Compromise is always an element in multi-national combat aircraft programmes but can SCAF still strike the right balance to meet all partners' needs? (Image: DGA)
Is the SCAF fighter programme still viable amid Franco-German fallout?
Multi-national defence programmes have inherent difficulties, as with any kind of club or team effort. In the combat aircraft sphere these efforts tend to exist for three broad reasons. The first is sharing cost (and arguably risk). The second is the availability of wider technical expertise than a single company or country might possess. The third is a political statement of solidarity in hope of future cooperation in technology, industrial and defence activity.
These often exist alongside each other, and within larger groupings may be regarded with differing priority and weight. Airframe intellectual property and construction are usually seen as primary bragging rights, but many aircraft are assembled in a multitude of locations. The supply of sensors, engines and other complex systems plus local modifications all make for a broad canvas... Continues below
This analysis article originally appeared in October's Decisive Edge Air Warfare Newsletter.
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“Multi-national” is therefore best seen as a sliding scale and an objective rather than a result, with varying levels of success. While the focus of this piece is the currently troubled Système de Combat Aérien du Futur (SCAF), there are other examples among its forebears and contemporaries.
The European Tornado and Typhoon were intended and succeeded in being wholly multi-national in concept and result. France’s Dassault Rafale was vehemently not, although some export customers – primarily India – got something of a look-in. The F-35 pays lip-service to collaboration, but Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney undeniably hold the reins.
The Swedish Gripen is often characterised as purely a Saab effort, but around 60% of value is derived from UK industry and it is powered by a US engine; E/F variants are also produced in Brazil. The Global Combat Aircraft Programme (GCAP), direct competitor to SCAF. is shared evenly between the UK, Italy and Japan and was always intended to be. Definition, then, is a little tricky and rests somewhat on point of view.
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SCAF was (is?) intended to fuse France, Germany, Spain and Belgium into a shared and joint programme. But that the acronym is in French should be telling; it had been often termed Future Combat Air System (FCAS) but this a) confused it with what became GCAP and b) was not to French tastes.
A following second point is that the French defence industry is emblematic of the state, country and culture. Unlike the “lesser” nations of Europe, it did not fall back on the charity of American hegemony, and for good or ill it kept its public-private national independence. Not that France entirely eschews work with its neighbours, but a cursory glace at its military order of battle quickly confirms that it will go it alone or demand the highest seat at the table.
This, then, is the current position of SCAF.
There is theoretically no good reason why SCAF should not succeed. Despite the observations above, France has independently produced great military machinery in the past 75 years, both for itself and others. For a decade the Israeli Air Force’s dominance was based largely on French designs, a testament both to that country’s skills and neutral export policies. But perhaps here lay the kernel of future failure: France had delivered and so France did not need partners.
Or perhaps political Paris – eventually a core NATO member – did, but to a lesser degree: the Anglo-French SEPECAT Jaguar light attack aircraft and Dassault-Dornier Alpha Jet trainer clearly show that SCAF has a degree of collaborative root. The question, then appears to be one of enthusiasm and compromise, and that will not easily be overcome.
Terming Airbus (Germany) “the Messerschmitt design bureau” as reportedly someone senior at Dassault did, is not really in keeping with team spirit, nor is criticising Belgium for its F-35 plans. Indeed, the three members of SCAF that are or were considering buying F-35s represent a significant spanner in the works for the programme.
That Spain might instead buy the Turkish TAI Kaan was not only unexpected, but has likely led to much gnashing of teeth in Dassault boardrooms. If not F-35, and then SCAF some years hence, why not Dassault’s Rafale? Or simply keep Eurofighters and wait it out?
As a counterpoint, on the other side of the planet there are several competing platforms, albeit not necessary from a collaborative or export perspective. GCAP is largely sewn up in terms of core members, although suspicions of Australian interest are not without foundation. India is in on Rafale but is a stretch as a SCAF partner possibility, given that it has its own advanced fighter programme in the AMCA.
South Korea is out, as is Pakistan with its “collaboration” on the Chinese FC-1/JF-17 joint project. Indonesia has gone for the Turkish option. No one else especially springs to mind.
China, meanwhile, shaking off the last vestiges of Russian defence support (although neither country will admit this), has made striking progress with a variety of designs. While exact details are not yet clear, a host of uncrewed aircraft were seen at the recent anniversary parade.
Of equal interest are a medium-sized fighter with twin-wheeled nose gear (often associated with naval operations), usually termed the J-50, alongside a medium-weight fighter/strike aircraft that has been generally designated J-36. Meanwhile the older J-20 seems healthy while the lighter J-35 is now on carrier trials. That all of this seems to have been achieved in a matter of five years is remarkable and should be worrying for SCAF and GCAP nations.
No one is quite sure what the US is doing, but it claims to have flown – and even rejected – several next-generation combat types. A cynic might say that the Russians have continually claimed that their forces are receiving advanced weapons while it is clear that they are not. But of the two, American progress is likely the safer bet.
So, from all the above, what assessments can be drawn? First, large nations with strong state support arguably do not need anything multi-national in the manner of SCAF. This is not surprising, but is worth raising in the sense that, should European efforts be held against those of China plus allies, the former do not seem to be matching a “pacing foe”.
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Russia is a direct threat which SCAF would likely have to confront, but in terms of wider technical and industrial output it is China that might be seen as the standard of progress. Of course, the same criticism might be thrown at GCAP, but whatever the shortcomings that might exist, that programme has been remarkably free of public squabbles.
What can be forecast for SCAF and its aspirations of European defence unity? The first is not to write it off. Belgium is clearly the weakest link from the perspective of contribution, but that it participates at all is not worthless. Spain might be on the fence, but from a political and financial perspective is a necessary partner, even if its technical involvement might not be key.
Germany’s pockets are fairly deep and whatever the embarrassment of its Messerschmitt et al roots, it cannot be accused of an underwhelming history of aircraft development. France is – arguably – the only partner with extra-European operations in mind but range, speed, weapons carriage and sensor fusion are aspects essentially common to operations over the Baltic as much as they are around the Pacific or the Gulf. Importantly, the latter region is a plausible export market. Once, of course, the aircraft has actually flown.
One possible future is that the consortium agrees to disagree. Putting airframe design before engines and systems has since time immemorial dogged major programmes and is arguably a distraction. The list of common engines, weapons and sensors shared between different fast jets is a long one.
So, it is possible that the French desire for air-launched standoff nuclear weapons and carrier operations will be settled by collaboration on key elements but using largely different airframes (or not). These possibilities certainly exist, and the collaborators have funding, expertise and purpose. Since 2022, this has been truer than at any time in recent memory.
This may however become a risibly inaccurate forecast. Some smart money is on SCAF and GCAP folding into each other, which is a perfectly sensible idea. Sharing of hard- and software is arguably the most technically plausible direction, despite politics and industrial politics (not the same thing, see the above “design bureau” comments).
Despite centuries of polite disagreement, the UK and France can successfully collaborate, and have done so particularly when pressure is arising to the East. Typhoon and Rafale coexisted for points both good and bad. There is in one sense every reason for SCAF not to exist and to become another – for the US – example of European incompetence.
But it can also develop along the same lines as past (roughly) concurrent programmes that shared major elements amid NATO standardisation. It may emerge as a feasible counterpart to a GCAP design that prioritises different elements but works in the same way. Perhaps powered by the same engines, likely with similar radar and weapons, managing UCAVs in the same way and under common AEW control. This is difficult, but essentially there is no reason why it cannot ultimately happen.
Given the current and projected threat environment, something certainly needs to happen.
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