Decisive Edge Newsletter | Air | August 2023
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Ukraine lessons: is bringing an attack helicopter to a missile fight too dangerous?
According to multiple OSINT sources, Russian forces have lost possibly as many as 200 rotary-wing aircraft since February 2022. Some of these losses occurred in early high-profile operations, but most have been attrition casualties during the ongoing fighting.
The absolute number of helicopters downed or written off amounts to possibly 10% of the operational fleet, but as these are likely more advanced variants flown by better crews, that remains a significant dent in capability. Interestingly, it is the relatively modern Ka-52 model that forms the bulk of these losses.
The reasons for this experience, and how the situation has evolved, are of interest to other operators keen to draw lessons on their own approach to rotary-wing operations, especially as the US and others are accelerating new helicopter development.
When Russian rotorcraft have been active over Ukraine, they have generally performed in small groups with little apparent coordination and forward air control (FAC) has been noticeably lacking. Helicopters have been seen pitching up rapidly from over their own lines to fire rockets in a vague direction before dropping down while turning back.
This latterly ineffective approach provides clues as to the problems suffered by Russian forces (and some solutions found). As this piece was being written, the Ukrainian counter-offensive was making slow progress, and the effectiveness of Moscow’s attack helicopters appears to have increased.
One of the truisms of the conflict has been the essential role played by traditional, physical weapons. Russian helicopters have overwhelmingly fallen at the hands of ground forces using SHORADS, machine guns and anti-armour rockets. This massive firepower direction is another part of the lesson concerning what attack helicopters can and cannot do.
During the first few months, the Ka-52, fast but relatively lightly armoured, operated tens of kilometres behind enemy lines on ‘armed reconnaissance’ flights, looking for known targets and those of opportunity, utilising speed and surprise.
Ukraine’s air defences proved extremely mobile, frequently surprising Ka-52 crews. The former could not easily be located and – being mostly passively guided – could shoot first. Plus, the distance from Russian lines meant a damaged aircraft had less chance of getting home.
By this summer, less ambitious Russian operations, stretched Ukrainian forces and a paucity of air defence units have reduced losses. Russian fast jets appear to have stepped up SEAD/DEAD activity, further reducing the threat to attack helicopters.
Night attacks have increased, making use of the Ka-52’s comparatively advanced all-weather capabilities. Finally, a combination of slightly newer helicopters and a Darwinian effect on Russian crews has likely increased survivability, and concurrently their destruction of Ukrainian air defences.
In short, they have become more realistic, more creative, more capable and have better managed their impact-versus-risk calculation.
As a counterpoint, the heavier Mi-28 seem to have suffered fewer casualties and seen less operational changes. These are used in a more conservative role as ‘flying artillery’ and closer to home, and their heavier construction and armour reduce vulnerability.
Above: The Mi-28, operating closer to Russian-held territory, has not faced the same losses or challenges as the Ka-52. (Photo: Rosoboronexport)
What wider conclusions on the role and utility of the attack helicopter can be drawn? Such operations without air superiority in the teeth of mobile air defences is foolish and much Russian equipment is old and well-understood by the Ukrainians. Pilot hours and training are also a fraction of their NATO equivalents.
NATO equipment, pilots and doctrine are undoubtedly superior, but the basic roles – and vulnerabilities – of Apaches and Tigers are not that different from those of Hokums and Havocs. NATO would pair these assets with UAVs and FAC, but these are also vulnerable, can be located and their effectiveness marginalised.
It is extremely rare for air forces to meet the opposition they expected or suffer fewer casualties than planned. By August 2023, through painful trial and error, Russian attack helicopters now appear to pose a far greater threat to Ukrainian forces than 12 months previously.
This is a worrying trend for Ukraine and will generate a response, but what was previously dismissed as another Russian failure seems to be evolving into an effective force.
Do NATO and its allies need to reconsider their own approach?
Starting with the aircraft, the ubiquitous AH-64D and E’s sensors and defensive aids are likely far more advanced than Russian equivalents, while its weapons are more accurate at longer ranges. Using highly networked communications, the aircraft should be far more survivable, and working with fast jets, UAS and ground forces this operational approach should avoid most of the problems listed above.
Above: The AH-64 has a number of technological (and arguably doctrinal) advantages over its Russian equivalents but is still at considerable risk against a peer adversary. (Photo: US Army)
Nonetheless, the Apache cannot fly or climb faster than Russian helicopters. To engage targets with most weapons it must advance deep into SHORAD/MANPAD territory. Its armour reduces risk but the aircraft can still be brought down by a single missile. A broadly similar assessment could be made of the Tiger or AW129.
So despite best efforts, NATO attack helicopters can certainly be surprised and ambushed by a modern foe in both kinetic and possibly electronic or cyber attacks. Having experienced this, Russia pulled back, swallowing considerable crew operational pride.
Even if not comparable directly, there is a case for reviewing how well NATO crews would fare undertaking equivalent missions in a similar situation against a well-equipped foe. The Taiwan scenario springs to mind here.
The Ukraine battlespace, then, is an example of an operator (Russia) pressing a solution while ignoring (at least initially) the problem.
Using this to peer into a cracked mirror, NATO’s doctrine of dispersed operations with a focus on EW and stand-off weapons might equally be stumped by myriad cheap drones bombing fuel and spare parts supplies, and/or hundreds of MANPADS distributed to all enemy formations plus basic UCAVs attacking with air-to-air missiles, all over a jamming screen that prevents most stand-off weapons from locking on.
The output of a study into NATO equipment and doctrine might conclude that the current approach is still viable. But 2023 is certainly a good point to continue evaluating, in the face of more information and evidence from an unexpectedly dynamic war.
As the US is only at the beginning of its Future Vertical Lift programme, the last 18 months of combat in Europe have come at a convenient time to review the assumptions and requirements on which that and similar projects are based.
Eurofighter Typhoon sales: what a difference a decade makes
In the second week of August, BAE Systems released a statement confirming that 12 of 24 Typhoon Tranche 3 models had now arrived in Oman. Despite this favourable export news, the aircraft’s industrial future remains somewhat clouded.
Although the Typhoon is regarded as an excellent aircraft, it suffers from several shortcomings. Its four partner nations had differing perspectives and enthusiasm for investment from the outset, and from an export viewpoint, this complicates government-to-government and commercial negotiations.
Above: Half of Oman’s 24 Typhoons have now been delivered, but there has only been one more export sale (to Kuwait) since that deal was signed in 2012. (Photo: BAE Systems)
The upgrade path has been erratic, particularly compared to France’s Rafale, and the aircraft is complex and expensive to operate (published Austrian figures of around €77,000 per hour did not help). But seen as an export proposition, a summation of these and some wider issues seems to suggest it has lost its market niche.
The (relatively) recent Omani and Kuwaiti contracts are clearly good for morale, but obscure some sobering facts. The aircraft has not won a new export order since Kuwait in 2016 and while those 28 aircraft plus Oman’s 24 from 2012 are solid business, the absence of recent success is concurrent with an increasingly competitive environment.
Since 2016, the F-35’s unbeaten string of successes and Rafale’s phoenix-like revival have diminished Typhoon’s room to manoeuvre. The German Quadriga order for 38 was a key lifeline and Spain’s 20-unit Halcon contract added additional security, but these are essentially replacements rather than new business.
Another 90 examples for the Luftwaffe seemed possible, but with recent events this might well be downgraded in priority and the German F-35 buy potentially accelerated. Airbus’s proposed two-seat EW variant, which seemed like a very good idea, has generated scant enthusiasm.
There is a sense that the respective partners may have to some extent lost interest in further export efforts. Bid participation is expensive and the short-term value of any contract may well be negative. This also has to be shared, which adds another layer of complexity.
The UK and Italy are partnering on a new aircraft in direct competition to that of Spain and Germany, so whatever polite smiles might be worn during conferences, this is not conducive to export collaboration.
Combat aircraft procurement is as much about politics as capability. Eurofighter’s withdrawal from Canada’s fighter contest (as did Dassault) was based on a view that the political winds were unfairly blowing. Saab stayed the course but in the face of a US-backed Lockheed offering, Eurofighter (the company) was correct to exit. However, an 88-unit export order was something it really needed, as was Finland’s 64-strong HX programme, while India should have been the jewel in the export crown.
For many years, BAE has cited a memorandum of understanding that Saudi Arabia will procure a second batch of aircraft, to replace aging Tornado GR.4s. German hesitancy in allowing exports has previously loomed over sales outside Europe and this has not receded. The Saudi purchase has not been realised, nor arguably does the Kingdom need the aircraft.
Above: The F-35 has emerged from the shadows of a decade ago to chalk up a winning streak of major export sales in recent years. (Photo: USAF)
Dassault meanwhile has snapped up a series of middle-sized military markets, while many governments are seeking the acclaim that accompanies an F-35 offer. Boeing will move heaven and earth to transition F-15 users to the EX while the F-16 Viper Block 70 and Gripen E are advancing from the single-engined direction.
It is difficult to forecast new Typhoon export opportunities. Poland has been mentioned, but even Warsaw’s intense procurement drive would surely balk at another fast jet. Most realistic opportunities have been decided, with those technically still open looking either towards the F-35 or a lighter aircraft.
Exports are unlikely to be completely over, but Typhoon’s selling point as a large and capable multi-role fighter does seem less aligned with remaining demand.
Typhoon managed strong sales during its initial period of export offering, but this dried up just as Rafale and F-35 shook off their lethargy and presented a new and single-government-sponsored face to the market. Both Paris and Washington, without the need to consult partners, have successfully managed export relationships.
Having multiple government participants and a high variety of industrial partners sits in contrast to this. If MENA markets are off the table, Eastern Europe has swung behind US products and the Indo-Pacific is largely decided in its next buys, little obvious remains for a fighter of Typhoon’s size and programme status.
Will a blended-wing approach to US tankers (and transports) work?
August 2023 saw sudden renewed interest in blended-wing-body (BWB) designs for military aircraft. Concurrent with its somewhat staccato approach to next-generation transport and air-to-air refuelling platforms, the USAF awarded a development contract to the Californian JetZero company for a flying BWB demonstrator, to be completed before 2030.
Above: While JetZero’s BWB demonstrator is not currently associated with a programme of record, the putative Next-Generation Aerial Refueling effort is certainly a contender for adopting the technology. (Image: USAF/JetZero)
The work, to be undertaken in concert with Northrop Grumman’s Scaled Composites subsidiary, has at present no fixed defence programme to fulfil. However, the obvious utility of a new high-efficiency airframe in the multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) space comes at a useful stage for ongoing C-17 replacement considerations and the still-nebulous KC-X initiative.
The US military has yet to work its way out of an MRTT fix. Canada recently signed for the ‘turnkey’ solution of further Airbus A330s, which can service the legacy CF-188 fleet as well as the likely new F-35s.
Essentially, this is covering the USAF’s KC-46 mission with a traditional civil-to-military conversion. Lockheed Marin has pitched the same basic aircraft for what the USAF had deemed an ‘interim tanker’ – previously KC-Y – as a KC-135 replacement to serve concurrently with the Boeing KC-46.
The air force itself has admitted that it really does not know what to do, but that in September a request for information (RFI) will be released for what might eventually become that interim aircraft. This is not, or probably not, connected directly to the KC-Z that has now become the Next-Generation Aerial Refueling system (NGAS).
Related, but not officially connected (yet), is the question of new transport aircraft. The C-17 has proved highly successful but is costly and its rough-field capability is not necessary for many missions.
With the C-17 now out of production, a new general transport type has been discussed and the obvious candidate would be based on a civil model, possibly a C-46 non-refuelling variant of the aircraft now becoming the standard tanker for the USAF.
But the longer-term plan is to field a Next-Generation Airlift (NGAL) solution, the details of which are even more vague than those for the KC-Z.
Likely to involve a range of airborne platforms, the need for efficient movement of payloads across Pacific distances will have to be balanced with cost-per-kilogramme-per-kilometre considerations.
Above: With the C-17 out of production for nearly a decade new airlift options for the USAF range from a non-tanker C-46 to more radical BWB designs. A single solution is unlikely. (Photo: USAF)
Improved survivability is useful but will not be crucial for most operations. As with all aircraft, additional sensors, ELINT/SIGINT suites, defensive aids, communications and UAS control will all undoubtedly be added.
Does the JetZero award indicate a consensus on MRTT direction? The pros and cons of BWB are well known but – if they can be made to work efficiently – such aircraft would be of great utility for the US.
Ignoring development cost, the in-service price per payload per mission should be lower. Having engines not under-slung has a whole host of benefits for landing on distant atolls, while the lower radar cross-section would be a useful plus in the tanker role.
Given the civil aviation sector is desperate for a profit-maximising design, plenty of scope exists for collaboration at a structural level.
This is all very much in the future. A nominated first flight of 2027 for JetZero’s demonstrator puts the KC-Z’s 2040 timeframe in perspective. And with a host of concurrent programmes, funding will be stretched.
Vital but less exciting assets such as MRTTs tend to be unfairly deprioritised against next-generation combat types. Sensible minds know this, and despite admitting that they are unsure how to proceed, the USAF mobility community understands that a realistic plan is crucial if fast jets are to operate at distance in the Western Pacific.
Perhaps a more conventional shape would convince those in control of the purse strings that this is an area that deserves a significant infusion of cash.
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