Above: If the LOI for 150 Gripens for Ukraine is firmed up, it will represent a major export success for Saab. (Photo: Saab)
Gripens for Ukraine – a good idea but how will it work?
During the Soviet era, Ukraine’s air forces were entirely equipped with the common fighter types in service across the constituent republics of the USSR. Come independence, and in the relative peace of the 1990s and after, there were more important issues than finding alternative fast jet suppliers.
This all changed with the increasing aggression of Putin’s Russia. An attack on Ukraine itself, widely expected, began with the 2014 annexation of Crimea followed by the all-out invasion of 2022... Continues below
This analysis article originally appeared in November's Decisive Edge Air Warfare Newsletter.
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At the time, Ukrainian forces, despite their spirited fight, were underequipped. The 1994 military “de-nuclearisation” had removed that card from the pack and in the fixed-wing arena, the air force had MiG-29 fighters, Su-25 fighter-bombers, Su-24 strike aircraft and Su-27/30 heavy fighters. These had little in the way of modern systems or weapons, were old airframes with limited availability and flown by crews with virtually zero combat experience.
They performed very well given the circumstances, but with the force ratio stacked against them there were fundamental limits. As in several previous conflicts, Russian incompetence was a critical factor. But even that country’s air force can learn. And to a degree it did.
The obvious answer to the Ukrainian fighter squadrons’ problem was the rapid acquisition of new aircraft, and this began with a search for second-hand stocks of in-service types. Old Soviet equipment was not in short supply, but often in poor condition, and its operators were politically hesitant to lay their cards on the table.
They performed very well given the circumstances, but with the force ratio stacked against them there were fundamental limits. As in several previous conflicts, Russian incompetence was a critical factor. But even that country’s air force can learn. And to a degree it did.
The obvious answer to the Ukrainian fighter squadrons’ problem was the rapid acquisition of new aircraft, and this began with a search for second-hand stocks of in-service types. Old Soviet equipment was not in short supply, but often in poor condition, and its operators were politically hesitant to lay their cards on the table.
And while replacing a MiG with a MiG puts limited stress on infrastructure, the two can be subtly different and possess little advantage over the Russian opposition.
The period of 2022-2024 saw calls for assistance to Kyiv in the form of sales or transfers of combat aircraft. However, it is extremely time-consuming to train pilots and ground crews on an entirely new type of fast jet, developed under a different concept of operations, with different systems labelled in a foreign language.
Pilots are generally selected for intelligence and adaptability, but going from 1980s Soviet to 2000s NATO aircraft was going to be problematic. Added to this was integration into C2 structures, plus supply of spares and weapons. It was not like dropping a consignment of new rifles to an infantry battalion.
In fact, over the previous decade Ukraine had already been shopping for new aircraft. One on which it had a keen eye was the Saab Gripen, which offered a feature absent in most of its contemporaries: ease of maintenance and support. Intended to operate from austere forest bases and serviced by conscripts, it was a good fit for Ukraine. However, for complex reason the deal never went through. Until, it would appear, October 2025.
Ukrainian fighter acquisition from 2022-2025 is complicated but in short, the US and other NATO members donated F-16s, the French older Mirage 2000s and various forces piled in with training and support. In general, this was a success
But the breaking news this autumn was the signing of a letter of intent (LOI) for a Ukrainian purchase of 150 new Saab Gripen E (and possibly two-seater Gripen F) fighters.
This was a shock for many reasons. The first is that Ukraine does not – in most estimations – have a huge amount of spare cash. Defence contracts are often complicated, but that is a serious investment whichever way one looks at it. Gripen is a relatively low-cost aircraft punching above its weight, not least because it was designed that way, but for a nation at war the price for 150 will not be low.
A second factor is that while Sweden has always been NATO-compatible, it was not a member until last year and hence its equipment is slightly niche. For support reasons this is both good and bad: good as it means Ukraine can enjoy being a core flagship customer; and bad because there is only one supply chain. With the Gripen’s Brazilian production line coming on stream this problem may be mitigated, but only slightly.
A third aspect is the turnaround this represents in Saab’s fortunes. Should this sale progress beyond the LOI to closure and delivery – and that is still a big “if” – it is a massive deal for the company. The Brazilian Gripen contract was a great win, albeit complicated by local assembly and Thailand, the Philippines and Colombia are all looking like done deals, but 150 aircraft is way beyond the scope of anything previously envisaged.
Suddenly, Dassault could have a major European competitor, unrestricted by the multinational headaches of Eurofighter and relatively free of US export regulations. Gripen E/F is 60% by value a UK product, so has strong support from London, and is newer than both F-35 and F-16V, the aircraft against which it regularly competes.
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Major procurement contracts are primarily political, then industrial/economic and price-driven, with actual operational need being last on the list. But suddenly the country fighting a major war has opted for Gripen in a shake-up to the status quo that few would have predicted.
This is not to say it will be plain sailing for Saab. An LOI is not a contract, and nowhere near binding at any level. Then there is the latest LOI struck by Kyiv with France for 100 new Rafale F4s. This is something of a slap in the face, but Dassault has a contracted production backlog far above that of Saab, so whether this is a threat to the Swedish deal remains open to debate.
Production takes time and even “delivery” is not the same as “utility” – training and logistics must be factored in. From the first aircraft arriving in-country to initial operational capability can often take several years, although Ukraine will certainly want to accelerate this. Sweden can slowly roll Ukrainian pilots and ground crew through its own training programmes and even lend older Gripen variants. But there are simply rules of military gravity that cannot be ignored.
Views remain mixed as to whether Ukraine can survive and in what ultimate shape it might emerge. Trump’s erratic diplomacy, European frustration at the balancing act between independent action and keeping the US on-side, a fluctuating front line and justifiable questions about who is actually paying for the war effort; all remain fluid and this keeps the world guessing.
The Gripen deal – the pair of Saab 340 AEW aircraft awaiting delivery increases its chances – is wholly sensible for Ukraine, with the timeframe being the main issue. The US meanwhile is effectively poisoning some previously solid relations, with Spain likely dropping an F-35 deal, and Canada and possibly Finland considering a mixed fighter buy. With Dassault wholly backlogged and Eurofighter a little on the pricey side, Saab has arguably a chance to be Europe’s strongest medium-term player in the fighter market. Quite a turnaround from a few years ago.
Clearly the story does not end here. War makes for strange bedfellows but also leads to rapid changes of course. Should the US decide to open the floodgates again on defence exports while reversing its trade policy, we could see an American-dominated Ukrainian military. There is not a lot that Sweden or France could do should a non-MAGA figure eventually enter the White House. As distant as this seems, it is on the POTUS’s whims that the entire chapter may depend.
But in the short term this is a good decision by Ukraine (albeit with funding remaining unclear) and fantastic news for Stockholm.
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