2025 will clearly be remembered largely for one event. The re-election of Donald Trump and his impact on the global system have for his opponents been an unmitigated disaster and for his supporters the fulfilment of many dreams.

While various other forces, personalities and random events may have significant sway over the course of 2026, the unscripted ponderings of the US president – and the agendas of those at home and abroad with whom he speaks – will likely remain the greatest single factor governing world events.

As the year draws to a close, this analysis identifies five major defence aerospace themes of the past 12 months and the degree to which they will continue as we sail through an equally choppy 2026... Continues below

This analysis article originally appeared in December's Decisive Edge Air Warfare Newsletter.

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1 Capability competition and export consequences

This idea may seem exaggerated, but essentially long-enjoyed US unopposed conventional military might is being eroded by China. The Pentagon’s oft-cited “peer threat” concern might be seen – cynically – as a tool for increasing defence budgets, but for the first time the US Navy faces an opponent with a genuine and growing carrier strike group capability, while the USAF is clearly worried by the appearance of so many new and advanced-looking PLA combat aircraft.

Behind the scenes there are certainly problems affecting China's new toys (Beijing is progressing rapidly into unfamiliar territory and has not fought a war since the 1970s), but it is sensible to take these threats seriously.

A working fleet of USN Ford-class carriers and new assets such as F-47 and B-21 plus UCAVs and other autonomous systems cannot come fast enough. Given the political dimension of defence exports, the optics of fresh Chinese matériel is a strong sales point in spreading their influence.

There is a complicated debate about the true role of uncrewed aircraft and how these differ from missiles. Defence is full of dramatic predictions that rarely play out as viewed (the tank has “died” so many times it is worthy of a role in a zombie film) and the same is now happening with traditional combat aircraft.

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China and others are still developing such platforms with great focus and energy, but the possibly greater impact is the reshaping of the export environment, an area the US has traditionally dominated. Buying American equipment has traditionally come with a multi-domain through-life guarantee; it might not be the best solution, but it cemented political and defence relationships, offered interoperability with neighbours and access to low-cost (US-developed) upgrades.

But with the wild swings of the Trump administration, that certainty has vanished. Indeed, is it any more to be desired?

2 Europe’s dash for independence

Despite the French propensity to buy as much as possible from its own industrial base, a “Europe absent America” defence strategy cannot rely on a single country or arguably even a close duopoly. The FCAS/SCAF Franco-German sixth-generation fighter project, with Spain and Belgium in support, appears to be crashing – somewhat predictably – on the issue of workshare.

But this is one headline event and should not be seen as reflecting wider efforts on comms, sensors, subsystems, weapons and platform standardisation across the region, partly driven by industrial investment. And not to mention greater commonality of training. Europe needs and will continue its slow trend of local sourcing. Arguably, the UK was one of more difficult elements with its history of mixed European and trans-Atlantic loyalties, but a post-Brexit London is rapidly shifting towards a more continental collaborative perspective (for now).

One issue often missed in media commentary about “European defence” is that contracts for systems tend to run over decades. Europe cannot simply become “independent” in the course of a single US presidential term.

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Quite apart from the fact that many of the F-35s ordered have not been physically delivered in-country yet, the integration and management of such a fleet is achingly slow. Spain decided not to buy the aircraft, but Italy and Germany supposedly will acquire further examples beyond current contracts despite a degree of anti-American sentiment.

It is not that Europe does not have extremely capable and advanced aerospace companies, but the supply and demand relationship is agonisingly slow. 2026 will undoubtedly see furious European efforts to develop local capability and systems, but this will be concurrent with Poland using Korean T-50s, Spain looking to Turkish Hurjet trainers, Italy working up F-35s aboard the new Trieste-class LHD and France left wondering why it has no combat aircraft friends.

The path has been set, but its realisation will be complex and painful.

3 The rest of the world catches up

For Europe it is both of benefit and a cause for concern that the world outside “the West” is developing its own capabilities. The arrival of Turkey and South Korea on the advanced aircraft map offers further opportunities for industrial collaboration but also increased competition. It is somewhat surprising that Spain should choose a new Turkish advanced trainer (TAI’s Hurjet) concurrent with the EU collaboration zeitgeist, but there it is. Possibly not a dark harbinger, but a development nonetheless.

The Polish decision to procure the T-50 trainer/light attack aircraft from South Korea – as well as tanks – is another sign that the defence market is changing. Both KAI and TAI are developing further combat aircraft, helicopters and UCAVs and such export salients are of great value.

The former is leaning on a significant degree of US assistance – which brings its own problems in terms of export restrictions – but the latter is arguably aligned more closely with Europe. The Turkish Eurofighter purchase, which is driven to a significant degree by industrial interest in the aircraft’s EJ200 engines, is not insignificant.

This movement, arguably inevitable anyway, is likely to quicken in 2026. Most recognise that the collapse of Russia as an exporter and/or industrial partner segues neatly with China filling that void. But the geopolitical alignment of the latter makes for somewhat difficult exporting: MENA – long a Euro-American market – is a core focus for Beijing and the latter has made inroads with a supposedly imminent (since 2023) Egyptian contract for the J-10 fighter.

As Chinese light aircraft and trainers such as the K-8 are politically neutral, these have long been a feature in the region. But an advanced combat aircraft sale would be a major coup. The difference, however, is that South Korea and Turkey can offer platforms and systems that work with existing NATO-standard stocks in these countries.

The KAI KF-21 is a quasi-Lockheed product and hence easy to bring within US-centric regional fleets while not being 100% American. Meanwhile, TAI has the unique selling point of offering the first advanced aircraft autonomously developed by a Muslim country. These are powerful tools in the export market sales pitch.

The US might have offered F-35s to Saudi Arabia – a prize long desired – but between the erratic nature of Washington’s actions and the fact that Israel is a key user, it is possible that 2026 might see Riyadh shift towards new suppliers, especially if these offer actual technology sharing. This latter is a longer-term goal of the wealthier MENA states, so if Europe wants to pay for its defence development with export revenue, it is up against strong competition.

4 Finding the right technological direction

Militaries are said to always prepare for the last war. This is inaccurate in many ways, not least that the previous conflict offered valid operational and technical lessons that were of future value, even if misconstrued. This stance has a strong prospect of stumbling after Ukraine, however.

The consensus that the future of war will be based on drones is so universal it has become an internet meme. But conditions on the ground are very particular to the Ukraine conflict: quasi-static front lines, limited advanced weaponry, unwillingness to open the strategic-weapon floodgates of total war, an extraordinarily complex political balance and a seemingly intractable basic dispute.

The “drone warfare” mantra, however, has become something of a stuck record. Uncrewed technology is neither new nor unusual, given that guided weapons have been a staple of military operations for decades. But the lucrative market for new efforts in this area will undoubtedly see 2026 far exceed 2025.

The US has recently announced it will mass-produce what is essentially a basic “drone”, which seems aesthetically to be a copy of the Iranian Shahad series. These are extremely useful in the low-cost/large-fleet sector of operations, albeit with significant performance limitations. There is simply not a lot that they can do, thus fielding a lot of them is a core rationale of low-cost item production.

Despite a rapidly rising interest in these lower-tech platforms, the major players will be budgeting for far more advanced systems and for very good reasons. As China has three or possibly four next-generation crewed combat aircraft, alongside AEW platforms, MPAs, helicopters and the ubiquitous UCAVs, should caution sweeping claims about the end of humans in combat. The launch of a new PLAN aircraft carrier and apparent development of a nuclear-powered successor class reinforces this.

What works over Donetsk is not applicable to the Pacific. Building on 2025, 2026 will certainly inherit much of the current energy and budget, but with different destinations. Between the major powers an escalation of spending in traditional and new technologies is certain, but this will not be driven simply by the fixation on Ukraine. Australia, South Korea and Japan have very different priorities from the quadcopter-plus-grenade trench warfare being enacted east of Kiev.

The focus for 2026, therefore is likely to be more conventional than the next-generation concepts often forecast. Russian shadow fleets and hybrid drone warfare will not disappear, but most larger armed forces will be looking to push their primary programmes in what would be generally considered traditional arms.

There is really no alternative to advanced combat aircraft, vehicles, ships and weapons, particularly as the enormous political and industrial capital already invested is unrecoverable. Start-ups and longer-term plans (Golden Done, space-based ISR etc) will receive funding, but medium-term efforts with recognisable delivery timeframes are likely to remain a focus, even if not always be front-page news.

5 Black swan events

Unexpected events are (obviously) difficult to predict. But by narrowing the criteria, it is possible to identify areas where the variables appear unstable. Setting aside geopolitics and focussing rather on the medium term of combat aircraft programmes, the obvious flashpoint is SCAF, where allocation of workshare may have comprehensively torpedoed the effort.

France will undoubtedly continue the development path. even if bereft of friends with benefits. But it leaves other European countries wondering where to go. Belgium can get by with its current F-35 buy, but Spain needs a Plan B. Germany, overtly, is looking at the rival UK-Italy-Japan GCAP fighter. Meanwhile, the unexpected resurgence of Saab has shaken the single-engine market, coming as it does just as US exports of F-16s seem less attractive than before.

The mix of inconsistent US policies, European efforts to restructure, new market players and various erratic technological developments all combine to form a confusing start to 2026. A last but major move on the chess board would be a cut to the F-35 programme. This might be considered at present of fairly low probability, but under the current Pentagon leadership environmental strains it should not be dismissed.

The Trump administration is confusing the military-industrial complex in a manner rarely before seen, including a sudden cut to the 2025-26 numbers procured of the Lockheed aircraft. On top of abandoning the E-7 AEW aircraft and a Presidential order apparently banning the new EMALS naval catapult system it is unwise to dismiss any new policy direction, however bizarre it might seem.

A sober evaluation would – as the GAO frequently does – warn that the F-35 Block 4 development is losing any semblance of cost-effective and timeframe-confident aspects. It is an evolutionary step that is required and will undoubtedly occur at some stage. However, the F-35 engine question essentially remains unanswered.

Concurrently with progress on F-47, F/A-XX, GCAP, a multitude of CCAs and UCAVs, the uncharitably christened “Fat Amy” may suddenly lurch into 2026 with an un-forecast slimming. Its rejection by Spain, wavering in Canada (and possibly Finland and elsewhere) plus further technical delays and the next Trumpian tirade may achieve – for Lockheed – a negative critical mass.

The size, depth and longevity of the F-35 programme preclude a complete halt, but the USAF’s 1,763 fleet size always seemed unrealistic. With myriad pressures on the defence budget and allies reconsidering options, a 2026 re-evaluation of Lockheed’s unfavoured son is not beyond reason.

These points are all framed within the wider context of a world undergoing a period of instability. With defence being primarily political, a change in major leaders or governmental balance could either upset or reinforce all of the above. Still, some forecasts seem safe: major established defence programmes will continue; traditional combat aircraft will be developed; UCAVs will remain of interest; drone hysteria will persist.

But who will be doing what with whom towards what goal and using whose money remains unclear. The countdown to the New Year has begun. Place your bets…

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