Decisive Edge Newsletter | Air | April 2023
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Mixed fleets versus multirole aircraft – has the balance shifted?
The cost of combat aircraft continues to rise and despite the opportunity presented by the developing uncrewed ISR and UCAV aircraft field, the role of the fast jet contingent appears to be ensured by both upgrades to current fleets and next generation replacements.
This follows the established path of a small but capable fleet that can undertake multiple roles and hence keep the tip of the spear both effective and economical.
This pattern has led – mostly in the West – to homogeneous but small forces with limited aircraft availability and low-hour pilots. Throw in the inevitable unexpected problems in a high-tempo environment and cracks in the combat force become obvious.
This is not idle analysis; a brief search of the trade press will return endless complaints by senior officers on this subject. True, various solutions exist, with the rise of the advanced UCAV clearly one. But making the high-end fleet more ‘multirole-y’ does not seem to be working.
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The result may be a growing reversal of the high-end, single type approach. Many air forces have ditched traditional jet trainers in favour of turboprops and simulators. However, a new generation of lead-in fighter trainer (LIFT) aircraft has stated to emerge and gain traction on the international market.
Traditionally offered with a very basic combat capability, the latest models feature higher kinetic performance, a range of radars, targeting pods and EW systems plus the ability to use weapons normally associated with pure combat types. Crucially, they are generally cheaper to purchase and operate, while offering higher availability.
No one would expect a Boeing-Saab T-7, Leonardo M346 or KAI T-50 variant to replace a pure fighter, but they can shoulder some of the burden: they can keep up pilots’ hours; they can intercept stray airliners; they can provide ‘Red Air’ adversary training and perform some combat operations in a low-threat environment.
If the newest fighters have to be treated as ‘Ferraris’, then these are the top-of-the-range ‘hot hatches’. It is clear which one would win a race, but it is also clear which one is more useful 90% of the time.
Poland is perhaps the most obvious example of an air force that has taken this on board.
In 2002 it selected the capable F-16 Block 52. In 2020 it purchased 32 F-35s and then in 2023 signed for 48 KAI F/A-50 light attack aircraft.
Above: Poland will operate its KA-50 fleet alongside F-16s and F-35s. (Photo: Lockheed Martin)
Granted, the country had previously operated a mixed fleet, but this is a major Western power concurrently combining three modern types of which it produces none. Malaysia and Indonesia are following the same course and clearly so is South Korea.
All have access to modern combat aircraft, but all have chosen to augment their high-end forces with a lighter and lower-cost alternative.
Mixed fleets are not new news in other forces. Egypt has one but now seems intent on moving in the opposite direction. While the Gulf states always operate several types, in these cases the decisions are largely political, buying from the US, France and UK to spread geopolitical capital.
Meanwhile the M-346FA light fighter variant has seen its first small export sales and hence has ‘broken its duck’. This would be an obvious choice for Greece as it retires its Mirages and Phantoms, adding to its M-346 trainers with a combat variant to reduce the burden on its F-16s and Rafales, saving cost and increasing pilot readiness.
The mooted alternative of buying costly F-35s before the engine/Block 4 issue is resolved would arguably have the opposite effect and place greater strain on the force.
The next design to break out in this class will undoubtedly be the Boeing-Saab T-7. Production will start in 2024, initially for the USAF and probably the USN.
The USAF’s Chief of Staff Gen Charles Q Brown had previously postulated a new 4.5th generation aircraft as an F-35 alternative for the cost/capability reasons stated above, but this idea appears to have been dropped.
Above: While the T-7 has only been marketed as a trainer so far, a light attack version would be a logical evolution of the design. (Photo: Boeing)
An ‘F/T-7’ is an obvious way to make good on this idea in a force seeking to save money and retire older aircraft. Given the scope of the NGAD next-gen fighter, the B-21 bomber and other projects, a capped F-35 force at around 1,000 seems likely.
The USAF has long flirted with an armed trainer and the T-7 appears a strong candidate should this path be pursued. And where the US buys, others take a keen interest.
An operationally driven move towards a range of three different modern types is currently seen only in Poland, but is an obvious choice for Greece. It is possible that countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands or Denmark may similarly decide that a one-type force is neither practical nor sustainable.
Italy, previously operator of the AMX attack aircraft, might also be interested in reviving its light tactical squadrons. The obvious counter-argument is the procurement of capable UCAVs under the loyal wingman model, but this will not solve the cost of operating a manned fighter fleet and that is still a primary short-to-medium-term concern for advanced air forces.
A mixed fleet including light fighters is not the only solution and will face opposition for varying reasons, but purely in terms of return on investment it is a strong candidate to overcome the cost spiral that many are facing.
What at first glance appears to be an added expense may become in fact a significant saving in budget otherwise wasted.
Is it the end of the road for Russian aerospace exports?
The Russian aerospace sector has generally been held in strong, if not high esteem. Arguably behind its Western equivalents in electronics, software and certain areas of metallurgy, it has nevertheless managed to produce iconic designs which are widely exported, with the MiG fighter family being the most (in)famous.
Russian military aircraft sales have usually been made to relatively unaligned countries. With such purchases being determined largely by political considerations, customers that are not (or do not wish to appear) too close to the US have often opted for Russian aircraft.
Previous purchases tend to lead to renewals, so Russian exports have often continued to traditional customers.
Among many of these buyers, until recently, the platforms themselves have been (rightly or wrongly) considered politically acceptable, operationally capable and with a strong Russian domestic sustainment and development future.
This traditional market may be close to ruin. While many of Russian’s repeat customers have been hesitant to condemn outright the conflict in Ukraine, that is a very different political position from buying new Russian equipment, the latter being an admission of continued close alignment.
Above: India has long been a loyal customer for Russian combat aircraft, but is having trouble finding spare parts for them. (Photo: USAF)
Syria, Iran, Venezuela and North Korea might not consider this a problem, but almost anyone else would. India, a huge customer, would almost certainly shy away.
On top of this, the view of Russian weapons as robust and reliable has taken significant damage. Not only has there been plentiful footage of Russian air power failings, but the wider campaign has been unimpressive.
Lastly, wider industrial and financial aspects of the conflict have raised questions about Russia’s ability to sustain its aerospace industry.
Despite claims of a pseudo-autarchy in high-end technology, it has quickly become clear that Russian weapons systems depend heavily on imported elements. These, many sourced from US, European and allied states, are no longer available.
In their absence, where do OEMs find replacements and crucially how do they implement the future development necessary for equivalent products over the next decades?
Various reports suggest that India, an established partner, is having trouble finding replacement parts. It is unclear to what degree this might be caused by high demand in Russia, interrupted supply chains or because key electronic elements came from third parties.
Russia might outsource assembly and final check-out to some customers, but most of the advanced systems remain dependent on domestic factories. Shortage of NATO weapons supply to Ukraine has shown exactly what limited production rates mean in time of conflict.
This lies within a wider issue: does the Russian state have the means to support current designs, evolve new variants or develop replacements?
Despite its own bullish statements, the considered opinion is largely that it does not. If successful designs such as the Su-27 and MiG-29 series enjoyed success based on utility, a strong supply chain, large domestic fleets and hence low cost/risk, what do current offerings provide?
The Su-34 and 35 are a minority within the Russian Air Force and there is no evidence they would be produced in large numbers. The Su-57 has never progressed beyond a pre-production batch, nor does it now seem likely so to do. The Su-75 is a dream looking for a pipe.
Above: The Su-57 and Su-75 are unlikely to be built for export without large-scale orders from Russia itself, which are currently not forthcoming. (Photo: Rostec)
All of this paints a gloomy picture for Russian aerospace exports. Domestically, design and production are under obvious stress. Key parts may not be easily replaced. Capital supplied by export sales is likely drying up. Political isolation may mean customers reject Russia entirely, and once lost a market is very difficult to recover.
Meanwhile China, South Korea and Turkey – alongside traditional Western aircraft providers – are all seeking aggressive expansion and sniffing an opportunity. While it might be too early to completely write off Russian combat aircraft exports, they have certainly dug themselves into a very deep hole.
How the F-15EX could help Pacific air forces overcome the tyranny of distance
Despite the current conflict in Ukraine, it is generally held that the Indo-Pacific region is where the danger of a general war is most present.
Allegiances have coalesced into a familiar bipolar state, roughly along a pro-China/pro-US divide. As a bellwether of the perceived tension, air forces across this territory are some of the highest spenders and the most rapidly modernising.
Here, two key factors are at the core of force planning: the largely maritime nature of the region and the huge distances involved.
Many aircraft procurements directly address the nature of the theatre. Key purchases include tanker-transports and maritime patrol aircraft, while managing assets over the oceanic expanse also requires airborne early warning and control platforms.
But with Chinese defences becoming increasingly sophisticated and longer-ranged, these aircraft will have to operate progressively further from any potential combat zone. This, in turn, means that the fighter force will have further to go.
Concurrently, the size of Chinese military forces has meant that the ordnance required to strike them has increased in size and power in terms of both air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons.
Above: While the F-35 in ‘clean’ configuration has a low RCS, adding the external tanks and ordnance needed for long-distance strike missions will negate that advantage. (Photo: RAAF)
These requirements of distance and payload may be something of an issue for US-allied forces. The primary fighter (by quantity) will be the F-35, which offers excellent sensors and connectivity as well as low radar cross-section (RCS), but at the cost of range and weapon carriage.
While the aircraft has large internal fuel capacity and can carry weapons in a bay, adding range and firepower would mean external tanks or missiles.
These both remove its stealth benefits and impact an already low-end speed and altitude performance.
For political and logistical commonality, Australia, South Korea, Japan and Singapore will together deploy an F-35A force numbering in hundreds, but – and especially in the case of the RAAF – this leaves a combat gap when operating across Pacific ranges.
Japan, Korea and Singapore all operate F-15 derivatives as the ‘heavy hitters’ of their air force.
Now, after a rocky start, the USAF will see new F-15EXs joining its squadrons in some numbers (104 as of the FY2024 budget). The rationale is that – despite the advantages brought by the F-35 – it cannot offer the same physical performance as the Eagle nor tote the same overall payload.
Above: The F-15EX’s second seat could be useful for controlling ‘loyal wingman’ adjunct combat UAVs. (Photo: USAF)
Clearly, the EX has a higher RCS, but the rationale in US circles is that this matters less over the Pacific than range and ordnance carriage. And the second seat may be of key utility as loyal wingman plans begin to solidify.
Boeing is undoubtedly pitching just these arguments at current Eagle operators, and given the company’s very strong Australian presence, will be making the case for swapping current Super Hornets for the F-15EX towards 2030.
Alternatives do exist in the shape of KAI’s KF-21 or Dassault’s Rafale (Indonesia was undecided over that or the F-15 for its recent fighter selection) but neither have the range/payload performance of the EX.
The Japanese-UK-Italian GCAP sixth-generation fighter, alongside the US NGAD future design, are likely to put range and performance back at the top of the requirement list.
F-35 was once a logical step for US Pacific allies, but in the face of PLAAF’s long-legged Su-30 variants, new carrier fleets and the very long-rage J-20, there might be a place for F-15 operators to follow the USAF in replacing current fleets with the newer model.
Australia’s maritime outlook was a large element of what drove it down the Hornet path, but memory of the F-111’s capability might just swing them to an alternative Boeing product.
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