Poland and Turkey are often cited as potential fresh export opportunities for the Eurofighter Typhoon. Are these sales prospects realistic, and what factors might tip the balance for or against?

Few would dispute that the pan-European Eurofighter (or Typhoon, if you are British) is an impressive piece of kit. It boasts a strong thrust-to-weight ratio, which has been a key factor in almost every successful combat aircraft, a respectable top speed, good range, heavy ordnance carriage and is nimble for its size... Continues below

This analysis article originally appeared in July's Decisive Edge Air Warfare Newsletter.

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The radar, particularly the ECRS Mk 2, plus updated electronic warfare suite, are regarded as very capable, although the exact details are not known in public nor tested in combat. On available evidence, it seems well-liked by its operators and generally respected by its competitors.

On the other hand, it is relatively large and expensive to buy and operate, has at best limited austere-field capability, is divided significantly into different marks and tranches, has a split support and operating group that all seem to be drifting towards F-35, is not US-operated, offers limited realistic export industrial cooperation and is – at the risk of sounding rude – getting a little long in the tooth. But then, many of the above criticisms could be levelled at its main competitors.

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It certainly remains an export player. While politics usually trump all other considerations, the aircraft generally has enough capability to offer an edge. Saab’s Gripen E/F is newer and easier to maintain while using essentially the same systems but has performance disadvantages. F-35 – should Block 4 ever emerge for export – has (possibly) better onboard systems, a lower radar cross-section and internal weapons carriage, but is underpowered, slow and expensive to operate. Rafale sits somewhere in the middle, alongside new F-16 variants.

Eurofighter, in the centre of the graph, has some good opportunities, although these are drying up as the “sixth-generation” concept gains momentum. The US F-47, Anglo-Italian-Japanese GCAP and Franco-German-Spanish-Belgian SCAF are on the lookout for further partners and customers.

Reflecting the truth that any “next generation” is always years late and billions over budget, the US recently increased its F-15EX buy to 129 - and this is not simply politics for once. The aircraft’s design is proven and it has a performance and payload that commanders and pilots appreciate. The USAF’s EX is based on a Qatari export version – the QA – with various new features.

Taking this as an example of strong pedigree retaining interest, there is no reason why Eurofighter could not sell more.

The Gulf States have long been considered a defence export gold mine. Procurement is almost entirely political, budget almost irrelevant and the operational aspect will do what it is told. This is idiosyncratic but follows a wider diplomatic agenda.

Eurofighter came strongly off the blocks here with a 72-aircraft Saudi order, followed a while later by Kuwait, Qatar and Oman. However, things began to slow. In particular – barring a rather opaque sale of 15 early models to Austria – the European export market was quiet. Losing India was another blow.

Beyond repeat business from Saudi Arabia, Poland and Turkey are often mentioned in media articles as export openings. The two nations are both high-tier NATO members with capable forces and a determination to modernise their militaries. France, despite aggressive Rafale export efforts, does not appear to have made much progress (while its ability to fulfil existing orders on schedule is questionable). Saab has pitched Gripen to Warsaw and was negotiating with Ankara concerning the latter’s domestic combat aircraft efforts, but this appears to have produced no tangible results.

It is understandable why a European manufacturer could decide there is nothing worth pursuing here. Both Poland and Turkey are loyal US customers, although the latter relationship is a frayed one post F-35 eviction. Both also have relatively modern fighter fleets already. Looking ahead, Poland is an F-35 customer and Turkey a domestic developer in the form of the TAI Kaan. Viewed in this light there is little room at the inn. Despite this, they remain repeatedly regarded as the next potential Eurofighter win. Why?

Taking Poland first, it has nominally simpler defence procurement motives. Lacking a high-end domestic aerospace industry but facing a strong threat on its doorstep, it wants as much kit as it can afford. With a defence budget of 5% GDP, that is not a small investment fund. It is also dependent on a US-supplied main fighter force, though with its South Korean-origin F/A-50 light fighter/trainer there is a degree of diversity.

Nonetheless, Poland has been a beneficiary of US Foreign Military Funding where the procurement cost of equipment is essentially reduced by provision of a guaranteed loan. But this policy seems to be on the way out, reducing American industry’s cost advantages. Simultaneously, concerns over Trump’s military support for and in Europe are adjusting attitudes towards alternative products.

This is one reason why Eurofighter has been linked with Poland. The other is that, with an F-16 and future F-35 fleet, Poland’s combat air arm lacks a larger and more powerful fighter. Warsaw has an obvious need for something that can get high and fast very quickly, taking a heavy payload with it.

The role that US and Israeli F-15s played in mass drone and missile interceptions earlier this year, while not an exact mirror of Polish requirements, was an interesting illustration of what fast and heavy interceptors could do. In addition, a large payload at high speed has a certain appeal in an air-to-ground role. Given current politics, Poland is also likely to be offered competitive pricing, support and industrial involvement by Eurofighter’s European partners.

None of this is particularly strong evidence for a Polish procurement, but such considerations appear to lie behind the subject’s cyclical reappearance in opinion pieces. Warsaw does not necessarily “need” a twin-engine multi-role fighter, but probably its air force would like one.

Eurofighter undoubtedly considers this an opportunity worth chasing, putting it up against Boeing and to a lesser extent Dassault. The latter has literally no space left on its production line, so should Poland go down the heavier aircraft route while seeking closer European collaboration then there is only one option.

Turkey, on the other hand, is a more distant prosect. President Erdogan has long championed his growing domestic defence industry, and the TB2 drone as sold to Ukraine became a brief media star. Less reported has been the development of the Kaan medium fighter. This has a complex history with tangled involvement of various potential foreign partners and/or suppliers.

From the Eurofighter opportunity standpoint, Ankara had been particularly interested in its EJ200 engines. Eventually, and largely for intellectual property reasons, the General Electric F110 was selected instead. Given that this also powers the F-16, it offers efficiency of support, but is a relatively old design.

As with the Polish fighter fleet, Kaan is very much in the middle-weight class when it comes to performance and payload, bearing a resemblance to South Korea’s KF-21. But Seoul also has a strong F-15K fleet for the heavy lifting, something that Turkey lacks. A return to the F-35 programme, from which it was defenestrated, remains a remote possibility.

So, from all this, particularly the engine interest angle, Eurofighter is periodically suggested as Ankara’s next large defence import. It does tick its own collection of boxes, and while the Trump administration seems generally well-disposed towards the country, this could change in a matter of days. Europe needs its southern flank secure and certainly no rising tensions across the Aegean. A Eurofighter sale is in no way a solution to the above, but would certainly suit wider political objectives.

Such are the various arguments for and against a likely Eurofighter sale in these oft-cited market opportunities. A similar yes/no case could be made for other types of aircraft. Politics and industrial considerations will likely be the primary drivers towards or away from such a deal. At base, these markets are not so much Eurofighter’s to lose, but rather theirs to catch with some skilful timing, effective pitching and a healthy dose of luck.

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