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Tactical advantage – is the best replacement for a C-130 another C-130?

Embraer’s C-390 was recently declared fully operational by the Portuguese Air Force’s 506 Squadron. The Brazilian manufacturer had put significant effort into collaboration with local industry and the common language was of likely benefit.

This has provided Embraer with a bridgehead into what is likely to become a highly valuable market: the EU/NATO tactical transport segment. Hungary is due to receive the first C-390s in 2023-24 while the Netherlands appears strongly inclined to announce a purchase in 2025-26.

Saab, partnered with Embraer on the Gripen E/F fighter programme and which had long considered its own tactical transport design, is also now on board. Boeing, after complicated legal wrangling, now is not.

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The recent Australian purchase of a further 20 J-models shows that the iconic C-130 remains the primary choice for the classic tactical transport role.

The retirement of aging Hercules (second-hand sales notwithstanding) offers significant sales opportunities. With a limited variety of NATO-standard aircraft in the same class, most forces had retained or looked to replace the older aircraft.

Airbus’s A400M is larger with a maximum take-off weight around 1.5 times that of the C-130 and C-390. Kawasaki’s C-2 sits somewhere between the two, but in the short-term the appetite for Japanese exports appears low.

Many operators, but by no means all, will be less inclined to consider a Russian aircraft (although there is little on offer here anyway). China is marketing the Y-9, but such an acquisition would mean crossing a political line by US aircraft fleet operators.

Airbus meanwhile has announced a new tactical transport study for what appears to be a C-130-class aircraft (smaller than the A400M), although the cynic might observe that Airbus always has a plan/study/initial concept in progress for a new aircraft. Sweden would have been a part of this, but Saab’s MoU with Embraer now suggests otherwise.

While the A400M and roughly similar C-17 have a certain degree of market share, they remain something of an outliner in tactical transport terms, both being larger and costlier than more typical designs.

Few nations require something as strategic as the C-17, while the A400M’s size has been something of a drawback for tactical operations, being a little too heavy and expensive for the simple ‘move from A to B’ mission of the classic airlifter. Supposedly, some personnel feel that the C-160 Transall was a better fit than the larger Airbus aircraft, but that (old) bird has flown.

In terms of new demand, and discounting the US market, aging C-130 models alone likely account for around 150 aircraft to be replaced by around 2030 and this may prove to be a low estimate.

Above: Embraer’s C-390 has had some sales success in Europe, with Portugal, Hungary and (soon) the Netherlands. (Photo: Embraer)

The C-390 and C-130J overlap in many key aspects such as range and payload, but in general the former is superior in virtually all categories by roughly 25-35%. One area that arguably favours the Hercules is rough-field performance, with its slightly lower stall speed and the ability to generate reverse thrust from its engines.

Take-off run is also likely to be shorter for the turboprop aircraft, although the Embraer offering wins out on subsequent climb rate. The higher FOD danger to the 390’s turbofans is also a factor.

While prices are notoriously difficult to quote, a bare-bones version of either would likely sit somewhere in the $70 million bracket. Services and support add to the cost, and here the US aircraft benefits from maturity and economies of scale. Both have special mission versions, but only the ‘K’ model tanker variants have seen much international interest.

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But will the tactical transport market live up to its nominal opportunities? Even before the Ukraine war, several programmes were under way to evaluate C-130 replacements. Yet two factors will likely limit the sales potential of aircraft like the C-390 or Japan’s C-2.

The first is the relative youth of C-130J fleets, many of which saw their last deliveries in the mid-2010s or have yet to be completed. Plenty of C-130H and earlier models exist, but traditional practice would to be replace by the development of a known type.

A complete replacement programme often lasts a decade, suggesting many opportunities for newcomers would be a 2030-plus consideration. Lockheed retains the upper hand for now.

The second factor is current priorities and the opportunity cost. The fighting in Ukraine has spurred a depth and breadth of defence spending not seen since the late 1980s. Some of the planned acquisitions appear rather more fanciful than strictly relevant, but one role apparently not prioritised is the tactical transport aircraft.

This does not mean that new types have not been considered, but spending on other capabilities will increase the likelihood of retaining those (usually C-130s) already in service. This is particularly true of Eastern Europe’s NATO members that have tended to show a preference for American equipment.

The other obvious target is the Indo-Pacific, but many of the wealthier countries here have C-130Js or are in the process of acquiring them. A quick scan down the MENA list reveals a similar situation.

While this could all be counted as market value, it diminishes potential in the short to medium term. Greater competitive potential could be argued for South America, where Embraer has home advantage, but that should not be overstated and in any case the volumes here are unlikely to be great.

Above: The A400M is ‘too much plane’ for many operators. While Airbus has proposed a smaller future tactical transport, this may struggle to gain traction against existing competitors. (Photo: UK MoD/Crown Copyright)

The high usage rate and sheer utility of tactical transports means that need for these aircraft – and some specialised versions such as aerial tankers – will not diminish.

Indeed, current spending on ground-based radar, air defence and light armoured vehicles may push forces back towards new purchases of these aircraft and away from fighters and high-end UAVs.

But the last round of procurement has left many fleets less than a decade old, the C-130J has retained a powerful grasp on the market and while opportunities exist and competition is rising, Embraer and (especially) Kawasaki have a hill to climb.

Chinese air power – analysing the bigger picture

Admitted by the US to be a ‘pacing threat’, the development of Chinese air power will continue to be a core measure of Beijing’s military capability.

While gaining the most attention, fighter aircraft alone remain only a part of the massive expansion under way. Advanced C4I, EW, UAS and cyber assets, a powerful A2/AD capability and long-range missiles, to which some assign almost supernatural powers, are all part of this modern ‘kill network’.

Crewed aircraft, particularly fast jets, have been well documented. The J-16 is the latest in a long line of Su-27 derivatives, succeeding the less capable J-11 as the backbone of the fighter force. Combined with the PL-12, -15 and -21 long-range missiles, an AESA radar (admittedly of unclear capability) and likely various EW improvements it is understandably considered in the F-15 class.

Above: The J-16, based on the Russian Su-27, remains the backbone of China’s fighter fleet. (Photo: Chinese MoD)

The J-10C single-seater is akin to the F-16 Block 70 or Gripen E. The J-31, resembling a cross between an F-35 and KAI’s KF-21 should be the low-observable conventional or naval fighter, while the J-20 has long been regarded as akin to the F-22.

The equivalences are rough, but the general fighter force structure is clear. And around 800 of the more advanced types are expected by the late 2020s, although this clearly depends on a host of factors.

The Flanker-derived J-16 has a famously long range, which the J-20 presumably improves on. While onboard fuel also equates to defensive loiter time, it certainly extends the operational footprint over the Pacific.

Comparisons can also be made of bombers, with the venerable H-6 (equals B-1B) modified for newer weapons, and hints as to the next generation H-20 (read B-21). But as with fighters, the debate over exact capabilities should be balanced against the clear intention.

These, however, are only the easiest to discern of the wider fleet. C3 has been a core part of combat operations for over 80 years and whatever the self-sensing capabilities of an aircraft might be, no commander would wish to fight in a single dimension.

There is also the wider issue of supply and support, with NATO taking a renewed interest in dispersed operations that could be considered as mirroring China’s approach to its growing web of artificial islands and reefs.

The advances in Chinese AEW&C and EW/reconnaissance aircraft are a cause for others’ concern. The KJ-2000 and KJ-500, developed in part to replace scarce imported Russian types, can be presumed to carry the latest radar and communications technology.

 Above: AEW aircraft such as the KJ-500 are a vital adjunct to the PLAAF’s fast jets. (Photo: Chinese MoD)

Again, combined with a growing and modernised fighter fleet, this is a long way from the ‘Communist mass’ of J-6 and Q-5 fighters in the 1970s. Other types, such as the Y-8, seem to cover a variety of EW and communications roles, likely alongside a growing satellite and UAS network.

The next issue is an expanding transport and tanker fleet in the form of Y-20 variants, which have gained few headlines but are highly significant. This aircraft and others provide both strategic airlift and range multiplication as part of the Nine-Dash-Line defence posture as well as for offensive operations.

Activity in disputed sea areas or south of Taiwan will place a heavy burden on such capability and without these assets, the combat fleet could achieve far less.

What appears specifically a counter-US force is the new Type 003 aircraft carrier. Likely to embark the J-31 fighter, it is also benefiting from testing of the KJ-600 AEW&C aircraft.

Although key details are murky, the latter is equivalent to the USN’s E-2D Hawkeye, with a modern radar as part of a collective C4I suite. Whatever its capabilities, alongside new naval fighters and assets such as the heavy Type 55 destroyer, it shows the direction of PLAN travel: fight a major and complex battle with the carrier air wing as a key component.

The subject of air power is massive and nuanced, but these crewed air programmes alone indicate a capability objective.

Up until the late 1980s, Chinese air doctrine was closer to the classic Soviet model of centralised C3 with limited integration. Economic and technical developments, coupled with a shift in strategic thinking, have clearly changed this.

Physical assets are only one part of a force’s capability, but the direction of travel and operational planning revealed by new aircraft types is clear.

Washington and others’ worries about a Taiwan conflict may or may not be overstated, but the ability of China to dictate the strategic air environment has certainly been accelerated.

A welcome observer? Workshare wrangles loom as Belgium joins SCAF future fighter effort

Of the three major Western next-generation fighter programmes, the (arguably) French-led SCAF has received the least attention in English-speaking media.

Language barriers aside, one reason for this is the relative lack of visible progress (and hence released details). After acrimonious negotiations, SCAF Phase 1B was signed in December, allocating around $4 billion to the crewed fighter element.

Above: Belgium now has observer status on SCAF, which may eventually lead to dilution of Spain and others’ workshare on the programme. (Image: Airbus Defence & Space)

During June’s Paris Airshow, Belgium’s participation in SCAF as an ‘observer’ was confirmed, with future options for closer collaboration.

While Belgium has a variety of high-tech companies the most obvious contributor would be SABCA, the aerospace concern that is participating in F-35 procurement. However, this muddies the position of Spain, which had previously been the junior partner.

Spain’s Indra would have expected to receive and delegate national workshare for various elements, but Belgium’s entry as another second-tier participant (or rival?) would dilute this.

Given that division of the cake has usually been a stumbling block for pan-European efforts, (with Dassault and Airbus already previously at loggerheads on SCAF) this is not a minor issue.

The Belgian question mirrors the Swedish position on the UK-Japan-plus-Italy GCAP effort. Stockholm had long admitted that it was a marginal actor, although the 2023 defence technology agreement with Tokyo has somewhat solidified its potential for participation.

One of GCAP’s strengths is that the UK, Italy and Sweden (ie Saab) are used to collaborating, particularly across Eurofighter and Gripen development and supply chains. Japan is a new entrant to the group but seems keen to demonstrate it can work without US assistance.

France, Germany, Spain and Belgium have a history of aerospace alliances, but differing and sometimes rival combat aircraft lineages.

This has ramifications beyond political, industrial and technical aspects. Elements such as software, sensors and weapons are obviously of joint interest across all participants. Structure, material and engine research can similarly be shared to great value.

However, both programmes have at their core a crewed fighter aircraft, something that will be the centre of gravity. In both cases, operational requirements for this figurehead aircraft are unlikely to be consistent.

For the UK and Japan, GCAP is intended to defeat major strategic threats (Russia and China). In the case of the latter adversary especially, this demands high speed and altitude performance plus range. Logically, this points to a large, twin-engined design.

Japan has spoken of replacing F-2 single-engined aircraft, but arguably needs more of an F-15 successor. Italy might be ambivalent on this, but as with Typhoon plus Tornado could be willing to compromise as part of a multi-national effort.

Sweden’s threat scenario, by comparison, has led to an operational doctrine that favours small, capable and independently operating fighters with low footprints. The Baltic is not the Pacific.

Above: Sweden’s future role on GCAP remains unclear, and its operational doctrine favours fielding a smaller aircraft than the designs seen in renderings so far. (Image: BAE Systems)

It seems unlikely that Stockholm would replace Gripen E/F with something in the F-22 class, leaving Saab the path of contributing to the UCAV element and benefitting from joint R&D but developing a Gripen replacement outside of GCAP. With access to the engine and sensor technology this is possible but carries risk.

A similar situation faces SCAF. One element of the crewed fighter that has long puzzled observers is French operational requirements. These call not only for nuclear capability –in keeping with doctrine – but also a naval role aboard a future aircraft carrier.

France’s weight in the programme might keep this requirement alive, but for Germany and Spain it is an irrelevancy that complicates design and increases cost: this was a key reason that Eurofighter and Rafale split.

Operationally, Belgium is closer to Germany and Spain in having no need of this, and France’s relative power decreases with the fourth partner’s admission.

Just as both programmes share objectives, elements and public images, so the entry of Belgium would further increase their similarities.

Both GCAP and SCAF would now have two major drivers (UK-Japan and France-Germany), a slightly junior partner (Italy and Spain respectively) and an outlier in Sweden and Belgium.

In both cases the programmes may manage internal differences and see growing success over the decade, but arguably the centripetal forces within SCAF could be more difficult to overcome.

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