Watchkeeper is reportedly due to exit service later this year, so any replacement needs to be quick to avoid a capability gap. (Photo: UK MoD Crown Copyright)
New drones for the British Army - is the right capability being procured?
The British Army’s 47th Regiment Royal Artillery is on notice that its Watchkeeper intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) UAVs will likely be retired in 2025. The programme, managed by Thales UK and based on an Elbit Hermes 450, has had what could charitably described as a chequered history. It is unlikely to be much mourned.
The replacement effort, “Land Tactical Deep Find”, is suitably vaguely (and ungrammatically) named to cover a wide range of potential solutions. But it does at least provide general identification of goals and parameters: the UAS will not require a maritime bent, range will be limited to hours of endurance of a few hundred miles over enemy supply and fire support areas, and its mission will be ISR and hence fires coordination, albeit likely with a data link to crewed air force assets... Continues below
This analysis article originally appeared in May's Decisive Edge Air Warfare Newsletter.
Newsletter Sponsors:
The rationale behind the replacement is a classic combination of mission and threat evolution. Ukraine – and probably the recent India-Pakistan engagement – will have had significant effect on development, procurement and operational perspectives. In short, the medium altitude, long endurance (MALE) UAV is now considered a less optimal platform to assist forces over a high-threat battlefield.
In the same way that the celebrated Turkish TB2 platforms have quietly retired from their previously starring role over Ukraine, technology is being overtaken by events. From the mists of 1915, the Royal Flying Corps Be2c aircraft is something of an example: designed to be stable and enduring for artillery spotting, it was not intended to face strong enemy air defences. The rise of heavier anti-aircraft fire and fighter aircraft forced it into retirement. So does history repeat.
Lest this be thought of as a unique problem for UK forces or an issue confined to outgunned Ukraine, the US campaign against the Houthis has seen between ten and twenty MALE UAVs destroyed in recent months. Israel is losing its own Hermes 450s at no small rate. And both a Saudi F-15 and US F-35 reportedly had to take significant evasive action during operations against the same non-state group.
Air defence proliferation and increasing expertise in data-sharing and coordination seems to be exacerbating the problem for ISR operations. In most military books, Houthis and Hamas are not considered “peer adversaries”.
One solution to this is the HALE UAV, epitomised by the Global Hawk. This is capable of extended operations at altitudes unreachable by most defences as well as multiple missions supported by high-end systems. However, clearly this brings significant problems of cost, fleet size, availability and through-life support. Most forces would love some examples, but for the 47th it is neither applicable nor available. The same goes for low-cost, small satellites: these simply do not fit the mission profile.
As with many military systems, some degree of commercial product may well be part of the Watchkeeper replacement. Commercially developed optical systems have risen almost exponentially in variety and capability. A similar story could be told about wider sensors and elements for radars. But performance must be balanced against direct cost, and opportunity cost against other priorities, usually captured in the term “attritability”.
Schiebel - Leading the unmanned evolution
Ukraine has demonstrated what the wise have said for years: an actual war will be far costlier than almost all optimistic peacetime projections, so mass will be a key consideration. This is supported by the return to dispersed sensor, command and effector assets, meaning that you need a wide view to keep track of the enemy network.
The potential replacements for Watchkeeper are unclear. Anduril, with its increasing UK relations, might be a partner for a new and specific design, while another choice is a return to Elbit for an off-the-shelf option. Or, with the current flow of enthusiasm, a European solution might be worth effort despite an inevitable delay in fielding. Against this, it should be observed that the use of numerous American or Israeli models by many European operators is no coincidence.
A decision in 2025 is possible, but the realistic view is that a push into 2026 is more likely. As always, capability, availability and cost will be a three-way tussle. An “attritable” medium-sized replacement should not cost more than $10 million and if possible closer to $5 million so losses can be managed and operations planned around inevitable force depletion.
Traditionally, military programmes go for impressive and shiny, but the hard lessons of the current campaigns are that this does not work well at the smaller end of the scale. The BE2c's replacement in 1917 was the RE8, an aircraft with better performance but nothing exceptional; it operated competently in concert with other systems but retained the same low cost and essential attritability. A similar arrangement could find favour here.
Don't want to miss out on future Decisive Edge content? Make sure you are signed up to our email newsletters.
