Pakistan has claimed that five Indian fighters were lost, including three Rafales, although wreckage from only two aircraft has been sighted so far. (Photo: IAF)
Air power lessons from the India-Pakistan clash - what we know so far
Fortunately for those at home and abroad, the brief shooting war between India and Pakistan seems for now to have abated. Political aspects aside, one thing that was not expected was that tens of modern fighters would clash in the air over the Jammu and Kashmir border area.
Various reports have suggested 100 or more jets were involved, although perhaps not concurrently. Based on still emerging evidence, the Indian effort was largely a stand-off strike against Pakistani targets with the former’s fighters remaining largely over “home” territory... Continues below
This analysis article originally appeared in May's Decisive Edge Air Warfare Newsletter.
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While information available after such a short period should always be treated with caution, the Indian Air Force (IAF) likely used a mixture of the domestic air-launched BrahMos together with French SCALP cruise missiles. Other weapons such as guided glide bombs – the French Hammer series is an obvious candidate – may also have been employed.
Pakistan claimed to have shot down five Indian fighters: one MiG-29, one Su-30 and three Dassault Rafales. A key aspect of this is the range at which both sides engaged. No Indian aircraft appear to have crossed – or at least not by very far – the Line of Control.
The wreckage of what appears to be a single Rafale and a MiG-29 were both discovered within territory controlled by India. At the time of writing the IAF, while being quiet about aircraft losses, claimed that all pilots were safe, although this does not preclude that some were injured.
On a historical scale, overclaiming in aerial combat is normally 2:1 to 3:1, with the number of aircraft engaged usually a major contributing factor. In a one-on-one fight, the outcome claimed is likely valid, while 40 versus 70 is ripe for a higher claim to loss ratio. But the two aircraft wreckage pictures seen on social media versus the five claimed by Pakistan puts this squarely in line with past averages.
With so many aircraft involved and apparently all combat occurring beyond visual range, this engagement is interesting from the electronic warfare (EW) perspective. While EW is often depicted as a black art of stealth, jamming and counter-jamming, in truth the subject covers a wide range, and this article seeks to provide analysis of the broader electronic and data role that evening.
India has released images of recovered JL-15 missiles, likely confirming their use by Pakistan. (Photo: Government of India)
Both India and Pakistan have released several briefings for journalists, and these will be used as the basis for the discussion.
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First up is the command and control (C2) aspect, from top level down to individual sections of aircraft. Both sides had many platforms airborne for what seems to have been around an hour. That presents a huge task regarding deconfliction and management of differing types, engagement priorities and weapons, plus coordination of ground HQs and airborne early warning (AEW) assets (and even possibly tankers). Added to this mix are ground-based air defences on both sides, an element of multi-axis combat that has an unfortunate record for fratricide.
Much of this C2 relies on secure voice and data links, both between aircrew but also when automatically handing off and prioritising targets, which in real-time is aided by the advanced missiles used such as the Chinese PL-15s fired by Pakistan (wreckage of one was found, suggesting this is an accurate statement).
These have a two-way data link so the missile can use the launch aircraft’s radar data and the aircraft absorb what the missile is seeing. This can be shared with neighbouring fighters and hence the battle coordinated. The aerial picture would evolve rapidly and could quickly overwhelm less skilled or experienced crews. It also adds to the likelihood of foes “slipping past” and engaging under more favourable circumstances. The complexity of such a scenario should not be underestimated and essentially forms the electronic backbone of modern warfare.
Part of this is the critical role played by automatic electronic identification systems. These are vital for each side to maintain an accurate picture of the wider chess match and would be best managed by an AEW crew (which Pakistan, at least, seems to have had aloft). Data links on such aircraft can aid deconfliction and optimisation of friendly airborne assets, as well as help ground defences successfully engage priority targets such as incoming air-to-ground missiles.
On the defensive side, both participants will undoubtedly have activated core modern EW systems in the form of onboard pods. These “jammers” - although the latest-generation examples are more complicated than the term suggests - help confuse enemy radars by either creating white noise or offering spoof targets.
No matter how advanced the PL-15, or MBDA Meteors India might have used, radar-guided missiles can be fooled and as range increases from the launcher and its own radar assistance diminishes, so the jamming effectiveness of the target grows. This is not an inverse square rule, but the general effect is not dissimilar.
Finally, there is active EW. This is possibly less key as it is an advanced capability and might not have been available on any or all of both sides’ aircraft. In essence this is trying to attack enemy radars, data links and communications so that they are degraded in the same way a computer virus affects a targeted PC.
This could involve disrupting them at source or what might be thought of as “hacking” to gain information. The Pakistani Air Force briefing on the action included radio traffic from Indian pilots recorded in real time, which if accurate is bad news for New Delhi, although as several have commented perhaps it was unwise for Pakistan to reveal this.
This conflict will be of high interest both for the two sides’ own post-action lessons but also for the many third parties facing modern air threats. Though general media might have focussed on how many aircraft of what type were lost, an arguably more important question is why they were lost and what we can learn from this.
The operation, as far as known, was not ground-breakingly complicated or subtle. The aircraft and weapons are in service with other nations, so it is interesting – especially for their manufacturers – to see if lessons can be derived on how they succeeded or failed. But with a professional focus on radar capabilities, comms, jamming, spoofing and how to tie this all together, the electronic portion is arguably the most interesting aspect.
As indicated earlier, combatants in all wars tend to form impressions that after later research prove to be inaccurate. The claimed Indian losses are a good example. Although Pakistan has suggested that radar data indicates five aircraft disappeared from its screens and QED were destroyed, the reality is clearly more complicated.
But information that becomes available on details such as the range at which aircraft or weapons were detected is priceless. Did missile radars and data links provide accurate and useful pictures, or did EW systems on the other side successfully fool these? What was the ratio of missiles fired for Pakistan’s five claims and under what circumstances versus recommended launch parameters? How did ground versus air weapon deconfliction unfold? Did Pakistan obtain real-time data or voice information? Did India manage something similar?
These details will likely not be known for some time and possibly never released to the public. But undoubtedly militaries across the globe are hoovering up any available information, determining its validity and feeding it into simulators and war-gaming software.
This might result in, for example, changes to F-35 Block 4 upgrade priorities, or alterations to Dassault’s planned Rafale F5 model. Certainly, China’s Chengdu, responsible for the J-10 fighters, and CAMA, maker of the PL-15 missile, will be ecstatic. Since nothing sells like success, this will be an undoubted fillip for export efforts.
Less so for Dassault, though it is unlikely to impact its current extensive contracts. Russia is probably grinding its teeth that “friend” China has helped kick in the guts its already poor weapons reputation.
A cliched phrase is that combat is about the pilot, not the aircraft, and this is frequently true. The complexity of modern platforms has meant that training and expertise arguably has a better return on investment than at any previous time.
The J-10 which seemed to make such a clean sweep over Kashmir is inherently something of an older airframe design. So, if the lesson drawn is that it was the software behind the radars, data link effectiveness or the frequencies on which the EW systems operated that were key (and that is not unlikely), then the new axiom would be closer to pilot > systems/weapons > aircraft. Or possibly even systems/weapons > pilot > aircraft.
Whatever the truth of claims and counterclaims, this has been the first genuine mass aerial engagement for some time. The degree of complication was high. The two sides and their systems were modern but not the classic “East versus West” scenario. Intelligence departments will be hard at work to sort the information wheat from the chaff. Militaries will be paying great attention to what did or did not work. Aircraft manufacturers will be trying to determine if any design flaws were demonstrated.
But ultimately systems, weapons and software suppliers will be taking this very seriously as their R&D-to-product cycle is extremely rapid. The market for next-generation electronic kit probably just became larger and more frenetic.
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