This year has seen several new Chinese combat aircraft revealed, often in blurry social media images. But are Western analysts making incorrect assumptions about the details of this technology and the reasons why it was developed?

Just as China replaced the USSR as the West’s “pacing threat”, so Beijing’s defence developments have become a new area of fascination for industry analysts. As with their Soviet antecedents, the new Sino systems are a mixture of the familiar and the strange, fuelling complex theories but also offering a solid gauge against which to measure more familiar aircraft across NATO and its allies... Continues below

This analysis article originally appeared in August's Decisive Edge Air Warfare Newsletter.

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From a professional perspective in which useful output of analysis is key, studying grainy social media pictures, snippets of information or wider community debate is a core intelligence effort. This process aims to answer three key questions: “What are they doing?”, “Why are they doing it?” and “How does that help us [fulfil our goals]?”.

When yet another Chinese tailless fighter or vacuum-wrapped UCAV appears it provides clues to PRC engineers’ technical progress, how they view the future of aerial warfare and what they think is required to win the next conflict.

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This becomes a useful measure of Western thinking and whether our theories about crewed fighters, low RCS, or naval aviation are correct or should be discarded. If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then the efforts of a “copycat” foe might be the truest (peacetime) test of one’s own design philosophy and capability.

2025 has undoubtedly been an eventful year for aviation-inclined China-watchers. The established J-20 heavy fighter platform flew with two seats, a mild but not entirely unexpected update to its perceived strategic offensive counter-air/UCAV management role.

Initial production J-35 naval fighters – which resemble a slightly uglier version of the US F-35 – now seem to be at pre-production or advanced testing stage. More recently, the venerable Su-27/33 airframe has appeared in a new guise as the naval J-15DT with apparent similarities to the land-based J-16. These are probably electronic warfare aircraft, and certain design changes (removed cannon, new systems, heavier undercarriage) offer strong hints at their purpose.

However, it is worth remembering that many years ago a lot of panic flowed from the Soviet MiG-25 revelation so any honest evaluation must retain some perspective. It is an error to attribute something to the other side just because it fits in with internal logic at one’s own briefings. The "other side of the hill", it should be remembered, is "other" both for vision and comprehension.

Common sense says that elements such as external pods and design changes to remove weight and strengthen support structures on an airframe are naval-oriented. But in strategic terms what does that actually tell us?

Aircraft carriers are a divisive topic in America and the limited number of allied operators. Are they useful assets or vulnerable behemoths destined to suffer an ignominious fate the day war breaks out?

The fact that China is producing new naval aircraft and developing its vessels and systems (EMALS catapult technology is a core element) indicates that, just because Western commentators might disagree on naval air power, this does not mean others do not get a vote.

The US military’s current confused approach to airborne early warning in the E-7 (USAF) versus E-2D (USN, but now possibly also USAF) debate, is not apparently reflected in China with its concurrent development of the KJ-2000 (air force) and KJ-600 (navy) AEW platforms.

Or is it? The US military-industrial complex helpfully and openly debates (many of) its issues and publishes (most of) its budgets, not something reciprocated in the PRC. Perhaps an internecine power struggle is occurring around the procurement departments of the different Chinese air arms. But what we do know – for now – is that both aircraft types are being built.

This is, in and of itself, of interest. Someone in Beijing is releasing money, and while keeping industry afloat has always been a driver of budgetary policy, it is unlikely to be the only one. Dictatorships tend not to wash their dirty linen in public, so whether the example cited above is shrewd policy, a hedging of bets or making the best of a poor decision is and will remain unclear.

The most significant aspect, however, of the “Great Chinese 2025 Aircraft Show” is the new – almost certainly crewed – combat aircraft designs that burst onto the scene in the first few months of the year.

In August a third tailless aircraft was spotted that was deemed not to be a derivative of the previously seen J-XDS/J-50 fighter-sized platform or larger J-36 tactical bomber. Initial government, industry and open-source evaluations of the earlier two types have been available for some time, but by comparison the latest item is hot off the press.

Initial assessment can be summarised as: apparently no vertical tail, possibly twin-engined, “W-tail”, potential for cockpit, likely internal weapons bay, no sign of airframe naval reinforcement. Meanwhile, debate continues as to whether this is part of a fly-off competition or something to supplement the earlier two types. Even more recently, new – what appear to be – UCAV designs have been seen in transport, heavily shrouded.

A high-performance Chinese UCAV or “loyal wingman” is also not exactly unexpected. So could one of these be its debut?

Questions remain. If these designs are intended for series production, some of the following points are likely true. First, under Chinese operational thinking, a low RCS is important, as are internal weapons, fired from larger – rather than small single-engine – designs.

Moving to confident speculation one might add that space for complex onboard systems is baked in, alongside power generation (provided by the engines) and heat dissipation aided by large flat fuselage areas. Low drag from a flat design will also improve efficiency and range.

Less important might be low-speed, high-angle-of-attack controllability (which usually demands additional vertical or horizontal aerofoils). This would suggest the designs seen so far are not intended for aircraft carrier operations. Or, maybe with innovative wingtip controls, China has found a way around this problem.

Analysis of opposing nations, intentions, commanders, capabilities and forces has a long and hallowed tradition. On the surface, it seems a sensible approach to determining what might be happening on the other side of the hill.

But it does carry with it the seeds of its own defeat. Even the most rigorous analysis can fall victim to unconscious arrogance. From the head of military intelligence to the person in the street, we tend to consider an opposing position on the terms of “What would I do?” And then: “What would I do if I were them?”

We tend to view the world through our own lenses and dismiss what seems illogical to us. So a better question might be: “But what – actually – could they do?” At the risk of rehashing tired tropes, this last is the question that the Anglo-French side failed to ask in June 1940, the Americans in December 1941 and the Germans in June 1944.

A recent open-source article argued that the Pentagon must increase F-35 orders and production, something that seems to fly in the face of US military opinion. It made multiple questionable claims, not least of which is that F-35 offers better readiness rates than “legacy” fighters, something that might raise a laugh among some USAF ground crews.

But the counterpoint made by others is that the F-35 is old news and its acquisition is detrimental to US combat air power because other nations have what appear to be newer designs with possibly better sensors, weapons, doctrine, training etc.

This may or may not be true, but it is a traditional fear that can run rampant and distort defence development and procurement. Importantly, it ascribes to the foe an omniscience that – bizarrely – the home side always lacks. Does China know what it is doing and have a cunning long-term plan?

It certainly is doing something, but whether that will be proven correct is another point. Why would Beijing’s generals and admirals not be worrying about what the US and allies are planning? They certainly are, but that does not appear on the front page of Western broadsheets.

Returning to the opening point, 2025 – and beyond – is a fertile pasture for debate on what China’s aerospace-technological, political, command, planning, industry and operational elements see as their future. And a crucial question is: why this might be so.

Are Chinese efforts wholly driven by external or internal considerations, by debates and compromises, by concerns over what they cannot do, what their foes might? Nobody can deny that China has flown updated versions of old and new airframes, developed even newer aircraft and has some unusual shapes flitting around. But the question must still be asked as to why, and crucially, why do they think that this is important.

Amid disagreement in the West over priorities and the relative merits of different platforms, the fact that an opponent has developed systems that mirror – or appear designed to counter – domestic efforts should be a strong basis for calm and honest reflection.

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