Much has been written about the use of air power by both sides in the ongoing conflict, and it has influenced policy and procurement around the world. But are the lessons from the front line universally applicable, or should other nations be planning for very different scenarios?

It’s fair to say that this month’s audacious remote first-person view (FPV) drone strike on four Russian airfields was totally unexpected. The targeting of bombers that had been a key part of standoff actions against Ukrainian cities was surprising in just about every regard... Continues below

This analysis article originally appeared in June's Decisive Edge Air Warfare Newsletter.

Newsletter Sponsors:

The long-term planning to load heavy trucks with UAVs and position these thousands of kilometres inside Russia, astonished everyone. The intelligence work to ensure the targets were there would have been a major achievement. And the mission required multi-mode control systems, involving relatively un-jammable fibre-optic cable, radio and some autonomy so that the probability of a hit was maximised.

No one saw this coming; not enemies, not friends, nor the wider defence reporting sector. Comparisons can be drawn with Israel’s 1967 strikes on the Egyptian Air Force, astonishing everyone and leaving behind the same pillars of smoke where Tupolev bombers once stood.

While the Ukrainian operation was handled with great ingenuity and professionalism, there is a caveat. An earlier draft of this article, written before the raid, concluded that, while FPV drones were extremely useful and had their place, too much should not be made of their capabilities. They lack range, payload or sophisticated control systems beyond line of sight. Furthermore, they are vulnerable to anyone with a machine gun and some warning.

But their low manufacturing footprint (and hence low opportunity cost or cost of failure or loss), minimal support requirements, limited operator training requirement, relatively small radar cross-section and low visibility, plus their effect against soft-skin targets does offer strong utility in a “poor man’s” war.

This operation will undoubtedly be confused in some quarters – including the general media – with the use of larger uncrewed combat aerial vehicles and the reciprocal case against piloted aircraft. But the two are very different.

What cannot be taken away from Ukraine’s forces, addressing one of the key points made in this article’s previous iteration, is how they creatively addressed range and control issues. Hitting strategic assets at low cost is usually the role of special forces sneaking in and setting off explosives. By using trucks to get most of the way there, Ukraine neatly merged the modern and classic.

GA-ASI—Leading the CCA Revolution: GA-ASI is revolutionizing airpower with its YFQ-42A collaborative combat aircraft, which enhances situational awareness so that warfighters see first and act first. See it now.

However, this is unlikely to be an action that is easily repeatable. Russian forces in their current state are not renowned for high operational security or professionalism but even they are capable of learning quickly. For this to occur a second time would amount to incompetence of an astounding degree.

The Ukraine conflict has ebbed and flowed, with the current front covering a large contested area. The last 12 months’ relatively static lines have placed an emphasis on rapid bracketing of targets. This means precision hits where possible, but otherwise cost-effective infliction of damage. Armoured vehicles or bunkers are often “degraded” rather than “obliterated”, and this is often sufficient.

The iconic example here is the deployment of small drones, mostly commercial-off-the-shelf products, carrying a small payload of 5-10kg and dependent upon operator (semi-) direct control. These feature in numerous videos, lofting small bombs through the roof hatches of enemy tanks. A major caveat is that they need to operate close in, in the sub-100m range.

Nevertheless, there are reasons to be wary of a “David and Goliath” story of FPV drones against Russian targets across the line of battle. The first is confirmatory bias. Many video-makers – and indeed drone operators – may not have been military personnel pre-war. And the reasons for releasing these videos are mostly of a celebratory nature.

It therefore seems likely that these “documented engagements” by small drones are leading to their utility being overestimated, owing to the fact that uneventful or unsuccessful missions are not uploaded. There is also some base dishonesty at play, such as the use of footage from computer games.

Claims should be treated with caution and of the 40-odd Russian aircraft reportedly attacked in this last strike, the final tally is likely to finish up at around 15-20 destroyed or seriously damaged, if historical averages and statistics are any guide.

Apart from limited range and payload, the second major shortcoming with small drones is the fragility of the platform. The link to the controller can often be affected or severed by electronic means, while most kinds of lighter turret or defensive system can hit them. To this scenario can be added geolocation of the command post and its engagement by opposing drones or other hostile fire.

Russia has certainly developed similar platforms, even if their reported operations are less frequent. That the airfield strike was so successful depended upon many elements, but this essential aspect of defence and reaction has not disappeared.

FPVs are far from the only platform in town. Turning to medium-sized (MALE) UAS, Ukraine has few, but Russia does possess examples of the MQ-9 Reaper-lookalike Orion. The US design is – notably – not used by Ukraine but might represent an obvious next step.

Kyiv had previously made wide use of the Turkish Bayraktar TB2, which won plaudits for its simplicity and capability, but its role has notably diminished over the last 12 months. It and similar designs appear to have had a mixed record as they lack the ability to penetrate air defences with a reasonable degree of survivability, although in less-contested areas their ISR capability, coupled with a modest weapon load, is still useful.

Schiebel - Leading the unmanned evolution

That they are more expensive, larger, require greater support and hence more are difficult to hide than the small drones used in the airfield attacks should be noted. But they are also more capable.

MALE operational casualties are not a uniquely Ukrainian or Russian problem. US forces flying missions against Yemen have allegedly lost around 15 or even 20 of the far more capable MQ-9.

The two environments are not identical, but the Houthi use of ex-Soviet SA-2s, -6s, and 11s indicates their “slant range” (engagement radius and altitude) are not trifling. Added to that are some domestic designs and re-purposed air-to-air missiles.

Compared to Russian air defences this array is less capable, but it is covering approaches to a smaller landmass with fewer potential avenues of entry. This might be the best lesson concerning medium-sized UAS in the face of active air defence - don’t be predictable.

One lesson that will probably not be carried over into others’ planning is the somewhat bizarre arming of Russia’s 1950s-vintage piston-engine training aircraft as “drone destroyers”. The Yak-52, fitted with an EO/IR turret for spotting and targeting, also enjoys the outstanding fire of a shotgun (mounted under the left wing) with which to destroy any “soft” targets.

It is unclear how this might help, being too unwieldy to engage small drones and too slow for MALEs (should they appear). While US aircraft have appeared with modified air-to-air versions of BAE Systems’ APKWS rocket for the same role, both forces would likely admit it is not an optimal way to destroy smaller and cheaper opposition.

The final class of uncrewed aircraft worth consideration is the long-range attack UAV, best exemplified by the Iranian Shahed series and its imitations. This is a useful asset in the current war, combining performance, range, speed, difficulty to intercept in numbers and a significant explosive payload.

It is no one’s idea of a sophisticated weapon, but requires relatively limited resources to manufacture, store and launch. This is important compared to cruise or short-range ballistic missiles, although the latter have a better ability to penetrate defences. Certainly, all three weapon systems are causing considerable problems for Ukrainian defenders.

Perhaps the key takeaway is the importance of depth and cost of interception. Even basic missiles in Western stocks are valued at $100,000 or more. Coupled with this are limited armouries.

In both air and ground defence efforts, most NATO militaries (except the US) face the possibility of a missile gap within weeks if not days. More precise C2 would reduce Ukraine’s wastage rates, but over the last the five years a generally limited depth of actual ordnance has been procured.

This problem has been common to virtually all conflicts, even those of 1967 or 1991 that appeared so one-sided. Often the forces involved found themselves quickly short of weapons, fuel, lubricants and spares. Trusted equipment broke down or failed in ways not previously seen. This is not just true of air defence, but rather of all arms.

Military operations tend to be hampered by extremely conservative allocations of the elements that make them tick. If Ukraine exemplifies the modern state of warfare in general and air defence in particular, then a significant leap forward is regarding the quantity of weapons, ammunition and effective ways of employing these. Russia’s seemingly unlimited supply of armed drones and basic missiles is unfortunately driving home this point daily.

The current conflict then, does have many potential lessons for the wider world, from the US and NATO through MENA into the tension points in Asia. Uncrewed vehicles of various sizes have proven their worth across a range of missions, but this needs to remain in context and the takeaways processed with care.

The cheaper the drone, the more limited its mission set and the higher its vulnerability to a professional military with sophisticated C2, modern sensors, low-light vision, layered air defence, and planning that takes the threat into account. While the absence of hardened aircraft shelters made Ukraine’s June strike far easier, it was an exhaustively planned operation that would be difficult to replicate.

For peer conflicts, then, the better lessons are that there will be a wave of uncrewed aircraft, from small through large, overlapped at each level with missiles of varying capability. Drones have been successful in Ukraine largely because both sides are equipped and trained relatively poorly. This should not be seen as dismissive, it is simply a fact.

But better armed NATO militaries, with their less exhaustible supplies and higher value placed on smaller numbers of troops and equipment, need to be aware that they also may need to absorb a continuous low-level threat. Iraq and Afghanistan brought about the low-cost but highly effective improvised explosive device, widespread use of the mis-named RPG and unexpected light mortar strikes.

None of these were likely to defeat capable formations, but philosophically and practically they are in some ways the precursors of the smaller and affordable UAS now seen over Ukraine. Just as in previous conflicts there was a realisation that better armour, remote weapon stations and sensors for each vehicle were needed, alongside the expectation that anyone could be attacked at any time.

The Ukraine conflict is an ongoing test case on how UAVs can be used and opposed. But it would be a mistake to claim that these weapons have fundamentally changed the battlefield.

Don't want to miss out on future Decisive Edge content? Make sure you are signed up to our email newsletters.