ‘stealth’ and ‘optionally manned’ have featured fairly continuously. But one statement is perhaps more interesting in terms of the US military’s approach to ownership of the finished product.
Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall publicly stated last month that the USAF was ‘not [going] to repeat the, what I think frankly was a serious mistake that was made in the F-35 programme’.
He clarified this as the service not previously owning the intellectual property and hence the rights to evolve support practices as well as control software updates and other modifications. Specifically, he referenced an error in allowing Lockheed’s ownership of the aircraft ‘for its entire lifecycle’.
He went on to add: ‘What that basically does is create a perpetual monopoly. I spent years struggling to overcome acquisition malpractice [on the F-35], and we’re still struggling with that to some degree. So we’re not going to do that with NGAD.’
Kendall continued: ‘We’re going to make sure that the government has ownership for the intellectual property it needs. We’re going to make sure… we have modular designs and open systems so that, going forward, we can bring new suppliers in.’
Whoever is chosen ‘as the platform integrator… will have a much tighter degree of government control over the future of that programme than we’ve had’ with the F-35, he added. ‘We’ve learned that lesson.’
Essentially this means that although there will be a single main contractor, the life of the fighter will be directed by the USAF, including the authority to use third-party software or other features distinct from the OEM’s own offerings.
As if to underline such sentiments, the F-35 has endured a particularly bad few months. At the core of this has been indecision on a new engine. It is now generally accepted that the current P&W F135 model is underpowered, resulting in insufficient cooling and higher maintenance. For the Block 4 (and beyond) upgrades cooling will be of central importance.
Above: The F-35 still has some potential mountains to climb on its current upgrade path. (Photo: USAF)
Meanwhile a large number of spares have ‘gone missing’, likely an issue stemming from the roundly disliked ALICE support network. Finally, the Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3) – gateway to the Block 4 upgrade – has not only overrun on cost and timeframe, (possibly now to Spring 2024) but the DoD has made the unusual decision that it will stop accepting some F-35s that were due for delivery in June and July.
Once TR-3 issues have been resolved, the stored aircraft will be taken on strength. This is the third delivery halt since mid-2022.
Though the nature of NGAD customer-supplier relations has undoubtedly been in discussion for months if not years, the most recent set of F-35 travails is likely to have reinforced the USAF’s view that its new approach is correct.
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