Above: Pakistan appears firmly wedded to China as its main supplier of combat aircraft. (Photo: Pakistan Air Force)
As China, Russia, India and Pakistan realign, what could it mean for defence aerospace markets?
Most political alliances exist with a degree of tension. Even those forged in the white heat of existential threat tend to fray once life returns to the status quo ante. This is currently evident in Donald Trump’s policy of dismantling 80 years of general cooperation across NATO and its wider allies.
While much debate in the West has focused on the Atlantic issue and its knock-on effect for Australia, Japan or South Korea, other powerful forces are at work. It has long been anticipated that the populous nations to the south and east of the core G7 would become a force during the 21stcentury... Continues below
This analysis article originally appeared in September's Decisive Edge Air Warfare Newsletter.
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The “BRICS”, although far from homogenous and arguably an antagonistic and unstable grouping, have mighty collective power, including in the air domain. Traditionally, India and China have engaged in a cold war. Russia has acted as benefactor to the former while Beijing has seen Pakistan as a useful counterweight to Delhi.
Yet Russia and China have long considered themselves somewhat aligned against US hegemony, dislike Japan and have what might be considered “imperial” ambitions. Concurrently, Pakistan and Russia have no real beef with each other. Pakistan and Iran are generally cordial, with Russia traditionally being aligned with the latter.
All see trade and investment opportunity with the GCC nations across the Arabian Gulf and have tried to keep Israel at least on side. So where do we go from here?
Without becoming mired in the economics, China has significant capital invested – metaphorical and physical – in the development of Pakistan and this is something of a test case for further overseas work.
From an aerospace perspective, the recent scrap with India has cast the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in a favourable light. Whatever the realities of the engagement, no one is disputing that India lost aircraft, but Pakistan only possibly did (a Saab 340 AEW platform). Underlining this is the apparent Pakistani use of the Chinese J-10C by No 15 Squadron, the only such unit in its air force.
By any measure this is a tactical victory for Islamabad and an enormous prestige/strategic win for China. As details emerge – and these remain subject to doubt – it has also been claimed that Beijing assisted Pakistan with intelligence on Indian intentions and activity. It appears this axis remains strong and mutually beneficial.
The same cannot be said of Russia and India. What was once a firm defence partnership has unravelled. Conservative figures in the Indian Air Force have traditionally been Russophiles, but the failure of the AMCA/Su-57 fighter collaboration and selection of the Dassault Rafale have suggested a new direction.
Something of a sore point is also the focus on domestic programmes such as the Tejas light fighter (which never quite seems to succeed). With Russia politically isolated and lacking capacity to assist India, this relationship has become a dead end: one half of the four-party defence see-saw clearly outweighs the other.
This leads to interesting geopolitical developments. Years of “Western” courting of India – with the recent Rafale sale being the most obvious aerospace example – appear to a degree undone by the Trump administration.
Bets were hedged by US sales of F-16 Block 50s and delivery of Saab AEW aircraft to Pakistan but for various reasons China has become the de-facto Pakistani military supplier. Traditionally, this would preclude India working with China, but with Russia falling away defence relationships across the region have evolved.
China and India have staged high-profile meetings and applauded new détente (at least publicly). As noted above, Russia and China are not currently enemies and have certainly cooperated on defence technology. Indian intermediary activity between the two appears unlikely, but is not impossible.
Supplying dual-use technology such as space equipment would make a degree of sense even if combat aircraft would not. Pakistan is likely concerned, being the weakest of this potential quad. The JF-17 joint fighter programme with China would amount to small consolation.
Meanwhile, Western defence exporters are in a difficult position. France’s famously neutral (or quasi-anti-American) position should allow continued work with Indian industry. The same is arguably true of Saab on both sides of the India-Pakistan divide. But both Sweden and France have IP concerns and certainly worry about supply of any information to Russia or China.
US export policy, either directly or via tariff pressure, has lost a lot of sway. Meanwhile, Turkey and South Korea are snapping at the West’s heels with modern equipment and a degree of independence, albeit still limited by the ITAR export restrictions that come with using US components.
With the world in a state of flux not seen for decades, exactly how these relations might evolve remains unclear. In aerospace and defence, several reasonable predictions can be made.
Successful Pakistani use of the J-10 and JF-17 will undoubtedly keep its aviation attention focussed on China. The PRC’s J-35 fighter is an obvious next step, alongside UCAVs and possibly strategic purchases such as KJ-series AEW aircraft.
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Whether Pakistan can improve its independent industrial capabilities remains to be seen, but the short-term path is clear. For China, not only is this a partner and potential combat testing ground, but also for cultural reasons a useful gateway towards the nations of MENA.
Meanwhile, Russia is desperate for friends and investment. The inclusion of President Putin in the VJ-Day celebrations in Beijing was undoubtedly a relief for Moscow. China does not – at base – need Russian technological support but the latter retains considerable skills in some areas and like India is also a proving arena for new technology, especially air defence, standoff weapons and drones.
A Russo-Pakistani partnership at present seems unlikely, particularly with the currently positive but bizarre Karachi-Washington relationship (Nobel price nominations vs access to apparently unknown and hence unexplored mineral reserves). But Trump’s antagonistic approach to India was also unexpected.
From a defence perspective, therefore, this situation is complicated and unpredictable. India operates Russian and European aircraft, neither of which are likely to be considered by or available to an increasingly independent China. Reciprocally, Beijing would astonish everyone were it to bring Delhi aboard on anything security-related, although perhaps not on civil aerospace.
India seems disenchanted with Washington and hence US purchases, at least for now. Russia is a deadweight and cannot help Delhi, so Tejas, the Prachanda helicopter project or a new major fighter programme would have to be indigenous or require working with someone else such as Turkey or Korea.
The four nations under discussion have some interesting defence and security matters ahead of them. America is at best erratic. Europe would like to be involved but is disparate and preoccupied. New powers could be friends under certain conditions. Above all, there is no global commander-in-chief for whom they have much respect, although dull and daily relations must be maintained.
For the global aerospace and defence industry this is undiscovered country, with plenty of potential pitfalls. Bets on any of the above constellations working out have at best medium odds and the loss of say a J-10 to a Rafale would likely upend the India-Pakistani calculations of the previous day.
But this is arguably the next technical area and – for the open-minded – the current divided nature of global affairs makes for a host of intriguing possibilities.
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